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ABSTRACT 
National legislation requires America’s homeland security agencies to disrupt 
transnational human smuggling organizations capable of transporting terrorist travelers to 
all U.S. borders. Federal agencies have responded with programs targeting extreme-
distance human smuggling networks that transport higher-risk immigrants known as 
special interest aliens (SIAs) from some 35 “countries of interest” in the Middle East, 
North Africa, and Asia where terrorist organizations operate. Yet ineffectiveness and 
episodic targeting are indicated, in part by continued migration from those countries to 
the U.S. southwestern border since 9/11. Should an attack linked to SIA smuggling 
networks occur, homeland security leaders likely will be required to improve counter-SIA 
interdiction or may choose to do so preemptively. This thesis asks how SIA smuggling 
networks function as systems and, based on this analysis, if their most vulnerable fail 
points can be identified for better intervention targeting. Using NVivo qualitative analysis 
software, the study examined 19 U.S. court prosecutions of SIA smugglers and other data 
to produce 20 overarching conclusions demonstrating how SIA smuggling functions. 
From these 20 conclusions, seven leverage points were extracted and identified for likely 
law enforcement intervention success. Fifteen disruption strategies, tailored to the seven 
leverage points, are recommended. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Because of the 9/11 attacks, national legislation required America’s homeland 
security agencies to dismantle transnational human smuggling organizations capable of 
transporting terrorist travelers to U.S. borders. Federal agencies responded with programs 
targeting extreme-distance human smuggling networks that transport higher risk 
immigrants known as special interest aliens (SIAs) to the country’s land borders. SIAs 
are identified based on their citizenship in some 35 countries in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Asia where terrorist organizations operate. SIA smuggling networks are 
substantially different than other human smuggling networks because they span 
continents and oceans, as well as dozens of nations’ borders over many months.  
Some American enforcement efforts to dismantle SIA networks since 9/11 have 
occurred in countries along established smuggling passages through South America, 
Central America, and Mexico. Numerous indicators, however, suggest ineffectiveness of 
effort; for instance, SIAs have consistently reached the U.S. southwestern border since 
9/11. This tenacity occurs in a relative void of academic literature; no systematic studies 
to date address this form of extreme-distance human smuggling—the only kind 
considered a terrorism-related homeland security threat. This thesis stands as a resource 
for homeland security policy leaders in the event of an attack by an SIA who illegally 
crossed the U.S. land border, or to mitigate perceived threats prior to any tragedy. But the 
results of this study also should be generalizable to smuggling of any migrant type that 
might replace SIAs as the threat of the day. 
This thesis asks how SIA smuggling networks function as systems working in 
complex, diverse geopolitical environments, so that their most vulnerable leverage points 
can be identified for better intervention targeting. Using NVivo qualitative analysis 
software, the study examined unstructured archival data from the total discoverable body 
of U.S. federal court prosecutions of SIA smugglers between September 2001 and 
September 2015. The number of cases reached 19. To enhance validity and contextual 
accuracy, the investigation pursued a triangulation method using a separate volume of 
non-court narrative data, such as the public testimony of U.S. security leaders, official 
 xvi 
government reports, and credible media information. The data was entered into NVivo 
and coded into common themes, which emerged during reading and analysis processes.  
Further analysis of the resulting themes and patterns produced more than 20 major 
conclusions about SIA smuggling, to include their internal architectures, routing choices 
displayed in maps, and most critical enabling factors. For instance, the thesis provides 
key common traits of SIA smuggling operators: their motivations, nationalities, 
leadership styles, and specializations. It identifies critical “enabling factors,” without 
which the studied SIA smuggling networks likely could not have operated, including 
specific institutional conditions in the six most frequently used Latin American transit 
and staging countries. The most common operational security and evasion methods used 
by SIA smugglers are detailed, along with the most common law enforcement tactics that 
were employed to defeat them abroad. 
From the revealed behavioral traits and operational eccentricities of SIA 
smuggling, the thesis next extracts and identifies seven major leverage points that 
American targeting and intervention likely will yield the greatest disruptive impacts. 
Among the identified leverage points, for instance, were the reliance of SIA smugglers 
and their clients on fraud vulnerabilities in the U.S. political asylum system, their 
acquisition of crucial travel permissions from the Middle East consulate offices of Latin 
American countries, and the catch-rest-and-release policies of certain transit countries.  
Understanding these leverage points in their proper contexts may inform future, 
more effective policy and disruption efforts. Fifteen strategies are recommended to 
pressure specific leverage points; these fall into two general tiers: significant new 
investment in covert intelligence collection operations, and conventional law enforcement 
investigations, both enabled by redoubled diplomatic and foreign aid initiatives targeting 
at least six countries. Lastly, the data was sufficient to paint a rare picture of the conflict 
between smugglers and law enforcement abroad. The data revealed common smuggler 
evasion and operational security methods, as well as American law enforcement tactics 
abroad that worked—a rarely revealed homeland security activity. An understanding of 
this dynamic cat-and-mouse game in foreign spaces, along with the overview of network 
xvii 
architecture and key characteristics of smugglers, provide important insight for American 
leaders for when they decide to chart better strategies.  
Additionally, this thesis aspires to fill a conspicuous void in migration studies and 
theory. It argues that ultra-distance people smuggling should be added to the pantheon of 
migration studies as a unique form deserving of further study, particularly because 
SIA traffic is regarded as a homeland security problem justifying significant public 
investments. 
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On June 24, 2008, Somalia natives Abdullahi Omar Fidse and Deka Abdalla 
Sheikh walked across the pedestrian bridge from Reynosa, Mexico to the Hidalgo, Texas 
Port of Entry and requested political asylum from an American immigration officer. 
Their journey had been far longer and more arduous than any of the Mexican nationals 
with whom they walked that final leg.1 For $4,000 each, an Ethiopian “gang” had 
smuggled Fidse and Sheikh from Africa all the way to the Texas-Mexico border on 
counterfeit passports and Mexican visas.2 The pair told authorities they had only met 
during the trek to Texas, but had fled Somalia and needed American sanctuary for the 
same reason: the terrorist group al-Shabaab killed their family members. The story 
worked for Sheikh; she was quickly awarded asylum and took up permanent residence in 
Fitchburg, Wisconsin, on a path to American citizenship. While still in Texas detention, 
however, Fidse confided to two fellow Somalis—who turned out to be paid FBI 
informants—that he actually came to conduct an unspecified “operation” for al-Shabaab.3  
Fidse went on as the informants secretly recorded him. He said he once was 
involved in an abortive plot to attack the U.S. ambassador in Kenya, drawing out the 
assassination plans and describing how mines would have been used to “blow up” the 
U.S. Marines in the protective detail. Fidse said he adored al-Qaeda leader Osama bin 
Laden. He confided that he had gotten military training at a camp run by an Afghanistan 
war veteran and had extensive knowledge of heavy weapons, including shoulder-fired 
rockets, machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles, and explosives.4 In other conversations, 
Fidse indicated he had procured a $100,000 battlewagon for al-Shabaab that 
unfortunately was blown up, killing all aboard, in a 2006 battle with Ethiopian forces at 
                                                 
1 United States v. Abdullahi Omar Fidse and Debkah Abdallah Sheikh, 5th Cir. Ct. (W.D. Tex., 2011), Detention 
Order, Document 26; Unsealed Indictment, Document 3. 
2 United States v. Fidse and Sheikh, Narrative from Immigration and Naturalization Service, Document 11, 
Exhibit 1, Narrative from Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
3 United States v. Fidse and Sheikh, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Due Process Violation, Document 58. 
4 United States v. Fidse and Sheikh, Document 26; Document 214 (filed February 13, 2015). 
2 
Idaale, Somalia.5 Fidse said he cried when a U.S. airstrike killed al-Shabaab leader Aden 
Hashi Ayrow, and that ‘the infidels must suffer the consequences.”6 Investigators found a 
phone number in Fidse’s cell phone memory card belonging to a well-known al-Shabaab 
terrorist later implicated in a 2010 Uganda soccer stadium bombing that killed more than 
70 spectators.7 Fidse’s sworn asylum story fell apart and unraveled Sheikh’s too. The FBI 
learned the pair had been married for years, rather than recently introduced travel 
acquaintances. In 2012, Sheikh and Fidse pleaded guilty to asylum fraud and obstructing 
a terrorism investigation.8 
Their case and others like it underscore a consequential sense of American 
insecurity spawned by the 9/11 attacks: that overseas terrorists could infiltrate a porous 
border and attack at any time. This thesis seeks to understand the kind of extreme-
distance human smuggling organizations that can bring terrorist travelers and illegal 
entrants like Fidse to American land borders, the only human smuggling network type 
deemed a U.S. terrorism-related national security threat. Nineteen U.S. prosecutions from 
September 2001 through September 2015, deconstructed for this thesis, demonstrate that 
such networks remain capable of transporting migrants to U.S. land borders from 
countries that violent Islamists call home. Specifically, this thesis asked: What are 
the systemic design and key vulnerabilities in the human smuggling networks that 
transport such immigrants to American borders, over extremely long distances, from 
nations where terrorist organizations are present in the Middle East, South and Central 
Asia, and North Africa? A central aim is to establish how these clandestine enterprises 
persist despite public investments to dismantle them since 9/11 and if potential leverage 
points for law enforcement intervention can be identified to help reduce the risk—before 
or after—a border-crossing terrorist strikes.  
5 United States v. Fidse and Sheikh, Document 26; United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
Judgement, No. 13-50734, Docket No. 5:11-CR-425-FB-1, Document 214, Filed February 13, 2015. 
6 Ibid. 
7 United States Court of Appeals for the Fift Circuit Judgement, Document 214. 
8 Ibid.; Document 164, filed 12/10/12, Government’s Notification Regarding Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
 3 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as 
targeting their money. The United States should combine terrorist travel 
intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept 
terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators and constrain terrorist mobility. 
—9/11 Commission Report 
 
In the two decades before the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, American 
strategic thinking about border security focused almost entirely on the clandestine ebbs 
and flows of Mexican laborers and those living in the country illegally. In 2000, former 
President George W. Bush took office promising to accommodate the American 
economy’s labor demands with a temporary worker visa program. His program would 
have legally normalized millions of Mexican workers while simultaneously reducing 
their need to clandestinely cross the U.S. border. The newly seated president understood 
the problem from the perspective he acquired as governor of the border state of Texas. 
The president’s plan was such a priority that his first foreign trip, in February 2001, took 
him to Mexico to discuss reform with his enthusiastic counterpart, President Vicente 
Fox.9 Momentum toward a bilateral accord had advanced to such a degree by September 
5, 2001, that President Fox and his wife came to the White House for the American 
president’s first state dinner and further discussions. 
But, as the president would write in his post-office memoir, “then 9/11 hit.”10 
A mere six days after the Fox visit to the White House, everything changed. As 
President Bush later wrote: “My most serious concern was that terrorists would slip into 
our country undetected. I put the idea of a temporary worker program on hold and 
concentrated on border security.”11 The former president’s choice of the term “border 
security”—rather than the previously favored “immigration reform” —signaled the 
profound extent to which the outlook had pivoted from accommodating Spanish-speaking 
                                                 
9 “Travels of President George W. Bush,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed 
July 22, 2015, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/bush-george-w. 
10 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2011), 302. 
11 Ibid. 
 4 
laborers, to blocking illegal entries of those who spoke the languages of the Middle East, 
Central and South Asia, and North Africa. In the years since, advocates and opponents of 
more restrictive or lenient immigration policies have offered dueling narratives for the 
true motive behind the landmark shift. 
Those seeking to mobilize support for a softer enforcement posture have 
frequently lamented the ensuing association of immigration with national security, which 
provides a compelling rationale for more restrictive policies.12 But a variety of internal 
White House memoranda on file in the George W. Bush Library in Dallas,13 as well as 
consistent public statements by administration officials in the aftermath of 9/11, lend 
more credence to the narrative that terrorist infiltration, as a threat priority, did 
authentically supplant the leniency reforms Bush was earnestly preparing only the week 
before 9/11. Ryan Bounds, the president’s domestic policy advisor on immigration, 
framed the White House thinking that informed border policy from 9/11 to the end of 
Bush’s second term and beyond. In a 2009 memorandum to the President, titled 
“Immigration Reform Legacy,” he explained: 
The prospects for a deal with Mexico were upended by the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. Although both Presidents remained 
supportive…an agreement of the kind under discussion earlier in 2001 was 
much lower on the list of priorities and no longer viable in any event. 
Instead, the national focus with respect to immigration issues immediately 
shifted to tighter borders and more robust enforcement….The Bush 
administration is committed to ensuring that our immigration policies and 
practices do not allow terrorists to enter or remain in the United States.14 
                                                 
12 Christopher P. Rudolph, National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United 
States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006) 203. 
13 Textual materials retrieved for supervised examination included the files of the following members 
of the White House Domestic Policy Council: Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolton, Special Assistant to 
the President Ryan W. Bounds, Special Assistant to the President Todd Braunstein, Special Assistant to the 
President Jay Lefkowitz, and Special Assistant to the President Kristin Hughes. Other examined textual 
materials came from the Bush Record Policy Memo files of White House Staff Secretary Thomas von der 
Heydt. 
14 Ryan Bounds, “Information Memorandum for the President, Immigration Reform Legacy,” 
Memorandum to President, undated from 2009 file folder. Official records of George W. Bush’s presidency 
are housed at the George W. Bush Presidential Library and administered by the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA) under the provisions of the Presidential Records Act (PRA). 
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Counterterrorism and illegal immigration were thus fused as an undifferentiated 
strategic priority, with emphasis on terrorism prevention via immigration enforcement.  
Although the 9/11 attacks brought the issue home in emphatic fashion, the shift in 
emphasis on a terrorist infiltration threat actually began years earlier. Throughout the 
1990s, national border control policy was concerned mainly with more aggressively 
managing illegal Mexican migration and drug running. As one Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report points out, however, with the first World Trade Center bombing in 
1993, the sense first dawned that the borders might be vulnerable to undesired entries by 
a new kind of enemy, al Qaeda.15 The 1998 Africa embassy bombings, and prominent 
plots involving violent Islamist extremists who had crossed the northern border, deepened 
that awareness. The cases prompted government-appointed commissions to study 
vulnerabilities to terrorist infiltration.16 Among the thwarted plots was the highly 
publicized 1997 New York subway-bombing scheme, planned by two Palestinians who 
illegally crossed the Canadian border into Washington State.17 Then, in 1999, two al 
Qaeda operatives crossed into Washington State with plans to bomb Los Angeles 
International Airport.18 Even as more legislation and appropriations were dedicated to 
controlling Mexican migration and drug trafficking during the 1990s, several high-profile 
bipartisan government commissions published reports identifying land borders as 
vulnerable to terrorist infiltration.19  
                                                 
15 Chad C. Haddell, (2010). People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of Border Protection Policies (CRS 
Report No. R41237) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 4. 
16 Marc R. Rosenblum, Jermoe P. Bjelopera, and Kristin M. Finklea. Border Security: Understanding 
Threats at U.S. Borders (CRS Report No. R42969) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2013), 2. 
17 “Motive Sought in New York Subway Bomb Plot,” CNN, August 2, 1997, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9708/02/brooklyn.bomb.pm/index.html?_s=PM:US. 
18 Edward Alden, The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration and Security Since 
9/11, 1st ed. (New York: Harper-Collins, 2008), 40. 
19 The official names and creation dates of the Commissions are as follows: (1) Gilmore Commission, 
known officially as The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, created on October 17, 1998 (P.L. 105–241); (2) Bremer Commission, 
known officially as The National Commission on Terrorism, created on October 21, 1998 (P.L. 105–277); 
and (3) the Hart-Rudman Commission, known officially as The U.S. Commission on National Security / 
21st Century, created on September 2, 1999; Ibid.; Border Security: Immigration Enforcement between 
Ports of Entry  
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Still, it was only after the 9/11 attacks that polling showed the American public, 
more fearful than before, wanted immigration enforcement that protected the country 
from terrorist traveler infiltration by air, sea, and land border.20 Although the 19 hijackers 
of the 9/11 attacks had entered by visa and identity fraud—not through land borders—the 
hypothesis was that similarly probing follow-on attackers would find those gaps. 
Numerous post-9/11 government commission reports drove the point home. Among them 
was the 2004 9/11 Commission staff report on Terrorist Travel, which cited intelligence 
linking Islamic terrorists to Latin American smuggling networks, and the 2001 California 
border crossing of a ranking Hezbollah operative later convicted of terrorism.21  
What emerged was a new paradigm merging counterterrorism and immigration 
strategy, its onus more on stopping migrants from countries where Islamic terrorists 
operate than on Mexican migrants. Alden and many other specialists acknowledged it 
was the attacks that left policymakers believing that: “the obvious solution to the threat of 
terrorists crossing U.S. borders was simply to beef up enforcement through tougher 
scrutiny of border crossers; greater inspection of vehicles; and the use of Border Patrol 
agents, physical barriers, and sensing devices to safeguard the barren regions between the 
official border crossings.”22 Andreas also acknowledges that, in a relatively short time, 
the attacks changed border control “from a low-intensity, low-maintenance, and 
politically marginal activity to a high-intensity, high-maintenance campaign commanding 
enormous political attention on both sides of the territorial divide.”23 
The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 was the first in a series of new laws 
and national strategic plans that cemented the foundations of the new border security 
counterterrorism regime. A common denominator of the legislation and planning was a 
                                                 
20 Joseph Carroll, “American Public Opinion About Immigration,” Gallup, July 25 2005,  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14785/immigration.aspx; Lydia Saad, “Americans More Pro-Immigration 
Than in the Past,” Gallup, July 11, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/163457/americans-pro-immigration-
past.aspx. 
21 Thomas Eldridge, Walter Hempel Ginsburg, Jancie Kephart, Janice L., and Kelly Moore. 9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
2004). 
22 Alden, The Closing of the American Border, 36–37.  
23 Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2012, Kindle Edition), 58–60.  
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priority insistence on preventing terrorist infiltration and travel, as assisted by 
transnational smugglers, over land borders.24 The 2002 HSA described this objective as 
“preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons” by threat actors described as 
“transnational terrorists, transnational criminals and unauthorized migrants.”25 The new 
legal mandate spawned strategy documents among federal agencies. The Central 
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) National Strategy to Combat Terrorism described one of its 
top goals as “denying terrorists entry to the United States” by disrupting their travel 
“internationally and across and within our borders,” and undermining the “illicit 
networks” and “in-house forgery operations” providing false identification documents 
that facilitate the travel.26  
Beyond engaging the CIA, the laws merging counterterrorism with immigration 
control also tellingly placed primary enforcement responsibility on Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Border Patrol. The first of several Border 
Patrol strategic plans in 2005, for instance, marked that agency’s new priority mission as: 
“establishing substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they 
attempt to enter illegally between ports of entry.”27 Other new laws followed. The Secure 
Fence Act of 2006 states that its purpose is “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the 
U.S., including entries by terrorists.”28 As a result, spending on border patrol agents more 
than tripled by 2014, and the number of field agents doubled to 21,000.29  
For the first time, countries where al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations 
operated were put on lists, their emigrants singled out as higher risk and for extra scrutiny 
                                                 
24 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, Title IV, Subtitle A, Sec. 401 (2001). 
25 Ibid. 
26 The White House, National Strategy for Preventing Terrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/. 
27 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, National Border Patrol Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2005), Executive Summary, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dhs/ 
national_bp_strategy.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
28Secure Fence Act of 2006, H.R. Rep. No. 6061, Sec. 2(b) (2002), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr6061enr/pdf/BILLS-109hr6061enr.pdf. 
29 “Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year: 1990–2014,” U.S. Border Patrol, accessed 
July 22, 2015, http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Budget%20History%201990-
2014_0.pdf. 
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based on citizenship in those countries. Within months of the 9/11 attacks, for instance, a 
2002 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) alien registration program 
foreshadowed which high-risk nationalities were to be singled out. These targeted 
individuals consisted of “certain non-immigrant aliens presenting an elevated national 
security threat” from 112 identified countries that included Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. 
For that early program, anyone from these countries had to be registered, fingerprinted, 
photographed, interviewed, and tracked.30 After counterterrorism was grafted onto legacy 
anti-drug and immigration control missions, domestic law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies zeroed in on this minority of migrant travelers from the high-risk countries.31 
1. Defending Forward 
The melding of counterterrorism and immigration enforcement may have called 
for a stepped-up domestic interior strategy, a home game, targeting non-citizens from the 
“sending” countries of the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa, deemed of higher risk. 
But a new “away” game strategy emerged on foreign soil at the same time. This foreign 
strategy reflected the dramatic reordering of all previously understood spatial boundaries 
of immigration control. Rollins has described the new strategy as a “transnational 
approach.”32 It deployed domestic law enforcement agencies, the intelligence services 
and military assets on a mission of border security and immigration control far from the 
fixed physical lines of home. The transnational approach to border security sought to 
interdict and confront terrorists long before they could reach homeland borders, whether 
through law enforcement investigations, military adventures, or outright spying. Borders 
were reframed as a last line of defense rather than as the first.  
This move to defend forward on border security was not merely a theoretical 
whim; it was the law. In addition to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 already 
                                                 
30 “U.S. Attorney General Announces Registration Requirements for Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens,” 
U.S. Department of Justice, November 6, 2002; “Second Phase of National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System Announced,” U.S. Department of Justice, November 22, 2002, http://www.justice.gov/ 
archive/opa/pr/2002/November/02_ag_649.htm. 
31 Haddell, People Crossing Borders, 10–12. 
32 John Rollins, “Ten Years After the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11: The Need for a Transnational 
Approach to Address Risks to Global Security Interests,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, no. 2 (September 
2011). 
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discussed, the hallmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
mandated “a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and 
constrain terrorist mobility domestically and internationally.”33 The act created a Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center to collect intelligence on human smuggling and 
“clandestine terrorist travel,” far from American borders.34 The game had been moved. 
Immigration scholars have provided identifying terminology for the new forward 
defense framework: “geographically focused,” “borders-in, borders-out,” “border 
thickening,” or “fortress versus complex organism model.”35 The war on terror and 9/11 
were duly credited. Ingram and Dodds, for instance, blame the West’s war on terror for a 
new “geopolitical order—a “spatial reordering” where traditional state boundaries were 
cast across foreign spaces to hunt “undesirables.”36 New anxieties about sleeper terrorist 
immigrants and asylum seekers inspired “securitization” of immigrants coming from 
countries such as Afghanistan, and Iraq, and neighboring countries such as Pakistan.37 
Muller points out that western industrialized nations wanted their land borders to protect 
against the usual illicit contraband, but they also were now seen as a defense line against 
unwanted immigrants from terror-sponsoring countries.38 Muller laments that the 9/11 
attacks caused Europe and the United States to implement a new era of the “thickened 
border” and the “proliferation of borders” to conduct enforcement, risk management, and 
preemptive assessments against certain undesired migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers 
who he said may not deserve the suspicion.39  
                                                 
33 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108–458, Sec. 7201, b1, 
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/hstcenter/. 
34 Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, Establishment of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking 
Center: A Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/49600.pdf. 
35 Ibid.; Haddell, People Crossing Borders, 12. 
36 Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds, Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on 
Terror (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 8–9. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Benjamin J. Muller, Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 14. 
39 Ibid. 
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The U.S. combined counterterrorism-immigration management strategy occurs in 
a distant ecosystem where state authority actors and undesired clandestine commerce 
swirl and interact. SIA smuggling networks qualify as the “dark networks” described by 
counterinsurgency scholar Sean Everton.40 These are clandestine enterprises that 
profitably move outlawed contraband and unwanted people as part of a vast underground 
economy, invisibility their greatest competitive advantage. In this kind of business, 
handshake bargains are struck for journeys, false documents and ill-gotten visas in 
Middle Eastern casabas, Kenyan refugee camps, and outside foreign embassy gates. The 
journeying itself occurs, both seen and unseen, in the unpoliced jungles of Colombia and 
Panama, in speedboats off the Pacific coast of Guatemala, at the ungoverned borderlands 
of developing African nations, and in the bus depots of Bolivia and Peru. The smugglers 
and their clients are state prey. Inside Guatemala, prior to 9/11, U.S. law enforcement 
targeted mainly sex trafficking networks moving women and children through the 
country.41 After 9/11, however, U.S. assets in the region switched to target smugglers of 
people from Islamic countries.42 The smugglers are well aware that American law 
enforcement and intelligence personnel are there to detect and arrest, which in turn drives 
evasion and adaptation. While a standard nomenclature remains elusive for these spaces, 
Hyndman and Mountz describe them one apt way as “non-sovereign, non-contiguous 
territories…where the legal status of persons being detained and processed remains 
unclear.”43 This description evokes the notion of these spaces as amorphous, dark, and 
clandestine areas of conflict between elusive migrants and state actors in hot pursuit. 
2. Special Interest Aliens and the Ultra-Marathoners of Smuggling 
A new lexicon emerged for high-risk immigrants—these migrants now fell into a 
category called “Other than Mexicans” (OTMs). As early as 2004, coinciding with new 
                                                 
40 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xxv. 
41 Todd Bensman, “Breaching America: The Latin Connection.” San Antonio Express-News, May 21, 
2007. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jennifer Hyndman and Allison Mountz, “Refuge or Refusal, the Geography of Exclusion,” in 
Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence, ed. Derek Gregory and Allen Pred (New York: 
Taylor and Francis, 2007). 
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legislation, homeland security policy leaders began targeting an even smaller subset of 
OTMs. This group’s profile had a unique face, unusual name, and dark meaning among a 
few homeland security insiders. They were called “Special Interest Aliens.”44 
The Special Interest Alien (SIA) term, and others of similar meaning, was affixed 
only to migrants and asylum seekers on the basis of citizenship in some 35–40 “countries 
of interest” in the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa identified as harboring Islamist 
terror groups.45 Fidse and Sheikh were SIAs from one of the listed countries, Somalia. 
SIAs were to be treated very differently, regardless of whether they were authentic 
asylum seekers, war refugees, or economic opportunists deserving of American 
welcomes and legal due processes. Their different status and treatment was to ensure they 
were not violent Islamist extremists planning harm after their U.S. arrivals. The rationale 
was that if common immigrants could reach a land border from terrorist source countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, then so too could 
terrorist travelers from the same countries. The idea to brand SIAs as a unique national 
security concern would be an essential, though often covert and therefore publicly 
unsung, part of a broader border-security tapestry. The offensive strategy seemed to at 
least partly satisfy new legislation requirements to suppress terrorist travel abroad while 
defensively deploying fencing and more patrols at the home borders. 
The formal SIA interdiction priority is traceable to a November 2004 
memorandum from U.S. Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar to all field agents. Its 
dissemination coincided with the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
                                                 
44 Blas Nuñez-Neto, Alison Siskin, and Stephen Viña, Border Security: Apprehensions of “Other than 
Mexican” Aliens (CRS Report No. RL33097) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005) 
19, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf.  
45 Over time, different homeland security agencies referred to such migrants as “Aliens from Special 
Interest Countries,” or “Third Country Nationals,” and the number of countries on lists has sometimes 
fluctuated as some were added or removed. For purposes of consistency, this thesis will use the term 
Special Interest Aliens. A memorandum released by U.S. Border Patrol Chief Patrol Agent David V. 
Aguilar in November 2004 listed the following 35 countries and the territories of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip have been designated as Special Interest Countries: Afghanistan, Kuwait, Somalia, Algeria, 
Lebanon, Sudan, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Djibouti, Mauritania, Thailand, 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Eritrea, North Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Oman, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, 
United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Philippines, Uzbekistan, Jordan, Qatar, Yemen, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, 
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Act.46 The memorandum listed the 35 countries of interest at that time and instructed 
border agents to take eight listed actions when immigrant citizens from any of the 
countries were apprehended (see Figure 1). The first step required that a “Significant 
Incident Report” be filed to the CBP Situation Room within one hour of any SIA 
apprehension. Afterward, all SIAs over the age of 14 would be put through outlined 
national security database checks. Their pocket contents would be seized for analysis. 
Most would be made subject to interviews by intelligence agencies and FBI agents. 
Figure 1.  Countries of Special Interest in Middle East, Africa, and Asia 
 
The 35 countries identified in a November 1, 2004 memorandum by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection Chief David Aguilar to all field agents.47 
From the immigrants themselves, U.S. national security leaders soon learned 
much about the ethno-national human smuggling enterprises that enabled their long treks. 
These networks were rare among people-moving enterprises because they were able to 
                                                 
46David Aguilar, “Arrests of Aliens from Special Interest Countries,” DHS Memorandum by U.S. 




span oceans and continents, and dozens of countries, moving human cargo over many 
months or even years. They were the ultra-marathoners of people smuggling. 
To bridge such vast geographies, with their diversity of customs, border 
inspection, and visa requirement regimens, the SIA ultra-marathoner networks had to be 
more sophisticated, innovative, and elusive than any drug-smuggling network. As some 
American military and intelligence agencies were deployed forward to counter SIA 
smuggling, law enforcement agencies went with them. More investigators were sent 
farther abroad than ever before to find SIA immigrants and the terrorists among them.48 
So while policymakers were very publicly beefing up U.S. land borders, often amid 
controversy in the public square about Mexicans, domestic law enforcement agencies 
were put to work in foreign lands, less ostentatiously hunting the newly named SIAs and 
those who transported them.  
To pave the way, the U.S. State Department aggressively expanded the number of 
cooperative counterterrorism agreements and attaché offices to some 75 countries,49  
particularly throughout Latin America, where many of SIA smuggling routes ran. The 
CIA and National Security Agency (NSA), too, began trolling for terrorist travel 
information in an unfamiliar border security mission, using their own tools. They did so 
using signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human agents, often with 
unevaluated, classified, and publicly unknown practices.50 Among the domestic law 
enforcement agencies sent to participate was the FBI, which tasked its legal attachés to 
help track SIA movements and collect intelligence on their smugglers, and also to 
interrogate the ones who made it through the border.51  
                                                 
48 Nuñez-Neto, Siskin, and Viña, Border Security. 
49 Penny Star, “Napolitano: DHS Is Working with Mexico on ‘Special Interest Aliens’ Threat along the 
U.S.-Mexico Border.” CNS News, January 17, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/. 
50 Richard A. Best, Jr., Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Intelligence Community (CRS 
Report No. 7-5700) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010). 
51 Todd Bensman, “Breaching America.”  
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The primary agency assigned to SIA-interdiction duty was the ICE Office of 
Investigations, later renamed Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).52 ICE described 
the mission involving 240 agents in some 48 foreign attaché offices53 as an effort to 
“aggressively pursue, disrupt and dismantle foreign-based criminal travel networks – 
particularly those involved in the movement of aliens from countries of national 
concern.”54 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano offered 
a rare public acknowledgment of the effort in 2012 when she said, “There’s a whole 
category called SIAs—special interest aliens is what it stands for. We watch that very 
carefully. We have been working—not just with Mexico, but countries of Central 
America, in terms of following more closely people transiting the airports and the like. 
And so, again, our efforts there are to try to ... take as much pressure off the physical land 
border as we can.”55 
3. The Problem: A Tenacity of Geographical Black Holes 
As it happens, however, the indications are that the transnational effort to 
suppress SIA smuggling has been less than effective—a circumstance that coincides with 
an absence of scholarly research or systematic study of them. Government audits and 
reports in recent years question if the counter-network strategy is working. One 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment, for instance, questioned if ICE 
had spent too little time on its new counterterrorism alien smuggling investigations—only 
                                                 
52 Government Accountability Office, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in 
Place to Inform Security Status and Resource Needs (GAO-13-25) (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2012). 
53 Written testimony of ICE Homeland Security Investigations, National Intellectual Property Rights 
Coordination Center Director Lev Kubiak for a Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security hearing titled “Strengthening Trade Enforcement to Protect American Enterprise and 
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54 Testimony of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations 
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about 17 percent—than on traditional drug trafficking.56 CRS analyst Richard Best noted 
in a 2010 assessment that, because much of the border security operations involving the 
intelligence services is classified, “there is no way to account for the … contribution.”57 
Pointing out neglect of the SIA issue, a 2012 GAO investigation of the Border Patrol’s 
work toward national security goals found slow progress in deterring SIA immigration.58 
It concluded that border patrol headquarters had not considered SIA smuggling to be its 
problem, despite a requirement in its own 2004 strategic plan. The GAO report also noted 
that hundreds of SIAs had reached the border and that, while these had been caught, the 
greatest percentage were more than 20 miles inland,59 indicating that more were slipping 
undetected into the interior. 
Another consideration is that numerous experts on the global crime economy 
write persuasively that U.S. efforts abroad have failed to adapt the old cat-and-mouse 
game to new realities of international criminality. The argument is that American strategy 
has lagged behind the international black market economy, which has boomed alongside 
the legitimate economy due to an explosion of trade agreements and technological 
advancements in communication, transportation and finance. Smuggling organizations in 
particular have quickly grown to unprecedented dimensions, energized and made more 
elusory by vast increases in cross-border flows of people and freight.60 Moises sums up 
the concept by noting the United States has become virtually hapless in countering 
clandestine industries because they operate in “geopolitical black holes where they live 
                                                 
56 Richard M. Stana, Alien Smuggling DHS could Better Address Alien Smuggling along the Southwest 
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59 Ibid. 
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and thrive…pushing our world in new directions that so far have eluded our capacity to 
comprehend, let alone arrest.”61 
Perhaps a more potent indication that enforcement strategy lags the trend is that 
SIAs have reached the U.S. southwestern border in steady annual numbers since the start 
of the post-9/11 transnational deployments of American law enforcement.62 The true 
degree of successful SIA interdictions, or of their successful undetected entries, may not 
be knowable due in part to classification restrictions, if the information can be tracked at 
all. But government data reflecting SIA apprehensions, episodically obtained by media 
outlets, show they consistently reached the southwestern border each year since 9/11, 
with unknown numbers undoubtedly slipping through undetected.  
For example, one set of SIA apprehension data reflecting September 2001 through 
2007 showed that nearly 6,000 SIAs from 40 countries had reached the southwest 
border.63 Other SIA apprehension data made public since 2007 suggest the traffic has 
continued at a regular pace.64 A 2009 GAO audit of border patrol highway checkpoints 
25 miles inland from the Rio Grande found more than 530 SIAs logged in 2008 alone, 
including three “identified as linked to terrorism.”65 A confidential Texas Department of 
Public Safety intelligence report leaked in 2015, citing U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) data, asserted that the more than 740 encounters with SIAs in Texas 
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reflected a 15 percent increase over the same period of 2014, among them migrants from 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, and Turkey.66 
Little research addresses the dynamics and internal workings of all kinds of 
transnational human smuggling, let alone the extreme-distance enterprises that specialize 
in transporting SIAs. In 2011, for instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) released a survey of available literature on global human smuggling 
and “irregular migration.” The survey said it was problematic that so little research had 
been done to understand such a consequential phenomenon.67 Among the literature 
survey’s findings of scholarly neglect, for instance, was that research had suffered from 
unreliable data, unbalanced geographical coverage, use of theoretical frameworks not 
globally applicable, disparities in the quality and quantity of information about how 
networks are organized, and perspectives over-representing destination countries at the 
expense of transit or origination countries.68 The survey did not mention any research 
about the potential for long-distance smuggling of violent Islamist terrorist travelers or 
“country of interest” migrants. No other research could be independently located 
addressing organized migrant travel from such countries to U.S. land borders, or ultra-
distance organizations generally. Numerous other human smuggling researchers in recent 
years found the same shortcomings for their own projects. Nils Gilman, Jesse 
Goldhammer, and Steve Webber, in examining Fujian Province China–U.S. smuggling, 
found other sophisticated, globe-spanning smuggling enterprises had “little rigorous 
scrutiny because the activities are illegal and confound techniques of inquiry traditionally 
employed by journalists or academics.”69 
As a priority, the long-distance terrorist infiltration threat showed no sign of 
retrenchment; national legislation requires it be addressed. The latest effort as of 2015 
was the Southern Borders and Approaches campaign, described by DHS Secretary Jeh 
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Johnson in familiar terms: “As we work to increase border security…we must continue to 
look beyond our borders. We are actively engaging our international partners to identify 
and interdict threats at the earliest possible point, before they reach our borders. We can’t 
sit along our land and maritime borders and play ‘goal-line defense.’”70 
B. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE: FILLING VOIDS IN STRATEGY AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
Based on the study of 19 U.S. criminal prosecutions of SIA smuggling networks 
after 9/11, this thesis intends to stand as a resource for homeland security policy leaders 
either before or after it is needed or wanted—for instance, in the event of an attack by an 
SIA immigrant who illegally crossed the U.S. land border. Understanding how SIA 
smuggling works and its most vulnerable points can guide law enforcement, intelligence 
services, and policy leaders to develop more efficient and effective counter-network 
strategies. The results of this study also should be generalizable to smuggling of any 
migrant group that may replace SIAs as the threat of the day. 
In addition, this thesis aspires to fill a gap in migration studies. The examined 
literature on migration, illicit economies, and the geopolitics of migrant flows across 
borders omit reference to this irregular migration form, even though it holds unique status 
as a priority U.S. national security concern. 
Geopolitics can be defined as the study of power rivalries over territories.71With 
the idea of a power rivalry in mind, clandestine human smuggling networks capable of 
moving Islamist terrorists to the U.S. land borders can be said to persist and thrive by 
exploiting or evading geopolitical factors unique to foreign national landscapes and 
territories through which they operate. The American transnational enforcement approach 
implemented after 9/11 to counter these smuggling networks would be more effective by 
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accounting for how they behave as successfully resilient systems with unseen leverage 
points in the context of geopolitical environments. 
This thesis does not assess or judge the perceived degree of terrorist infiltration 
threat from either border. It does not attempt to evaluate if or how any empirical 
circumstance drove political and spending imperatives on either border after 9/11. Rather, 
this research rests on less disputable rationales: that SIA smuggling networks provide the 
capability for terrorist travelers to reach the southwestern border, and legislation requires 
U.S. agencies to tend the phenomenon as a terrorism threat.72 SIA smuggling networks 
give empirical life to the terrorist infiltration threat because, without them, solo 
circumnavigations across unfamiliar alien nations, territories, language barriers, borders, 
and cultures become less tenable, even for the most wily and hardened terrorist. 
Neither does this thesis attempt to address, beyond the aspect of asylum claims as 
a part of SIA smuggling, strategies, public investments, effectiveness, nor non-SIA 
immigration issues along the actual physical U.S. border from Texas to California. Much 
has already been written and debated about the issues related to physical border security, 
including short-range human smuggling of Mexican nationals and contraband and the 
American response to those many associated issues. 
As an important side note, this study focused on the southwestern border because, 
to date, it has attracted far more spending and human resource allocations than the 
northern border. The selection of the southwestern border for resource allocation and as a 
subject for this thesis, however, was in line with perceptions—often empirically 
supported—that Canadian geography and immigration security protocols enacted with 
the United States after 9/11 have vastly reduced the number of higher-risk migrants able 
to reach Canada–and its U.S. border.73 Fifteen of the 19 post-9/11 U.S. prosecutions 
examined in this thesis involved smuggling to the U.S. southwestern border. Only one 
case involved Canadian smugglers whose model involved breaching the northern border. 
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Three other cases involved smugglers who flew clients directly into American cities—
albeit after first smuggling them into Latin America and over other borders. 
 21 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
When it comes to academic theory, it could be said that the topic of human 
smuggling remains a neglected area. Most research in this field consists of 
single case studies: few cross-comparisons are made vis-à-vis types of 
smuggling or on a country-to-country basis, and there is a fundamental 
lack of hard evidence to substantiate most aspects of the smuggling 
process. 
—Ilse van Liempt74  
 
Much as U.S.-bound SIA migrants transit diverse geographies, this thesis crosses 
a range of theoretical disciplines, including aspects of migration theory, complexity 
science, systems theory, social network theory, and geopolitical theory. To discover how 
SIA smuggling works in these contexts, an emergent body of scholarship and thinking 
also was consulted centering on how globalization has rapidly changed the dynamics 
between black markets, deviant entrepreneurs, and those seeking their demise. One other 
context found to be pervasive in the literature involves vehemently opposing narratives 
over whether the “securitization” of migration in the name of national security is an 
appropriate national strategy. The review of literature begins by addressing this dispute, 
then discusses each of the theoretical frameworks that best apply to SIA smuggling. 
A. THE GREAT DIVIDE 
Opposing scholarly camps have subscribed to different narratives regarding the 
relative threat posed by the special class of migrants transported from Islamic countries to 
the southwestern border. One narrative, now holding sway among homeland security 
policy makers in the United States and Europe, assumes that a certain kind of human 
smuggling chain poses a higher national security threat than others as potential terrorist 
travel conduits. But there has been little consensus as to whether national security is an 
apt justification for this kind of immigration securitization. Many migration scholars find 
as problematic the idea that refugees and asylum-seeking migrants from Islamic countries 
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should be stigmatized and singled out as potential terrorists. Cresswell decries the post-
9/11 view of migrants from those countries “as a threat, a disorder in the system, a thing 
to control.” He writes: “Think of the role of the outsider in modern life, a constant source 
of anxiety with a whiff of ‘elsewhere’ about her. The drifter, the shiftless, the refugee and 
the asylum seeker have been inscribed with immoral intent. These have all been 
portrayed as figures of mobile threat in need of straightening out and discipline.”75 
According to Aas, the end state of affairs when nations stigmatize faceless 
outsiders as potential security threats is a demonization of innocents, denied mercy and 
basic human rights.76 In the name of 9/11 protections, nations portray desperate refugees 
from the Middle East as “risky mobiliites” moving clandestinely along transnational, 
extraterritorial networks “like a hidden fifth column.”77 Aas asserts that the sole point of 
this new discursive terrorism threat framing is to stop undesirable non-terrorists from 
claiming asylum.78 She and others say the dehumanizing processes involved in 
securitizing migrant mobility undermine Western moral values, which emphasize humane 
welcomes and safe harbor. Coleman points to a whole “new generation of scholarship” 
arising from post-9/11 immigration enforcement. This genre of scholarship, he writes, 
views the framework as a paradigm shift by “privileged state spaces of global capitalism” 
from management of territories along defined physical borders to a “more spatial 
management of populations” far away.79 The intended result is to cast these “mostly non-
white” populations as “objects of state security practice” to legally deprive them of the 
opportunity to reach safer borders.80 
Other migration specialists argue, alternatively, that such critical narratives 
conspicuously ignore the reality that some asylum-seeking migrants are far from 
benevolent. A national government’s fundamental obligation is to assert territorial 
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sovereignty, in part by screening out undesirable visitors while allowing desired ones in. 
Christopher Rudolph, for instance, argues that conventional wisdom dictates national 
security and migration control should continue to be linked in light of a new kind of 
threat, from al Qaeda.81 He argues that the nature of global terrorism, where foreign 
attackers constantly seek to exploit U.S. immigration policy loopholes, makes separating 
external from internal security dimensions difficult.82 Where critics of merging 
immigration and national security see a demonization of the unknown faceless migrant, 
Rudolph sees the same invisibility as a threat accompanied by an empirical history. 
Migration, he points out, is one of the primary means by which “sleeper cells” have 
sought to proliferate, justifying rational states’ responses with new ideas to protect. 
“What is threatening about the clandestine entry of alien terrorists and the presence of 
sleeper cells in the homeland is essentially their invisibility,” Rudolph writes. “They are a 
specter lurking in the shadows. Thus, security would seem to require policies that 
increase visibility rather than decrease it so that entry of potentially dangerous individuals 
can be prevented.”83 
B. TRAVERSING A SPAN OF THEORY 
The literature regarding all varieties of international human smuggling is scant, 
unevenly rigorous, and does not address SIAs smuggled into the United States. A small 
number of academic works do address the perceived threat SIAs pose, however none 
examine how SIAs, as a unique national security category, are able to journey from 
distant troubled regions, or if U.S. counter-network measures contemplate disruption 
clues in how they operate in foreign spaces. For instance, Nathan Whitfield published a 
thesis in 2012 titled “Traveling the Terrorist Highway,” which claims SIA entry over the 
U.S. border represented a significant terrorism threat because the public investments in 
the defensive bulwarks along the physical borders left them still too porous.84 But 
Whitfield’s work, along with several others that that recognize SIAs as a threat, focuses 
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on conventional law enforcement strategies to shore up the physical land border, mostly 
inside the United States, and not how smuggling networks outside move them there.85 
More promisingly, other works have addressed the characteristics of illicit contraband 
smuggling in ways that could be generally transferable to a study of SIA smuggling in the 
context of systems, geopolitics, and international relations. 
C. SIA SMUGGLING NETWORKS AS SOCIAL NETWORK “SYSTEMS” 
Meadows writes that a system is set of things—people, cells, molecules—
interconnected in ways that produce their own patterns of behavior over time.86 Systems, 
she writes, “may be buffeted, constricted, triggered, or driven by outside forces.” In the 
context of human smuggling, systems thinking helps observers visualize a system’s parts 
and their interactions with one another and with external elements to predict possible 
future behaviors. While the science of prediction is still developing, this concept is 
important for homeland security leaders to understand because, as Meadows and Write 
state, “systems can change, adapt, respond to events, seek goals, mend injuries, attend to 
their own survival in lifelike ways, even though they consist of nonliving things.”87 As 
systems receive feedback from interactions with new factors, they can self-organize and 
self-repair, or otherwise fail to survive. This ability to adapt to disruptions or changes as 
positive or negative feedback arrives makes them evolutionary.88 
The related field of complexity science has proven particularly helpful for 
researchers who have autopsied networks, both licit and illicit. These theory approaches 
generally share the idea that systems are the sum of identifiable “links” and “nodes” that 
interact with one another based on systemic rules. By monitoring these outcomes’ 
interactions, rule-based emergence is observed, and patterns and vulnerabilities can 
potentially be discerned. 
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Complexity science can inform how to break down large, complex, adaptive 
network systems into several smaller ones to identify the critical actors, artifacts, 
networks, and interactions.89 The networks need not be mechanical; they can also be 
social—that is, comprised of people. Social networks are systems comprising human 
relationships between individuals (known as objects, or nodes), and their various links, 
flows, and exchanges.90 These relationships may involve interpersonal feelings among 
people, information exchanges, or more tangible exchanges such as goods and money. By 
mapping such relationships, network analysis theoretically helps uncover informal 
organizational patterns, as sets of actors (nodes) and ties (links).91 Cragun and Cragun 
write that “social network theory has been used to examine how companies interact by 
characterizing the many informal connections that link executives together, as well as 
associations and connections between individual employees at different companies.”92 
The networks, they write, provide ways for companies to gather information, deter 
competition and even collude in setting prices or policies.93  
The same approaches also have been used to better understand and target illicit 
transnational networks. Some researchers have recently argued that social network 
analysis (SNA), a process of mapping the relationships between the links and nodes of 
human networks, has been tried out against terrorist organizations overseas. The 
literature, however, does not indicate if any one template is squarely applicable to human 
smuggling networks. Also, the science of applying SNA to criminal networks is relatively 
young, rife with definitional disagreements among practitioners who have attempted it, 
and requires a high degree of detailed information that is not often available.  
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For instance, Roberts and Everton, in “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 
advocate for using the SNA approach to target terrorist networks in kinetic (violent) and 
non-kinetic (soft power) ways.94 Roberts and Everton demonstrated their use of SNA—a 
rare effort—to identify the relationships between nodes of the defunct Noordin terror 
network in Indonesia and Malaysia. They based their study on a series of data-filled 
reports about the Noordin network by the International Crisis Group (ICG). They 
generated their “conceptually-driven, multi-relational, multi-layer, and multi-metric 
analysis” of “closeness,” “betweenness” and “centrality” relationships among the 
network’s many terror associates and supporters. The metrics they chose, for instance, 
included degree of friendship, kinship, internal communication, and affiliations with 
schools, businesses, locations, organizations and operational events.95 These were 
mathematically calculated to identify weak points amenable either for violent or non-
violent targeting, for instance, covert counter-messaging campaigns, insertion of 
informants into identified institutions, recruitment of key figures as informants, or killing 
or capturing leaders. The researchers claimed their social template can be replicated to 
analyze other terrorist networks to inform counterterrorism strategies. But they also noted 
problems in replicating the framework for other dark networks. For instance, they noted 
difficulty clearly defining and identifying appropriate relationship variables necessary to 
apply the template–especially within the scarcely known but important subgroups that 
make up larger networks. “Researchers who have tried to use social network analysis to 
disrupt dark networks too often focus on central players, missing out on links to sub-
groups and individuals whose roles may be crucial,” they write.96 
Similarly, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) researcher Rebekah Dietz used social 
network theory to analyze and identify key nodes and links to compare three 
generalizable types of illicit networks with one another, none of them human smuggling. 
After using social network analysis to deconstruct them, she compared case studies of a 
terrorist network, a proliferation network and narcotics network to determine how they 
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differed or overlapped in their typologies, motivations, structures, characteristics, sources 
and patterns of funding.97 Dietz said she wanted to use this systems approach to map 
relations between individuals, groups, and organizations, as a means to “prescribe courses 
of action that will potentially influence behavior.” But Dietz noted that network analysis 
“is not yet adequate to explain them,” that mapping tools are still being developed to 
explore covert networks, and that confusion in the literature reflects divergent views over 
how to define the nature and structure of individual networks to be deconstructed. 98 
Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun Chen likewise argue that social network analysis often 
can’t get past incomplete, incorrect and inconsistent data about these enterprises, nor does 
it take into account changing network dynamics and ambiguous boundaries.99  
Unique SNA models would have to be constructed per situation, which would 
seem to require an extraordinary volume of specific detail. Such detail, however, was not 
available in the court materials examined for this thesis. The available literature still 
suggests that systems theory can help policy makers generally understand that complex 
organizations, such as the human smuggling networks examined here, will react—
predictably and sometimes unpredictably—to internal and external pressures, and to 
circumstances that include law enforcement surveillance and disruption strategies. 
D. INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS AND GEOPOLITICS 
As mentioned, geopolitics is the study of power rivalries over territories.100 In 
terms of SIA smuggling, geopolitics helps contextualize the conflict in foreign places 
between individuals who seek to cross borders and states that seek to stop them.  
SIA migrant smugglers and the American agencies hoping to interdict them far 
from U.S. borders have to contend with how transit nations view their sovereignty and 
place in the world, which is an important aspect of geopolitical thinking. Dodds defines 
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this landscape as “geopolitical architecture”—the international rules and expectations 
among and within individual nations that emerged after World War II.101 Dodds lists two 
key influencing components that vary from nation to nation and change over time and 
space. These, he explains, are self-concepts of territorial sovereignty manifested by a 
nation’s border controls, and appreciation for international laws, treaties, and 
relationships with other countries. In short, Dodds writes, these are “the ways in which 
states and non-state organizations access, manage, and regulate the intersection of 
territories and flows, and in so doing establish borders between inside/outside, 
citizen/alien, and domestic/international.” 102  
The migrants paying smuggling fees, the networks that accept payment to move 
them, and the states that try to suppress and disrupt them all have to contend with one 
another within this architecture. Smuggling networks must adapt, thrive, or die depending 
on how each nation-state along their routes perceives territorial sovereignty. Border 
patrols offer an apt example. The United States, for instance, invests heavily in staffing 
and equipment along its borders; Brazil does not. This can shift and change with 
governments at any moment, altering all local dynamics.  
By the same token, any effort by American law enforcement and intelligence 
services to counter SIA networks must recognize how other governments regard them on 
their territories. If SIA smuggling networks are viewed as complex systems, reliable and 
consistent feedback loops are necessary to track movements at any given time or place. 
Monitoring and assessing such feedback would require dedicated intelligence collection 
and analysis operations of a sort to be discussed later. A nation unconcerned about SIA 
smuggling in its jurisdiction is less likely to commit. 
Another concept worth grasping is that landscapes where deviant enterprises 
operate have changed dramatically over the past decade. Illicit businesses, such as drug 
trafficking and human smuggling, have boomed to unprecedented heights since economic 
globalization took hold in the 1990s. Countering bigger, more resourced, and nimble 
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enterprises has become more difficult, requiring law enforcement to innovate. That 
requires intelligence, or in systems theory terms, real-time feedback loops. 
There are two general schools of thought concerning what this new landscape 
means to both cat and mouse. One view suggests that traditional, high-consequence, 
kinetic law enforcement strategies based on tips and leads to capture and imprison 
stimulates profits and criminal enterprises. The other holds that more nuanced, multi-
layered enforcement (more reliant on the involvement of intelligence services and 
diplomats) can at least manage transnational criminal activity downward. Gillman, 
Goldhammer, and Weber argue that reduced trade barriers and regulation, as well as 
integrated financial, transportation, and communications systems have made deviant 
entrepreneurs highly adaptive and more resistant to law enforcement pressure.103 “Punish, 
strike, and kill policies fail,” the authors write, “because they focus on the sins of actors, 
not the complex dynamics of the system in which the actors participate.”104 Naim argues 
that uninformed flailing at transnational smuggling causes prices, profits, and incentives 
to rise, further feeding demand for more enforcement in an endless cycle.  
“Surge pricing,” a strategy used by the U.S. taxi cab app Uber, illustrates Naim’s 
point. Uber’s business model quickly calculates prices to pair passengers with drivers 
using an algorithmic approach that sends prices up or down according to driver 
availability and passenger demand in any given area at any given time. When drivers go 
off line, prices go up, incentivizing more drivers to join the market and passengers to 
leave it.105 This model has disrupted the established industry with inconsistent and often 
lower fares for the same service. Likewise, Naim and others argue that when law 
enforcement removes smugglers and contraband, prices and profits rise and reward 
enterprise continuation. Andreas argues that chasing and arresting are doomed for much 
the same reasons.106 A critic of enhanced post 9/11 border security measures, Andreas 
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sees clear consequences of immigration enforcement driven by unthinking national 
security fear. “Professional smuggling services,” he explains, “have continued to boom 
during the past decade, [and] can be expected to grow as migrants become even more 
dependent on hiring a smuggler to successfully navigate the border crossing.”107 
An opposing line of thinking argues that harsh deterrence and interdiction 
strategies can at least reduce unwanted behaviors—even if undesirable international 
commerce cannot be eliminated entirely. Advocates of such “enforcement with 
consequences” strategies believe these can at least manage criminal problems. A 2014 
CRS report considered the impact of CBP’s “Enforcement with Consequences” 
strategy.108 Implemented at the southwestern border in 2005, this strategy aimed to 
reduce high rates of re-entries by apprehended Mexican immigrants that were occurring 
as a result of allowing them merely inconvenient “voluntary” returns to Mexico. The 
problem addressed was how to reduce high recidivism reentry rates. The study found the 
rates only fell significantly when CBP instituted progressively harsher legal 
consequences against most apprehended migrants in a certain region. Undocumented 
Mexican immigrants were hit with criminal prosecutions, “remote relocations” into 
distant areas of Mexico, and administrative reporting that could prevent a migrant from 
entering the country legally for five-year periods.109  
This view makes sense, especially when polities in democratic societies desire 
control of certain public health and safety threats, such as child sexual predation, 
residential burglary, or terrorist infiltration. How SIA smuggling fares in the context of 
these theoretical frameworks—whether the industry self-corrects and thrives under 
pressure or dissipates—merits significant attention in this thesis. How, for instance, 
would SIAs and their smugglers respond to harsh deterrent strategies not currently in 
place, compared to Mexican migrants closer to the border? 
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A number of border security researchers have argued for a U.S. strategy more 
sensitive to environmental complexities, targets its resources according to priority-based 
risk analysis, and forges foreign alliances. Rollins calls for a more significant U.S. 
commitment to a transnational approach that “entails understanding and addressing the 
interrelationship of global risks to a nation’s short- and long-term strategic interests.”110 
He argues the lack of “appreciation of the global complexities” and confused 
organizational responsibilities have led to “inefficiencies, actual and near tragedy, and 
continuing challenges in detecting, responding or recovering from a security-related 
issue.” He also believes a more informed American transnational effort will help leaders 
know how to apply funds and other resources in a more efficient and targeted manner. 
Sims notes that the U.S. government’s ability to protect its homeland depends 
“critically on the ability of foreign governments to stop terrorists traveling or resting in 
theirs.”111 The broad trends with which U.S. policy will have to cope are clear, she 
writes: accelerated mobility of people, information, and capital, as well as persisting 
conflict and war among states. U.S. security strategists and intelligence agencies will 
have to understand these trends, either strengthening other nations’ rule of law and 
democratic institutions or undermining them when necessary.112 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis asked if a deconstruction of ultra-distance smuggling networks, from 
publicly available data, would reveal how the networks generally are configured, operate 
and overcome obstacles in diverse geopolitical environments. If so, it sought to identify 
the key factors upon which their operations substantially depended, considering that some 
factors might represent leverage points where law enforcement could intervene. Using a 
quantitative analytical tool and process described in this chapter, this thesis presented 20 
common operational traits, characteristics and methods of SIA smuggling, from which 
seven likely law enforcement leverage points were identified where interdiction would 
produce significant results. 
To deconstruct SIA smuggling operations and help identify their law enforcement 
leverage points, this thesis used unstructured archival data from the total discoverable 
body of U.S. federal court prosecutions of SIA smugglers between September 2001 and 
September 2015—a total of 19 cases were examined. The research sought to enhance the 
court records’ validity and contextual accuracy through a triangulation method that relied 
on non-court narrative data, such as the public testimony of U.S. security leaders, official 
government reports, and media information.  
All the data used in this thesis was available in the public realm. As will be 
described in greater detail in the following sections, all of the data was imported into the 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software known as “NVivo.”113 The data 
was then analyzed in order to identify SIA smuggling organizations’ most commonly 
occurring themes, variables, and traits to determine generally how they operated based on 
a frequency of their occurrences in the data. The most commonly noted themes, variables, 
and traits were further organized by how critical they were to the organization’s 
continued operation. Criticality is defined in this thesis as the degree to which SIA 
smuggling seemed to depend on any given variable or set of variables. Lower criticality 
would be ascribed to easily replaceable variables, or those that did not occur frequently in 
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the data. The higher the criticality of a variable, the more indispensable it was regarded. 
Through this assessment process, SIA smuggling is generally explained, and seven key 
enabling factors were identified, listed and presented as potential law enforcement 
leverage points in the smuggling systems. 
This chapter first discusses the data sets collected for the thesis. It then lists the 
three procedures used to understand and analyze the data through the NVivo software. 
Lastly, this chapter discusses limitations of the data and the processes used. 
A. DATA COLLECTIONS 
1. U.S. Court Prosecution Records 
The UNODC review of the limited academic literature available about these 
networks lauded court prosecution records as the more reliably revelatory data. The 
literature survey also noted that, along with the benefits of court records, “research 
projects often require a combination of sources.”114 This research sought the largest 
possible sampling size of case studies on grounds that larger data pools can enhance the 
reliability of results and increase the chance they can be generalized to real-world 
scenarios. The chart in Table 1 breaks down the name of the smuggler, his or her 
nationality, and the associated case number for the 19 court cases examined in this thesis.  
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Table 1.   Court Cases Examined 
# SMUGGLER NATIONALITY CASE NUMBER 1 Ashraf Ahmed Abdallah* Egypt 1:101-cr-00465-RMU DCDCE 2 Merzhad Arbane* Iran 103-cr-20765 FLSD 3 Muhammad Hussein Assadi* Iran 1:2002-cr-00030 DCDCE 4 Samuel Lovelace Boateng Ghana 1:07-cr-00298-RMU DCDC 5 Salim Boughader-Musharraffile Lebanon 3:02-cr-03048-W SDC 6 Ahmad Muhammad Dhakane Somalia 5:10-cr-00194-XR TXDW 7 Samual Abrahaley Fessahazion Eritrea 4:09-cr-00498 TXDS 8 Rakhi Gauchan Nepal 3:14-cr-0068-DCG TXDW 9 Annita Devi Gerald Guayana 4:09-cr-00690 TXSD 10 Maher Wazzen Jarad* Iran 1:02-cr-00090-HHK DCDCE 11 Muhammad Qasum Lala Pakistan 2:04-cr-00287-RSL WASH DW 12 Nizar Kero Lorian Syria 4:05-cr-00332 TXDS 13 Zeayadali Malhamdary Iran 2:05-cr-00502-SMM AZD 14 Abtom Merhay Eritrea 1:12-cr-00076-RBW DCDCE 15 Rosa Umanzor-Lopez Guatemala 4:12-cr-00250 TXDW 16 Kaushik Jayantibhal Thakkar India 4:12-cr-00250-1 TXDS 17 Anthony Joseph Tacy United States 1:10-cr-00122-LMB VED 18 Irfan Ul-Haq Pakistan 1:11-cr-00056-JDB DCDCE 19 Neeran Zala* Jordan 1:04-cr-00401-RMC DCDCE 
The 19 court prosecutions used in this study were identified in two ways: via open source 
research and by informally acquiring pointers from practitioners, prosecutors, and 
investigators involved in SIA smuggling interdiction. Most of the court cases are 
viewable via publicly available online law libraries, such as the Public Access to 
Electronic Records (PACER) system, which began posting electronically after 2004. 
*Five pre-2004 cases obtained elsewhere are available upon request (see Supplemental).  
Most of the 19 U.S. federal court prosecutions of SIA smugglers, were retrieved 
piecemeal from the Public Access to Electronic Records (PACER) system.115 Five pre-
2004 cases that were not entirely available on PACER were acquired directly from U.S. 
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Attorney’s offices.116 All span the 14-year period from 2001 to 2015. They form a 
unique compilation, accounting for all known, discoverable U.S. prosecutions of 
SIA smuggling that occurred during this period. To qualify for collection, the 
case’s prosecution must have been adjudicated or mostly adjudicated to conviction 
and must have involved the irregular smuggling of migrants from a Middle Eastern 
country (8 cases), North Africa (5 cases), or South Asia (6 cases). Only one case, the 
one involving Guatemalan smuggler Umanzor-Lopez, had not been fully adjudicated as 
of this writing. The cases were selected in line with publicly available government 
descriptions of U.S. policy identifying SIAs and countries of interest. Most of the 
prosecutions were identified by informal consultation with homeland security 
practitioners directly involved in the cases and relevant government programs.117 
Searches of open-source realms over a period of five months reinforced the 
likelihood that few other SIA smuggling cases exist for collection, although this 
cannot be concluded with certainty.118 Collectively, the 19 court cases contain 
hundreds of pages of narrative hearing transcripts; agent complaint affidavits; 
indictments and superseding indictments; depositions; plea agreement proffers and 
factual resumes; government and defense attorney motions and counter-motions; 
witness testimony; and judicial rulings. 
Court records that contained mere procedural motions or which did not contain 
sufficient descriptive content were not included in analysis. Most other records from the 
cases, however, were systematically examined in the PACER system and downloaded if 
they had potential to shed light on a smuggling operation. A number of the court cases 
also involved underling co-conspirators of kingpin smugglers, which spawned cases in 
116 United States v. Ashraf Ahmed Abdallah, United States v. Mehrzad Arbane, United States v. 
Mohammad Assadi, United States v. Mehar Jarad, United States v. Nancy Zaia. The author acquired these 
cases in 2007 during research while working as a journalist. See Supplemental to request copies of case 
files used. 
117 Five of the 19 prosecutions were identified and collected in 2006–2007 while the author, working 
as a journalist reporting about Iraqi border crossers, consulted with federal prosecutors and ICE agents 
whose duties involved investigating SIA smuggling. Another eight were located by the author in 2015 
through open source research and in consultation with ICE agents and analysts.  
118 The search of other primary court case material involved an extensive search for references in 
books, academic literature, media accounts, and periodicals. 
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addition to the 19 selected here. These cases were not added to the original 19 to 
avoid promulgating the false impression that more smuggling enterprises were 
prosecuted than actually were. 
2. Triangulation and Validation
A cross-section of other unique primary and secondary source material provided 
crucial supplementation to validate results extracted from the court cases analysis. Media 
reporting documented various stories of SIA travel and routes that were never addressed 
in a court filing, but which buttressed trends discerned in the court filings. For instance, 
historical narratives reflecting the evolution of counterterrorism in immigration policy 
benefitted from archival White House domestic policy council texts retrieved and 
reviewed in March 2015 from the George W. Bush Presidential Library in Dallas, Texas 
(see Figure 2).119 All major public laws dealing with border security after 9/11 also were 
collected and examined for supporting contexts. 
119Textual materials retrieved for supervised examination included the files of the following members 
of the White House Domestic Policy Council: Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolton, Special Assistant to 
the President Ryan W. Bounds, Special Assistant to the President Todd Braunstein, Special Assistant to the 
President Jay Lefkowitz; and Special Assistant to the President Kristin Hughes. Other textual materials 
examined included the Bush Record Policy Memo files of White House Staff Secretary Thomas von der 
Heydt. 
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Figure 2.  Image of an Original White House Document Retrieved from the 
George W. Bush Presidential Library 
 
Documents like this were retrieved from the files of the White House Domestic Policy 
Council stored in the research wing of the George W. Bush Presidential Library. They 
were analyzed over two days in March 2015 to help establish an accurate historical 
context for how and why the 9/11 attacks caused a marked policy shift from one that 
accommodated Mexican migration to one that prevented terrorist border infiltration with 
negative consequences for Mexican migration. 
Other supplemental data sets supported facets of the study not addressed by the 
court cases. For example, to support an underlying assumption that American strategy 
could stand improvement, it was necessary to show the extent to which SIA traffic has 
continued to cross U.S. land borders. This was no easy task; government agencies 
involved in SIA enforcement activities restrict access to official information, perhaps to 
protect sensitive methods or for political reasons. As a matter of practice, DHS includes 
in annual public reports all data reflecting apprehensions of illegal Mexican and most 
non-Mexican immigrants, but omits any reference to those from countries of interest and 
has rebuffed efforts to obtain such information through the Freedom of Information 
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Act.120 Enough collectable SIA apprehension data, however, had become public over the 
years (through episodic leaks reproduced in the media)121 to determine that SIA flows 
toward the U.S. land border had continued with some consistency from 9/11 through 
mid-2015.122 SIA data was collected from a variety of disparate sources as one collection. 
Security officials’ public testimony before congressional committees, which 
articulated foreign efforts to interdict SIAs and disrupt their smugglers, was another 
important data source. A number of GAO, CRS, and other government reporting 
provided additional credible knowledge and context. 
B. PROCEDURE 
The procedures described in this section took place after data was collected from 
all of the various sources and stored in an organized fashion. 
(1) Step 1: Importation and Organization 
Records from the court cases, together with many of the described supplemental 
materials, were downloaded from their original sources, converted to PDF or Word 
document formats, and stored both on a hard drive and with a cloud-based storage 
service. Key passages from the four cases available only in hard copy format were 
transcribed into Word documents. The court materials were organized in electronic 
folders by the name of each primary defendant. Non-court materials were stored in 
folders titled by theme, such as “Public Testimony of Security Leaders” or “GAO 
Reporting.” Using an NVivo tool, the folders were then imported into NVivo’s internal 
database, in alphabetical order, where they could be analyzed, queried, manipulated, and 
referred to as needed. 
                                                 
120 Janice Kephart, “‘The Toughest Transparency Rules in the History of Government’? Saga of a 
FOIA Request,” Center for Immigration Studies, October 26, 2011, http://cis.org/kephart/saga-of-a-foia-
request. 
121 Mora, “474 Illegal Aliens from Terrorism Linked Countries Apprehended in 2013 Alone”; Reid 
Wilson, “Texas Officials Warn of Immigrants with Terrorist Ties Crossing the Texas Border,” Washington 
Post, February 26, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
122 “Judicial Watch Obtains New Border Patrol Apprehension Statistics,” Judicial Watch Press Room. 
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(2) Step 2: Building the Blocks 
After records from the court cases, together with supplemental materials, were 
imported to NVivo, a search began for key commonalities, or themes, to be compiled as 
“nodes.“ The researcher accomplished this by reading and identifying relevant material, 
guided by the research question. NVivo allows users to create and name main thematic 
“parent nodes” and “child nodes” as material in the internal database is read and 
delegated, or “coded” (see Figure 3 for an example). Decisions to create new nodes 
depended on how frequently information occurred, from a minimum of two occurrences. 
Initially, three main “parent” nodes were created—the Middle East, North Africa, and 
South Asia—because government policy identified those regions. If certain common 
characteristics were observed two or more times as the reading progressed, a themed 
“child node” would be created under the appropriate parent node. Additional text 
passages from the material were highlighted and coded to the appropriate established 
child node, building it for later reference and analysis. For instance, certain activities 
related to the smuggling services’ marketing and advertising were identified in the first 
several cases; a sub-node titled “Recruitment” was then created, and bits of related 
qualifying information were coded to it. The addition of material from more than two 
sources meant the node would be retained; nodes that did not were set aside as anomalies. 
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Figure 3.  Screen Captured Image of NVivo Project 
 
This captured screen shot reflects a view of child nodes under the parent node “Middle 
East,” affording a sample of how the NVivo tools were used to analyze, discard, and 
group large amounts of unstructured data about SIA smuggling networks. In total, 167 
unique sources of information produced 711 coded references that were analyzed for 
meaning. 
As the data examination, node creation, and coding process continued, the number 
of child nodes under the three regional parent nodes stabilized at 13, which were selected 
as most likely to answer the research question. These selected nodes reflected such 
themes as transportation methods, money transfers, and communication methods. Others 
were key enabling factors, methods of travel document acquisition, law enforcement 
evasion methods, and law enforcement investigative methods. At the end of analysis, the 
three main nodes had drawn 491 references from 67 unique sources. Four other major 
nodes had to be established to accommodate themes that emerged in the material with 
significant frequency. These were categorized as: bilateral relationships, criminal 
network innovations/adaptations, law enforcement methodologies, and smuggler 
information. Two particularly important nodes were titled “routes” and “key transit 
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countries,” which were distilled for route mapping. See Figure 4 for a visualization of all 
the major nodes discovered during this process.  
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(3) Step 3: Analyzing, Discerning, Choosing, and Presenting Conclusions 
Once all the materials were read, nodes created, and all possible data coded into 
the appropriate thematic nodes, another analysis process began. This involved studying 
each of the 13 nodes and determining their framing as conclusions that would inform the 
research question, and also their relative strength. In part, establishing and presenting 
conclusion validity often meant tabulating total occurrences. For instance, if a particular 
characteristic was common to a majority of the 19 cases and helped advance an answer to 
the research question, its strength as presentable, new knowledge was judged high or low 
depending on its occurrence frequency. Each node was tabulated for frequency to answer 
a variety of questions prompted by the creation and population of each, such as: How 
many smugglers spoke multiple languages and held dual citizenship? 
Four other major parent nodes had to be established to accommodate themes that 
emerged in the material with enough frequency to be discerned. These were categorized 
as: bilateral relationships, criminal network innovations/adaptations, law enforcement 
methodologies, and smuggler information. Collectively, these four categories drew 212 
references from 100 information sources. 
Analyzing individual nodes allowed for the presentation of 20 of the most 
significant conclusions detailing the most common characteristics and traits of SIA 
smuggling in line with the original research question. The traits include evasion tactics, 
but also tactics that American law enforcement and intelligence agencies employed to 
disrupt the 19 operations.   
Two particularly important bases of knowledge were extracted from the material 
collections: Transcontinental route information unique to each of the three regions and 
Latin America, and organization typologies. Adobe Illustrator and Photoshop were used 
to map the SIA travel patterns extracted from the court records and other material. 




(4) Study Limitations 
The 19 prosecution cases collected for this project represent most of the American 
SIA smuggling prosecutions since 9/11. These 19 cases suggest—though do not 
confirm—a relative paucity of such investigations by the assigned U.S. agencies, despite 
formal American strategy and policy to do so. To be fair, U.S. officials do note in various 
public forums that transcontinental SIA investigations are highly complex and difficult 
because they cross so many international jurisdictions, require reliable bilateral 
cooperation, operate covertly, and are expensive. Also, some evidence suggests that 
investigations American authorities conducted or initiated did not result in U.S. 
prosecutions but, rather, prosecutions by foreign countries such as Mexico and Ecuador. 
It is unclear how many or why the United States handed over prosecution responsibility. 
Some of the 19 known U.S. smuggling prosecutions required extradition from a third 
country, following extensive joint investigations. 
It can furthermore be argued that law enforcement targeting decisions are more 
often based on opportunity rather than on academic tenets of sampling science and pool 
size. The pool of court cases analyzed for this thesis therefore cannot accurately reflect 
all facets of the state of SIA smuggling affairs, to include important factors such as 
pervasiveness, market share size, or all variations.  
Likewise, the dearth of highly granular information about the links and 
relationships among network members and subgroups did not lend itself very readily to a 
social network analysis effort where links and nodes could be mapped out. Although 
these court cases credibly open a unique window into SIA smuggling, the view has to be 
regarded as only partial. For instance, migrant travel, as reflected in the available court 
cases, represents only 17 of the 35 transit or origin countries of interest, meaning a wide 
range of other potential smuggling means and methods potentially are left in the dark. 
One reason for the partial view is the often-unaccountable selection biases endemic to 
prosecution and law enforcement decisions, such as which front-end leads to investigate 
or let lie. Other issues limiting broader understanding included prosecutor decisions as to 
which investigative details to include or exclude from court filings, not to mention the 
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considerable influence of investigative winds of fortune on total bodies of information 
successfully collected for any one case. 
Also, areas of knowledge about SIA smuggling could not be penetrated because 
of classification protections and sensitivity. For instance, the regime in place to vet and 
process SIAs after they reach U.S. land borders was not extensively addressed here, in 
part due to unavailable public information but also because what happens at the U.S. 
border is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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IV. ULTRA-MARATHON SMUGGLING: A STRATEGIC
UNDERSTANDING 
The investigation of human smuggling presents unique enforcement 
challenges. Human smuggling organizations are primarily based in foreign 
countries and depend on loose, but highly effective, transnational 
alliances. These alliances involve various operators, such as recruiters, 
brokers, document providers, transporters and corrupt foreign officials, to 
exploit vulnerabilities in our and other nations’ immigration and border 
controls. The complexity of this problem demands a closely coordinated, 
comprehensive, and proactive international and domestic strategy. 
—James A. Dinkins, ICE Executive Associate Director of Homeland 
Security Investigations123 
As suspected, analysis demonstrated that SIA smuggling is a highly complex 
endeavor that, given a large enough pool of data, could be autopsied. This chapter begins 
broadly with an organizational overview of what the analysis showed about SIA 
smuggling networks. First, it details the three unique network types discovered and some 
of their basic internal structures. A broad overview of SIA smuggling architectures is 
presented, focusing on the way they are built and how they may help law enforcement 
know how operators are linked, where they fit and how they behave and interact, 
especially as investigations and intelligence development proceed. Next, some key 
common characteristics of SIA smuggling operators are described, including 
motivations—are smugglers in business to help terrorists attack, or for profit, or both?  
A. THREE SMUGGLING STRUCTURES 
The NVivo-assisted analytical processing of 19 court prosecutions brought into 
sharp relief a number of essential strategic-level links and nodes, behavioral traits, and 
characteristics of SIA smuggling and smugglers. Familiarity with these variables can help 
law enforcement strategists seeking to strike at the smuggling operations. 
123 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security: Regarding a 
Hearing on Enhancing DHS’ Efforts to Disrupt Alien Smuggling across Our Borders (2010) (statement of 
James A. Dinkins, ICE Executive Associate Director of Homeland Security Investigations), 3, 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/100722dinkins.pdf. 
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SIA smuggling is not one-stop shopping. Like any other industry, fees and 
services cater up or scale down depending on clients’ ability to pay. Those wishing to 
reach the United States may choose services that range from all-inclusive, doorstep-to-
doorstep guided journeys, to more piecemeal arrangements that cost less. Deconstructing 
the 19 court cases revealed three general but distinct types of smuggling, dependent on 
the smuggled individual’s desired price point: full service stage-to-stage, partial service, 
and limited service.  
(1) Full Service Stage-to-Stage 
Full service, guided, origin-to-destination journeys are arranged in advance. They 
involve pre-existing collaborative relationships with a multitude of independent networks 
along the route. They often involve initial recruitment, and they provide travel 
documents, air tickets, lodging, and accompanied transportation along each stage. 
Of the 19 prosecuted cases, 12 involved smuggling networks that offered full-
service, pre-organized, “stage-to-stage” guided travel from home country to destination 
country. Most of the prosecuted smugglers were able to guide migrants across numerous 
borders, often through passport-controlled airports outside of the United States (and, in 
three cases, inside the United States) by controlling recruitment, transportation 
coordinators, secure staging areas in key transit country points, document procurement 
specialists, cooperative arrangements with indigenous transit country networks, and 
primary funding and communications control. The preponderance of full-service cases in 
the sample may reflect law enforcement preference filtering rather than an accurate 
breakdown of different SIA smuggling types that truly operate. 
Detroit-based smuggler Neersan “Nancy” Zaia’s case exemplifies the full-service 
organization type. A dual U.S.-Jordanian citizen, Zaia moved Middle Easterners into the 
United States until her 2004 arrest.124 Zaia’s organization controlled a travel agency in 
Jordan, which recruited clients with misleading advertisements and through word of 
mouth. A subcontractor there provided fraudulent passports and purchased airline tickets. 
                                                 
124 United States v. Neeran Zaia et. al., 35 F.3D 567 6th Cir. Ct. (D.D.C. 1994), Indictment. 
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Other subordinate appointees accompanied paying customers to South Africa, handing 
them off to other subordinates who cared for and then accompanied the migrants to 
Ecuador.125 From there, additional conspirators accompanied the migrants on the next leg 
of travel. The operation proceeded this way, in an unbroken, guided journey that could 
cost $50,000 or more. Once the migrants reached the United States, other conspirators 
would meet and transport them to various cities. 
(2) Partial Service 
Partial-service smuggling involves assisting largely self-propelled individuals for 
one or more guided journey stages, brokering introductions to other organizations, or 
facilitating a key enabling service such as fraudulent document acquisition. Between 
stages, travelers are left to make their own ways to the destination, sometimes referred by 
word-of-mouth. Five of the 19 cases involved smugglers who fit the partial-service 
category, working as component links covering one or two journey stages. An example 
was a small Mexico City-based group run by Rakhi Gauchan, a dual citizen of Mexico 
and Nepal and career smuggler.126 Until Gauchan was arrested in 2013, the network 
maintained alliances with other networks to the south that guided Pakistanis, Indians, and 
other South Asians into Central America. From her Mexico City base, Gauchan would 
accept an average of 10 referred migrants a month in Guatemala and Belize, and transport 
them to the Texas border, charging an average of $3,500 each.127  
In 2007, a family of Iraqi Christians told their story to a reporter, detailing their 
experiences as migrants who used partial-service smuggling.128 The Iraqi couple, 
identified only as George and Baida, had taken refuge in Damascus, Syria with their two 
young boys during the war. A full-service smuggling organization could not be located, 
although the Baidas had the funds to pay for such a journey. Instead, they took an offer 
by a Jordanian man who was offering partial services, including important information 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 United States v. Gauchan, Criminal Complaint, Document 3. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Todd Bensman, “Out of Iraq: An Illegal Flight of the Chaldean Christians to America,” San 
Antonio Express-News, May 2007, 1. 
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and advice. For $10,000, the Jordanian provided authentic Guatemalan and Cuban visas 
likely obtained from Guatemala’s consulate office in Amman and Cuba’s embassy in 
Syria. The smuggler also provided Damascus–Moscow–Cuba–Guatemala City airline 
tickets, and a referral to a woman who ran a safe house in Guatemala City. At this point, 
the smuggling facilitator’s role ended; the Baidas were on their own once they reached 
Guatemala. In Guatemala City, the couple on their own eventually found an unaffiliated 
local smuggler named “Miguel,” who, for $15,000, brought the family to Texas. 
(3) Limited Service 
In a limited-service scheme, the smuggler’s primary competitive advantage is 
marketing a single key enabling service, such as fee-based recruitment. Other marketable 
services might range from trading on relationships with corrupt consul offices or 
document-forgers and passport thieves to provide lower-budget, self-propelled clients 
visas or identity documents enabling travel.  
In only two of the court cases (but in other accounts), smuggling facilitators 
specialized in providing one or two key services to make travel possible for semi-
autonomous, self-propelled migrants who would travel toward waiting networks in Latin 
America, or perhaps shop on their own for indigenous smugglers upon arrival in 
whatever country they transited next. An emblematic example was the sole proprietorship 
of U.S. citizen and convert to Islam Anthony Joseph Tracy—a Virginia resident who 
moved to Kenya to associate with Somali war refugees and to open the business “Noor 
Services.” He provided 270 Somalis with fraudulently obtained Kenyan passports, Cuban 
visas, and travel documentation onward to the U.S. border.129 To obtain Kenyan 
passports, Tracy used local collaborators to create fake identity cards, bank records, and 
citizenship documents to defraud the Kenyan passport offices, helping migrants breach 
the critical first obstacle—exiting the region by air and reaching a key staging country.130 
Iraqi citizen Ahmr Bahnan Boles (shown in Figure 5) provides an example of a 
self-propelled migrant who needed only to overcome an initial obstacle. His $4,000, low-
                                                 
129 United States v. Anthony Joseph Tracy, 4th Cir. Ct. (E.D.Va., 2011), Document 132. 
130 Ibid. 
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budget journey to the Texas border was substantially predicated on his acquisition in 
Damascus of a Guatemalan visa from a travel document broker who leveraged his access 
to a corrupt Guatemalan consulate employee. 
Figure 5.  Ahmr Bahnan Boles 
 
Iraqi war refugee and asylum seeker, Boles, shown after his release from federal 
detention in 2006. Boles crossed the Texas-Mexico border following a journey from 
Damascus, Syria, using a Guatemala visa that his limited-service smuggling agent in 
Syria obtained for him in Jordan for $750. Boles spent a total of $4,000 on the budget 
journey. Here, he is about to board a bus to Detroit where he will stay with an uncle. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURES 
Organizationally, the 12 full-service, state-to-stage smuggling systems generally 
featured a pyramid-like architecture with one or two general directors as the most 
important node, or in law enforcement parlance, “kingpin” smugglers. For this thesis, the 
two main structures managed by leaders of high-volume, full-service, stage-to-stage 
networks are identified as: “trusted sub-contracted confederates” nodes (insiders close to 
the lead smuggler who handle important operational duties) linked to “indigenous 
partners” nodes (which tend to be loosely affiliated groups or networks necessary to 
navigate specific local territories and problems). The graphic in Figure 5 and the text 
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presented in the rest of this section describe this structure in more detail, although 
insufficient data was available to map all nodes and links, or their relative social strength 
of those that were revealed.  




At the pinnacle of the 12 full-service systems was a general director, or kingpin 
smuggler, who maintained position by exploiting his or her own dual citizenships, bi-
nationalism, innate organizational skills and initiative. Kingpins also lead by centrally 
controlling cash flow, communications, key competitive advantages such as corrupt 
government officials, and major logistical decisions such as when and where travel will 
occur. The leaders of large-scale SIA smuggling networks in the court cases were skilled 
entrepreneurs who created the organizational frameworks enabling profit. 
The pyramidal architecture—that is, a sole proprietor leader working with a close 
circle of sub-contracted ethnically affiliated confederates, and an outer stable of 
indigenous partners in local transit countries—did not seem applicable to the smaller, 
partial-service and limited-service operations. Although these smaller enterprises also 
featured a sole proprietor, their shorter spans appeared only to need a main sole 
proprietor. But kingpins of large operations that continually moved large numbers of 
clients from home country to destination tended to have built these two structure types 
because they were necessary. 
2. Trusted Sub-contracted Confederates (the Inner Circle) 
Inner-circle sub-contractors often were ethnically, religiously, or tribally similar 
to the managing director—close enough confederates that they were often indicted or 
prosecuted as co-conspirators or indicted separately. Inner-circle confederates include 
transportation logisticians, recruiters, brokers, document forgers, money couriers, and 
other key logisticians requiring a high level of trust. A number of court cases revealed 
significant detail about the relationships between kingpin smuggling directors and their 
trusted ethno-national subordinates and partners, whose contributions often involved 
initial client recruitment in home countries, but often extended to assisting with 
management duties in Latin America. The Eritrean smuggler Habtom Merhay relied on 
an African “team” of five fellow Eritreans and one Ethiopian with whom he shared 
information and money obtained through his alien-smuggling activities. The HSI 
investigation of Merhay revealed that he maintained contacts with fraudulent document 
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vendors, human smugglers, and travel agents in numerous countries. This team initially 
recruited clients in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and elsewhere and, at Merhay’s 
direction, would personally smuggle them from their points of origin in Africa by foot, 
air, boat, or vehicle, to a stash house Merhay maintained in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 
In Dubai, Merhay and members of his Africa team were able to access the necessary 
visas and airline tickets to transport the clients on to Cuba, Ecuador, Colombia, or other 
Latin American countries, where local co-conspirators would prepare them for the next 
travel stages toward Latin America.131 
Similarly, the Pakistani smuggler Irfan Ul Haq used associates in Pakistan to 
provide false travel documents and exit visas. From Detroit and Amman, the Jordanian-
American smuggler Nancy Zaia ran her enterprise by working closely with five trusted 
associates with whom she shared ethnic and religious characteristics, and several of 
whom were prosecuted with her. In the Boateng network, both kingpin smugglers were 
natives of Ghana living in Belize and Mexico and were prosecuted together for having 
shared key management duties that included couriering cash and clients. 
The Egyptian smuggler Ashraf Ahmed Abdallah had a trusted fellow Egyptian 
recruiter providing clients, and collecting money and travel advice, including a phone 
number they should call when they reached Guatemala or a neighboring country on their 
own. Egyptians would agree to travel great distances on the word of a smuggling 
recruiter, which is a testament to the credibility engendered when a fellow countryman 
offers such propositions. 
3. Indigenous Partners (the Outer Circle)
All of the 12 full-service, stage-to-stage smuggling systems featured 
interoperability agreements with parochial smuggling groups and individuals indigenous 
to a single country or region of countries. Most of the SIA networks studied depended to 
a great extent on other highly localized smuggling groups that were indigenous to a single 
country or region, such as “coyote” smugglers along the U.S.–Mexico border, who could 
market their intimate familiarity with local landscapes and security conditions. The use of 
131 United States v. Habton Merhay, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D.D.C., 2010), Indictment. 
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local smugglers also reduced personal risk of a kingpin’s discovery or capture, providing 
distance and separation from clients as they moved clandestinely.  
The court records reveal little about these highly parochial indigenous operators 
other than to repeatedly establish their presences throughout the Latin American portions 
of journeys, often leaving them unidentified. Also unclear was the extent to which SIA 
kingpin smugglers were required, under threat or duress, to use local guides, perhaps as a 
form of taxation at the behest of dangerous armed criminal cartels. For example, 
prosecutors wrote that Eritrean smuggling kingpin Samuel Abrahaly Fessahazion would 
often hand deliver his African clients to Spanish-speaking local drivers and guides, 
sometimes meeting up with them at destinations for additional hand-offs to local 
confederates. This use of local guides is outlined in the description to investigators of 
their journeys provided by three clients who testified against him and were identified in 
court records only as “Aliens T.W., E.B. and S.O.” For instance, “a Hispanic driver” 
retrieved Aliens E.B and S.O. from Honduras to Guatemala.132 Fessahazion took over in 
Guatemala, bringing E.B. and S.O. by bus to a safe house at the Mexico–Guatemala 
border.133 Fessahazion turned the clients over to another guide for the crossing into 
Mexico, providing them with contact information to another local smuggler (known only 
by the alias “Matamoros,” after the Mexican border city across from Brownsville, Texas) 
who in guided them to Reynosa, Mexico. Matamoros then turned the pair over to yet 
more guides who “carried guns and ferried the couple across a river on the Mexican-
United States border in inner tubes.”134 
Another illustrative example of the reliance placed on interoperability with local 
indigenous networks was the Iranian smuggler Maher Wazzen Jarad, who ran a high-
volume, South America-based smuggling organization until it was disrupted in 2004. 
Jarad offered Iraqis and other Middle Easterners sea passage from Ecuador aboard large 
cargo vessels to points off the Pacific coast of Guatemala. To move his clients from the 
larger vessels to land to cross into Mexico, Jarad had a local Guatemala network run 




speed boats from Guatemalan beaches to the cargo ships, pick up his clients, and run 
them back for a land crossing into Mexico. A third network of Spanish-speakers in 
Mexico would then guide Jarad’s clients over the Texas border.  
One court case shed limited light on indigenous guides who work with SIA 
smuggling kingpins—the prosecution of Guatemalan Rosa Astrid Umanzor-Lopez, who 
was indicted as part of the 2012 case against the Indian smuggler Kaushik Thakkar. 
According to records, Umanzor-Lopez ran a small localized network in Guatemala, 
Mexico, and Texas that served the northernmost leg of a long chain that brought 
Thakkar’s Bangladeshis, Indians, and others from South Asia during 2011 and earlier. 
Umanzor-Lopez was among six Mexican and three Indian smugglers arrested by 
Mexican police in December 2013 after a long-running U.S. undercover sting 
investigation mainly targeting Thakkar.135 With them were Bangladeshi, Nepalese, and 
Indian clients. Little public record could be found regarding the arrested Mexicans, but 
Umanzor-Lopez was indicted in a U.S. court and extradited from Guatemala in May 2015 
to face human smuggling charges in Texas. Although little personal information about 
Umanzor-Lopez was provided in public court records, it was clear that she had the 
marketable ability to cross back and forth between Mexico and Texas to personally 
transport border crossers to Houston-area hotels for the Thakkar enterprise. On several 
different occasions detailed in her case records, the Guatemala City-based Umanzor-
Lopez personally accompanied several groups of smuggled people over the border, from 
McAllen or Laredo, Texas into Houston after other affiliated networks had brought them 
into Brazil, Guatemala, or the Dominican Republic.136   
In one case—the full-service Boateng network, which specialized in moving 
Somalis and Eritreans through an Africa-South America-Mexico-U.S. pipeline—
leadership was shared between two partners, probably due to their equal competitive 
advantages. Mohammed Kamel Ibrahim, from his base in Mexico City, had access to 
corrupt Mexican officials and relationships with local smugglers. His partner, Sampson 
135 United States v. Rosa Umanazor-Lopez et al., 5th Cir. Ct. (S.D. Tex., 2010), Superseding 
Indictment, Document 193. 
136 Ibid. 
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Lovelace Boateng, lived in Belize and had access to corrupt Belize embassy officials and 
recruiters and transportation facilitators in Africa. But even so, the general model of 
trusted insiders and allied local outsiders seemed consistent among these full-service 
smuggling enterprises: kingpin directors, their inner-circle ethno-national confederates 
and external indigenous allied groups, appeared loosely organized and interchangeable as 
different links were added or subtracted as needed—sometimes after a law enforcement 
disruption—from a single adaptable “chain” of travel. The degree of insider and outsider 
use often depended on the manner in which migrants were recruited and routes used to 
transport them to the United States. 
C. KEY NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
As previously established, ultra-distance human smuggling networks are 
configured based on their capacity to offer ranges of services. They are constrained or 
free to grow based, for instance, on their ability to access fraudulent documents and 
corrupt officials, or to form relationships with other organizations in distant countries. 
Their range of services therefore varies from partial and limited ability to move migrants 
to one leg of their journey, to full door-to-door destination capabilities. In turn, the extent 
of their capacities determines their organizational architectures. The majority of the 
networks examined, full-service organizations, formed as hierarchies with tight-knit, 
ethnically aligned operators at the top, but with loose-knit, interchangeable components 
at their bases. Beyond these organizational fundamentals, though, other informative 
attributes emerged from the data analyses to assist homeland security leaders who want to 
disrupt SIA smuggling networks. As is described later in this thesis, SIA smugglers tend 
to be non-violent sophisticated international entrepreneurs who are less interested in 
extremist ideology than profit and prefer to work with people of their own nationalities. 
1. Nonviolent leaderships
Generally speaking, SIA smugglers did not behave as violent organized crime 
kingpins, using violence to protect market share or keep underlings and competitors in 
line. In one instance, the Ecuador-based smuggler Nizar Lorian told an undercover agent, 
who asked what would become of a migrant if his family did not deliver $24,000 in 
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overdue fees, that “There’s no f***ing around with me, on me” and to tell the smuggled 
aliens that if they try to leave “I tell them you are going to be our barbecue tonight if 
anything!” In none of the 19 court cases, however, did information suggest that Lorian 
physically abused paying customers or ever used physical coercion. A number of 
migrants did suffer robberies and discomforts, and one smuggler, Nancy Zaia, was 
discovered plotting to murder the ICE agents who investigated her. There is some 
information to suggest that an established kingpin smuggler based in Brazil threatened 
the Somali underling smuggler Ahmed Dhakane upon learning that Dhakane had been 
transporting clients and taking their fees without authorization. Dhakane responded by 
fleeing to the U.S. border himself and claiming asylum, for which he was later 
prosecuted. But for the most part, smuggling leaders relied on finesse, personal 
relationships and negotiations to get business done. Also, as will be seen, kingpin 
smugglers tended to have dual citizenships and spoke multiple languages. 
2. Profit or Ideology 
Motivation is always difficult to discern. But rather than taking their inspiration 
from terrorist-like ideological objectives or zeal for radical religious teachings, SIA 
smugglers in the 19 cases were cast as primarily profit-motivated. In some cases, 
however, smugglers were so focused on profits that they chose to overlook evidence of 
client extremist beliefs and associations. Three other cases leave room to question if 
ideological sympathy with violent Islamic extremist groups did influence affirmative 
decisions to smuggle suspected terrorists. 
Analysis showed that, in 17 of the 19 cases, prosecutors believed that personal 
profit primarily motivated the smuggling ringleaders, who often leveraged their unique 
knowledge, experience, or connections to demand tens of thousands of dollars per person 
for full-service stage-to-stage travel. The object of most of the 19 SIA smuggling 
conspiracies was, government prosecutors often wrote in boilerplate language, as in the 
case of the smuggler Maher Jarad, “for the purpose of commercial advantage and private 
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financial gain, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that said aliens had not 
received prior official authorization to enter.”137 
Sometimes, investigators, prosecutors, and judges found that smuggler thirst for 
profit was so profound that they opted to disregard their clients’ backgrounds at the 
expense of national security. In the case against Iranian smuggler Muhammad Hussein 
Assadi, prosecutors wrote, “evidence at trial clearly showed that Assadi was driven in his 
illicit business purely by monetary gain and exercised no discretion at all with respect to 
the character or potential motives of those whom he helped smuggle into the U.S.”138 
Assadi rejected government accusations that he was motivated purely by profit, offering 
that he “acted out of humanitarian motives to help refugees obtain asylum.”139 A jury 
was not swayed. 
Indeed, in some of the cases, smuggler interest in profits did appear to override 
reticence to transport suspected terrorist clientele. The Pakistani-Ecuadorian smuggler 
Ifran Ul Haq presents an ambiguous case in point. Until his 2011 arrest at the Miami 
airport, Ul Haq for years had run a profitable, globe-spanning human smuggling network 
out of Quito, transporting mostly fellow Pakistanis willing to pay his $60,000 fees to 
cross the U.S. southwestern border. He was caught after HSI agents directed three 
undercover operatives to ask him to transport a fictitious member of the terrorist group 
Terik-e-Taliban, known as the Pakistani Taliban. The informants explained that the 
terrorist was in hiding, “blacklisted” by Pakistan, and that other fugitives like him needed 
similar assistance. Ul Haq was recorded accepting the offer, according to unsealed court 
documents, and that he was not concerned with what the Pakistani terrorist wanted to do 
once in the United States–“hard labor, sweep floors, wash dishes in a hotel, or blow up. 
That will be up to them.” Ul Haq boasted he could smuggle blacklisted terrorist fugitives 
by having a corrupt immigration officer in Pakistan provide the airport exit stamp, 
naturally off limits to terrorist designees, and a bogus Ecuadorian passport bearing 
someone else’s fingerprints, all used to move the “terrorist” from Lahore, Pakistan to 
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139 Ibid., Government Trial Memorandum. 
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Dubai, UAE, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti for the leg into Mexico. Ul Haq 
was charged with material support for terrorism and sentenced to 51 months in prison.  
Other examples were evident of smugglers who moved people they, too, thought 
might have been terrorists. The Mexico City-based Nepalese smuggler Rakhi Gauchan, 
who charged clients up to $40,000, told an undercover government agent in 2013 that she 
believed a Pakistani client she smuggled into Arizona from Mexico was a terrorist, but 
she transported him on a partial-service basis anyway, for $3,500.140 Later, American 
investigators confirmed that the Pakistani from the embattled region of Kashmir had 
indeed made it into the United States and was granted asylum. Agents interviewed him 
but the court records did not indicate if Gauchan’s instinct was correct.       
In 2004, the Pakistani smuggler Muhammad Qasum Lala was convicted of 
illegally transporting fellow Pakistanis over the U.S.–Canada border. After serving his 
sentence, Lala was returned to Canada, which deported him to Pakistan. In rejecting 
Lala’s deportation appeal, a panel of judges lamented that, in his quest for personal profit, 
“the appellant either deliberately or recklessly disregarded the particular circumstances of 
the individuals, i.e., whether they were genuine refugees or economic migrants or 
criminals.... The panel finds the appellant continues to pose an unacceptable security risk 
to society and in undermining the integrity of the immigration system.”141  
In some cases, there is cause to question if sympathy for extremists contributed as 
much as profit to willingness to transport extremists. The 2010 Texas trial of Somali 
smuggler Mohammad Ahmad Dhakane is one such case. Dhakane was an SIA smuggler 
convicted of asylum fraud related to his own illegal crossing of the Texas border. 
Testimony was introduced purporting that, while working as a smuggler in South 
America, Dhakane facilitated the transportation of as many as seven Somali men across 
the Texas and California borders whom he knew, from long personal discussions in hotel 
rooms along the way, were extremist affiliates of the American-designated terrorist 
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organization Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI).142 Dhakane eventually was compelled to 
admit to FBI case agents that these clients were “ready to die for the cause” but that he 
happily smuggled them anyway, which set off a nationwide FBI hunt for the unidentified 
men. While he was not sure of their purpose for entering the United States, Dhakane told 
agents he believed “they would fight against the U.S. if the jihad moved from overseas 
locations to the U.S. mainland.”143 Was Dhakane motivated solely by profit? Prosecutors 
suggested not. They introduced an array of evidence that Dhakane himself was deeply 
involved in AIAI, as a guerilla fighter, financier, and leader, before he became a 
smuggler of other AIAI operatives. The evidence justified a terrorism enhancement of 10 
years extra in prison. 
American smuggler Anthony Joseph Tracy’s motives were similarly opaque. 
Tracy was an American convert to Islam who abandoned his wife and children in 
Virginia and moved to Kenya. There he took a Somali wife and had communication with 
the terrorist organization al Shabaab. Tracy eventually was convicted of providing false 
identity documents that allowed 270 Somalis to reach the United States. According to 
prosecution records from his 2010 Virginia case, Tracy admitted the terrorist organization 
al Shabaab asked him to provide fraudulent travel documents to its operatives and that he 
failed a polygraph test while insisting that he had refused the entreaty. Investigators 
produced in court a January 15, 2010 email from Tracy to an associate about his 
document fraud business, in which he stated, “I helped a lot of Somalis, and most are 
good, but there are some who are bad, and I leave them to Allah.”144At a detention 
hearing, an ICE agent told the judge the admitted al-Shabaab contact, email, and failed 
polygraph evidence had prompted investigators to mount a nationwide around-the-clock 
hunt for Tracy’s Somali clients on grounds that “we have no idea who these individuals 
are that he assisted. These individuals pose—possibly pose—a risk of national security to 
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this country.”145 The case records show Tracy earned at least $80,000 in the course of a 
year.146 He was never charged or convicted of terrorism, and there was no indication if 
he ever turned down fees out of sympathy to al Shabaab or to aid its operatives. 
3. Ethnic Affinity 
In the examined court cases, smugglers tended to favor fellow citizens and co-
religionists for recruitment, likely due to shared language and culture but also because 
they were positioned to understand local demand patterns and could exploit community 
ties. In a study of illegal migration to Europe based on more than 300 interviews, Staring 
writes of finding “ethnic networks,” in which those running commercial human 
smuggling enterprises and those who used them paired based on an embedded 
infrastructure of tea houses, cafes, mosques, shops, and cultural organizations.147 Aside 
from the potency of a shared language, Staring writes, the smuggler and client common 
origins “are the foundation for the support compatriots can expect to receive.” 
Such ethnic affinity appeared to be the case in 16 of the 19 cases studied, a 
finding that emerged from a variety of other materials. In these cases, SIA smugglers 
transported compatriot clients from their own home tribes, countries, or geographical 
regions and only opportunistically strayed from this business model. The Guatemala-
based Egyptian smuggler Ashraf Ahmad Abdallah, regarded in 2004 as one of ICE’s 
most wanted smuggling kingpins, for instance, primarily recruited clients from the area 
around his home community of Bata in the Egyptian province of Qaubiya; he transported 
at least 100 of them through Guatemala and Mexico over several years.148 According to 
the 9/11 Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, court records, and press reports, 
Lebanese smuggler Boughader-Mucharrafille smuggled at least 200 fellow “Lebanese 
nationals sympathetic to Hamas and Hezbollah” into the United States from Mexico, 
including the high-ranking Hezbollah operative Mahmoud Kourani, who was smuggled 
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into California in the trunk of a car in 2001 and was convicted a few years later on 
terrorism charges.149 The Indian smuggler Kaushik Jayantibhai Thakkar mostly 
transported fellow Indians.150 Sammy Lovelace Boateng and Mohammed Kamel Ibrahim 
were natives of Ghana operating a smuggling network from Mexico City and Belize City 
that moved hundreds of Africans to the U.S. border during the mid-2000s until their 2008 
arrests.151 In one case, a naturalized U.S. citizen who emigrated from Jordan to Detroit 
used her ties with immigrant communities in Michigan to recruit clients in Jordan.      
The rule is not without exceptions, though, since smugglers were regarded as 
primarily profit motivated. Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura Ingersoll, who has prosecuted 
numerous SIA smuggling cases for the U.S. District of Columbia, was quoted by the 
Associated Press saying that “people from places in the Middle East will hear about who 
to go through, and they tend to be people from their same country, but once you get into 
the system we saw associations that really were driven by, ‘What’s the most effective 
way for me to move my product?’”152 Iranian national Mohammed Hussein Assadi was 
convicted of running a network that moved not fellow Iranians, but mostly Iraqis willing 
to pay tens of thousands of dollars each. Anthony Tracy, the American with no known 
personal connection to Somalia, trafficked fraudulent Kenyan passports and ill-gotten 
Cuban visas primarily to Somalis. The Syrian smuggler Nizo Lorian, a naturalized U.S. 
citizen, transported numerous Chinese nationals, as well as Middle Eastern clients and 
anyone else willing to pay him up to $30,000 each to be brought through Central America 
and Mexico to Houston, Texas.153 
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V. FROM CRITICAL ENABLING MOBILITY FACTORS: THE 
LEVERAGE POINTS   
As established in previous chapters, ultra-distance human smuggling networks 
and their leaderships are essentially multinational and multilingual, ethnocentric, and 
non-violent—though they violate the rule of law all along their routes. Rather than 
trafficking unwilling victims, they provide a service that is highly desired to customers 
who voluntarily pay sometimes-enormous sums. They are mostly motivated by profit, 
rather than ideology, although some cases suggest ideological affinity may have 
contributed to smugglers’ willingness to move suspected terrorists. 
Homeland security leaders who are interested in retarding SIA traffic long before 
it reaches the U.S. border should understand the most common enabling factors by which 
such long-distance smugglers succeed—and which staging or transit countries they prefer 
and why. This comprehension is essential in strategic planning and resource allocation to 
target logical disruption leverage points. 
This chapter begins with a brief presentation of seven identified SIA smuggling 
leverage points for potential disruption by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
These are followed by extensive descriptions of the factors and other findings from which 
they were extracted. The more detailed, at-length descriptions of the findings and factors 
that most enable SIA smuggling are provided for other potential clues, not specifically 
singled out for more discussion, that might further inform how and where along routes 
law enforcement and intelligence officers might proceed against the networks. To 
visualize how these enabling factors likely influence travel patterns, five detailed route 
maps are provided indicating air, land, and sea modes. The maps show emigration routes 
from each of the three main countries of interest regions—the Middle East, South Asia 
and North Africa—and, separately, their northward movement through Latin America. 
It has been noted elsewhere that transnational smugglers, in general, purposefully 
conduct their businesses in failed or failing states, sometimes under the guise of 
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legitimate business, and without regard to sovereign borders.154 SIA smugglers have 
found other advantages in those countries but also in unexpected quarters, such as the 
consulate missions fielded by some Latin American nations in the Middle East. It also is 
shown that they leveraged local geopolitical circumstances specific to other countries, 
such as passive government interest in pass-through migration, under-resourced 
government institutions, unintentionally beneficial national policies, and corruption. The 
ability of smuggling enterprises to discern and leverage opportunities—sometimes one or 
two critical enabling factors—determined their success, but also informs the following 
seven leverage points for law enforcement intervention and intelligence collection 
opportunities. 
(1) Leverage Point 1: Kingpins 
SIA smuggling “kingpin” leaders are less dispensable than those who run other 
smuggling enterprises because they tend to own highly specialized capability sets such as 
dual citizenship and multiple languages, which allow freedom of intercontinental 
movement and flexibilities necessary to conduct business in multiple nations. They often 
maintained pivotal accesses to key corrupt officials or to necessary fraudulent documents. 
Because the most successful long-distance smugglers represent a kind of commodity, 
replacing them may not be quick or easy once they are removed. The criticality of SIA 
smuggling leaders to their networks strongly suggests low resiliency of organizations and 
a point of vulnerability with potentially outsized disruption potential. 
(2) Leverage Point 2 : Foreign Consulates of Mexico and Latin America 
Through bribery or lax policy, SIA smugglers have acquired crucial visas and 
passports from Mexico’s consulate offices in Lebanon, Turkey, and India, from Belize’s 
diplomatic mission in Singapore, Guatemala’s consulate in Jordan, and Cuba’s embassies 
in Syria and Kenya. SIA smugglers have incorporated into their business models 
acquisition of travel visas and passports from the consulate offices and embassies of 
Latin America that are located in the Middle East and elsewhere. Such travel documents 
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are critical because they put SIAs within striking distance of the U.S. border, shortening 
travel time, distance, risk, and expense. In some instances, consul workers or diplomats 
were corrupted to provide the documents—in others, fooled. The implicated countries 
included Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, and the 
Dominican Republic. 
(3) Leverage Point 3: The Hostile Nations 
Countries diplomatically estranged from the United States offered critically 
enabling advantages to SIA smugglers in the sense that they were relatively impervious 
to U.S. demands for action or the threat of U.S.-sponsored bilateral investigation. Cuba, 
Venezuela, Russia, Bolivia, and, to a certain extent, Ecuador figured often in SIA 
smuggling as transit and staging countries. In addition to cold diplomatic relations that 
limited or entirely precluded responsiveness to U.S. concerns, some of these countries 
also featured weak internal border enforcement capability, disinterest, and corruption that 
appealed to SIA smugglers. 
(4) Leverage Point 4: Defrauding the U.S. Asylum System 
SIA smugglers and individual migrants have incorporated into their recruiting and 
operations advice and promises of U.S. asylum through fraud. The probability of 
achieving access to the American asylum processes emerged in the data as a critical 
enabling factor in migrant recruitment, since asylum mitigates the risk of costly 
deportation and loss of the significant smuggling investment. Smugglers helped their 
migrant clients exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. legal and vetting processes to fraudulently 
gain political asylum. U.S. asylum, which normally leads to permanent residence and 
legal status, was often regarded as an essential objective and success metric of the 
smuggling service. Several of the SIA smuggling organizations embroidered into their 
service promises of asylum at journey’s end and advice about how to commit asylum 




(5) Leverage Point 5: The Expatriate Communities of Latin America 
SIA smugglers and individual migrants have found critical facilitating support 
from within expatriate communities of similar ethnicity or nationality. Generational 
immigrant communities of Middle Eastern and African origin reside in key transit 
countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Mexico. SIAs and their smugglers 
have found in these communities crucial same-language hubs, enabling information 
exchanges, referrals to smugglers and clients, fraudulent document acquisition, 
communication, money transfers, travel arrangements, lodging, and temporary 
employment to raise funds for travel. In some cases, hotels and boarding houses used to 
stage SIAs in South America became central social exchanges, attracting ethnic and 
religious compatriots seeking to breach the American border. 
(6) Leverage Point 6: Catch, Rest, and Release Policies 
Mexico, Panama, and other countries of Latin America sometimes only briefly 
detain apprehended SIAs. Rather than deporting SIAs, these governments shelter, feed, 
and then release them with temporary legal status permission so they could continue their 
northward journeys. These practices proved critical to SIA smuggling; the migrants often 
have too much at stake to risk apprehension and deportation far from the U.S. border. 
Because their journeys start on the other side of the globe, SIA are unlike others traveling 
through Latin America. By the time they reach the hemisphere, many have paid tens of 
thousands of dollars in smuggling fees, airline tickets, false documents, and bribes to 
make physically arduous journeys requiring many months in transit—potentially a once-
in-a-lifetime fortune not easily raised for a second or third trip. Catch and release policies 
mitigate those deleterious consequences of deportation and loss of smuggling 
investments. 
(7) Leverage Point 7: Critical Enabling Factors of Six Nations 
SIA networks have purposefully routed their clients through the same six transit 
or staging countries in Latin America on a northward march to the U.S. southwestern 
border: Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico. Some of these 
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countries were chosen in part out of geographical necessity; for instance, Panama offers 
the only land-based exit northward from South America, Guatemala acts as a land bridge 
to Mexico, and Mexico is the only country from which to access the U.S. southwestern 
border by land. But these six nations also all feature four distinct enabling geopolitical 
factors, which proved critical to the forward mobility of SIAs and minimal risk of arrest 
to their smugglers: politically passive governments indifferent to trans-migration and 
U.S. security concerns, weak government institutions and budgets that preclude direct 
action, formal policies that unintentionally aided SIA migration, and corruptibility of 
border and airport customs officials. 
The following sections describe the findings of the analysis from which the main 
leverage points of intervention were extracted. Chapter VII describes 15 strategies 
recommended to take advantage of the leverage points and suggest an approach to other 
important enabling factors as well. 
A. THE KINGPINS 
The research for this thesis strongly suggests that, unlike the ever-replaceable 
leaders of other kinds of clandestine smuggling operations, those who run ultra-distance 
people-smuggling networks are not easily replaced; they bring a higher degree of often-
necessary specialization and capability to their enterprises, suggesting lower resiliency. 
SIA smuggling kingpins tend to be highly specialized individuals with dual citizenships, 
language skills, and key connections. The criticality of kingpin capabilities—uniquely, in 
SIA smuggling, as opposed to most other kinds of clandestine smuggling enterprises—
presents a leverage point opportunity for law enforcement intervention. 
Until their arrests, many of the smugglers examined successfully operated full-
service stage-to-stage guided operations by relying extensively on their own personal 
mobility, often enabled by bi-national citizenship in a migrant source country and in a 
key staging country. Approximately 18 of the 19 prosecuted smugglers maintained dual 
citizenships and/or residences in various countries; one (Umanzor-Lopez) lived in her 
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native Guatemala but apparently was able to travel into and out of the United States.155 
Their dual passports, bi-national residencies, and multilingualism, combined with 
business acumen, provided the ability to legally enter and exit nations at will, manage 
clients and underlings, and carry out recruitment and staging. A case in point is 
Mohammed Kamel Ibrahim, the Ghana citizen who helped run the Boateng network. He 
was a naturalized Mexican citizen who spoke fluent Spanish and was able to travel 
frequently between Mexico and Africa. 
SIA smugglers used their travel and linguistic flexibilities in a range of countries 
to access document fraud infrastructure, corrupt officials, safe houses or hotels, and 
associate smuggling organizations. Prosecutors described the versatility of one such 
smuggler, Eritrean national Halbtom Merhay this way: “The defendant is believed to be a 
citizen of Great Britain, to reside in the United Arab Emirates, and to travel frequently to 
London, England” and therefore “has contacts with fraudulent document vendors, human 
smugglers, and travel agents in numerous countries.”156  
American and British passports, given their acceptability in the widest range of 
nations, proved to be of particular value for Merhay and three others of the 15 smugglers. 
For example, Lorian held U.S. citizenship but maintained residences in Guatemala and 
Mexico, enjoying ease of travel throughout Latin America and the United States. 
Investigators noticed that the American passport of naturalized U.S. citizen Neeran Zaia, 
who was also a citizen of Jordan and speaks Arabic, Spanish, and English showed 
extensive travel to the Middle East and throughout South America. But the passports of 
other countries offered legal entre to many of the countries necessary for operations. 
Furthermore, most of the smugglers also appeared to make significant use of their 
knowledge of other languages, particularly Spanish and English. The Iranian smuggler 
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Assadi, who lived in Ecuador, for instance, was fluent in Arabic, Spanish, and “other 
languages” as well.157 Languages, coupled with the ability to legally travel globally at 
will, enabled smugglers to speak with home country clients, as well as with indigenous 
smuggling partners, brokers and facilitators of various sorts. 
Information from the collected data could not sufficiently determine the extent to 
and speed at which arrested SIA smuggling kingpins were replaced and their disrupted 
operations restored, a subject worthy of additional study. But some limited reporting 
suggests that restoration of SIA smuggling may be slower than other kinds of illicit black 
market enterprises. A U.S. immigration officer testified in a Mexican court affidavit that, 
after the Mexico-based Lebanese smuggler Salim Boughader-Musharaffille was arrested 
in 2003, a few months passed before other smugglers returned to helping Hezbollah-
affiliated migrants illicitly enter California from Tijuana.158 Left unclear in the reporting 
is whether or not the new organization was able to move migrants by the hundreds as did 
Boughader-Musharaffille.  
Other case records revealed that underlings do lie in wait for kingpins to be 
removed or to step aside, although timelines were not available to indicate delay times. 
For instance, the 1997 arrest of a “legendary” Ecuador-based alien smuggler named 
George Tajirian, responsible for smuggling hundreds of Middle Easterners into the 
United States during the 1990s, was followed by a competition for the helm among 
numerous successors.159 The prolific Iranian smuggler Mohammed Hussein Assadi won 
out and ran his highly lucrative network until his own 2002 arrest. The Somali smuggler 
Dhakane, who had begun working as an operative for a major full-service smuggling 
kingpin in Brazil, was forced to quit the organization under threat and cross the U.S. 
border after he was discovered moving clients on his own without the kingpin’s 
knowledge. 
                                                 
157 United States v. Muhammad Hussein Assadi, 223 F.Sup.2d (2008), Government Trial 
Memorandum.  
158 Arrillaga and Rodriguez. “Investigation: Smuggler Pipelines Channel Illegal Immigrants into the 
U.S.” 
159 United States v. Assadi, Government Motion for upward Departure.  
 72 
B. FOREIGN CONSULATES AND EMBASSIES OF LATIN AMERICA  
Given the vast distances and nations that SIAs must transit to the southwestern 
border, document fraud in passports, visas, and identity papers figured as a common 
denominator in all 19 SIA smuggling cases. The fraud perpetrated to acquire these key 
enabling documents took on many creative forms, ranging from altered stolen visa waiver 
European passports, forged visas, false identification cards, and fake banking and 
personal financial information required by visa offices. Migration studies and previous 
scholarly works on human smuggling have recognized document fraud as the one 
indispensible key to cross-border mobility. 
Arguably less recognized, if at all, is the role played by foreign diplomatic 
missions of Latin American transit countries—not in Latin America, but inside the 
originating countries of interest. These foreign diplomatic stations appear to have often 
figured in extreme-distance people smuggling by providing crucial travel documents, 
largely sight unseen. Their critical role in some of the smuggling suggests that diplomatic 
missions of Latin American countries present a leverage point for law enforcement 
intervention as will be described next. 
It helps first to understand that, for SIA travelers still in their home countries, a 
prerequisite of any planned U.S. southwestern border crossing is that they must first 
reach, most preferably, Mexico or then, in descending order of preference, any of the 
nations to its south offering route approaches to Mexico. Visas or passports enabling 
passage to these countries can put a migrant within striking distance of the U.S. border—
the closer the better. The migrants and their smugglers, however, can be hard pressed to 
acquire real visas or passports from their local consulate of the 23 nations of South 
America, seven of Central America, or from Caribbean island territories and states such 
as Cuba and the Dominican Republic.  
Court filings and other publicly available materials indicated that SIA smugglers 
have incorporated into their business models the presence, inside the Middle East and the 
other regions, of the foreign consulate and embassy offices of Mexico and nations to 
Mexico’s south. Latin American diplomatic missions in countries such as Jordan, Syria, 
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India, Russia, Kenya, and Turkey unwittingly, wittingly through corruption, 
indifferently—or with hostility—provided crucial passports and visas, enabling SIA 
smugglers to transport their clients to Western Hemisphere landings. In turn, such 
landings put them within striking distance of the U.S. border.  
Not all South American and Central American nations maintain foreign 
consulates in all high-risk source countries. Among those that surfaced from the data, 
however, were the foreign consulates of Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Sometimes corruption played a 
definitive role in the document provision, but so, too, may fraudulent applicant behavior 
intended to outwit visa application personnel. A typical example emerged from the FBI 
transcript of a covertly recorded conversation between an undercover FBI informant 
inside a Texas detention facility and the Brazil-based Somali smuggler Ahmad Dhakane, 
who had just been apprehended crossing the border from Mexico. The informant was 
posing as a potential smuggling sponsor for a brother still in Somalia. Dhakane explained 
that, through his connections with a Nairobi, Kenya church, he obtained six-month Brazil 
missionary visas and 90-day Mexican visas for clients who typically paid about $9,000 
each for the complete U.S. trip.160 As a bonus, Dhakane let the informant know that 
missionary visas also enabled his clients to obtain free traveler’s health insurance. 
The enabling power of Latin America’s visas, through diplomatic missions 
abroad, is exemplified by 24-year-old Iraqi war refugee Ahmr Bahnan Boles, whose 2006 
globe-trotting, solo journey from Syria to the Texas border was documented in articles 
published by Hearst Newspapers the following year.161 During the American war in Iraq, 
Islamic extremists drove Boles, along with hundreds of thousands of other Iraqi 
Christians, into the neighboring countries of Syria and Jordan. Tight quotas on refugee 
visas to the United States and other Western countries, predictably, led to a booming 
human smuggling market, which escalating demand and values of all travel documents. 
In Damascus, Boles met a smuggler who, for $700, arranged the purchase of a tourist visa 
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from a Guatemala consulate station in downtown Amman, Jordan; the photo in Figure 7 
shows the inside of the consulate office. Boles himself did not personally appear at the 
consulate station in Amman, as ordinarily required for such applications, his background 
was not vetted, as is also officially required.162 The document procurement agent 
returned with the visa to Damascus. With the Guatemala visa stamped inside his Iraqi 
passport, Boles then traveled a few miles to the local Cuban embassy in another 
Damascus neighborhood. There, for a $70 application fee, in a half hour with no 
questions asked, Boles had secured a Cuban transit. The following year, in 2007, the 
Honorary Consul of Guatemala’s Amman mission told a reporter that she strictly follows 
the rules, and refused to talk further.163  
Figure 7.  Interior Office of Gautemala’s Honorary Consul to the Kingdom of 
Jordan, Circa 2007 
 
Citizens of Middle East countries obtained visas necessary to reach Guatemala and 
eventually cross the U.S. southwestern border. Iraqi asylum seekers Ahmr Boles and 
“George and Baida,” who crossed the Texas border, reportedly obtained their Guatemala 
visas from this office located above the furniture store of a Jordanian appointed Honorary 
Consul. The office was located in the main business district of downtown Amman, the 
capital of Jordan, a Guatemala flag flying atop a pole outside the building. Previously 
unpublished 2007 photo by Staff Photographer Jerry Lara. Printed with permission of the 
The San Antonio-Express News. 




In Damascus, the Cuban Foreign Service officer in that country’s Syrian embassy 
told a reporter “that his country happily grants visas to any Middle Easterner who asks, 
because America doesn’t give anyone the opportunity to take refuge, especially after 
9/11.”164 When asked about vetting processes involved in granting visas to Iraqi war 
refugees in Syria, the Cuban diplomat said he was pleased to send Iraqis, even potential 
terrorists, to the home state of President Bush, as just desserts for starting the Iraq war. 
“I’m sorry your president is from Texas,” he said. Now, you’re receiving your own 
medicine. The problem started in Texas, and it’s finishing in Texas.”165  
To exit the Damascus airport without question and fly to Moscow, the two visas 
were necessary for Boles, a male Iraqi of fighting age from a hot war zone where al 
Qaeda extremists were combatants. Once in Russia, he was again able to pass legally and 
again avoid questioning or detention, which would have ended his U.S.-bound journey. 
Instead, with his visas, Boles was able to proceed to Cuba and then finally to Guatemala 
City. Once in Guatemala, he found his way to a smuggler in Mexico who brought him 
over the Texas border as an asylum claimant.  
Boles likely would never have escaped the Middle East without the probable 
corruption of one nation’s foreign consulate office and the diplomatic estrangement of 
another nation’s. 
The Damascus Cuban embassy personnel’s willingness to grant travel visas to 
Boles (and anyone else who asked in Syria), with little regard for U.S. sensitivities, 
underscores the even more expansive role that foreign embassies and consulates have 
played in the years since 9/11—particularly in nations with which the U.S. is 
diplomatically estranged, or that are indifferent to U.S. security concerns. For instance, 
Venezuela, which has been at diplomatic odds with the United States since Hugo Chavez 
came to power in 1999, was an SIA transit country in several of the examined court 
prosecutions. The U.S. Department of State’s 2014 Country Reports on Terrorism noted 
that Venezuela had not cooperated fully with U.S. counterterrorism efforts for nine 




consecutive years.166 In 2007, long lines of local citizens, in the Venezuelan embassy in 
Damascus, Syria, waited for nine different kinds of tourist and business visas described 
as easy and affordable to receive.167 Notably, the State Department report omits reference 
to Bolivia, which had cut most ties to the United States in 2008 when a leftist government 
took power; Bolivia also has frequently figured as an SIA staging and transit country. 
Mexico’s foreign missions were among the most problematic, perhaps due in part 
to the corrupting and highly sought value of Mexican visas. Mexican visas reduce 
the travel distance within Latin America and its associated costs and physical 
difficulty. They can bring SIA asylum-seeking migrants right to the door stoop of the 
United States. Court cases and public data showed that Mexico’s embassies have 
figured in SIA smuggling in Cuba, Turkey, India, Jordan, Colombia, Lebanon, and 
Belize, where visas or blank passports were fraudulently sold for thousands of dollars 
each.  
To be sure, Mexican authorities have taken steps to fire and prosecute some 
consular employees caught taking bribes, as they did after discovering the Lebanese 
smuggler Boughader-Musharrafille bribed employees of Mexico’s Beirut embassy to 
provide hundreds of visas to his California-bound clients.168 After a Mexican 
investigation of Beirut-based Mexican embassy employees in November 2003, a veteran 
Foreign Service officer was fired for the disappearance of passports from the consulate 
office; the investigation proved the employee sold the passports for up to $4,500 each in 
service to the Boughader-Muscharrafille network.169 The same investigation turned up 
evidence, however, that Mexican visas and passports also were being sold out of other 
unspecified Mexican consulate offices, including the one in Cuba.170  
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Fraudulent use of Mexican visas and passports continued after this 2003 
investigation. The 2005 smuggling prosecution of Iranian Zeayadale Malhamdary 
showed that Malhamdary predicated his operation on acquiring Mexican visas, for which 
he would charge $12,000 each.171 At one point, Malhamdary boasted to one undercover 
agent that he had smuggled 60 Iranians over the Mexico-Arizona border by previously 
obtaining Mexican visas.172 Malhamdary would fly to meet his prospective Iranian 
clients in Tehran or European cities, collect their passports, and deliver the documents to 
a third party, who would somehow obtain and insert the Mexican visas into the passports 
without the applicant being physically present (as is required). The passports would then 
be returned to their owners for travel. 
Mexico’s Honorary Consul in Jordan, appointed in 2004, acknowledged in a 2007 
interview that his predecessor, under American pressure, was dismissed for accepting 
bribes to provide Mexican visas to those desiring to cross the U.S. border.173 Honorary 
Consul Raouf N. El-Far said in 2007 he then began routinely receiving the same bribery 
offers from Iraqis, Syrians, and Jordanians who openly disclosed plans to be smuggled 
over the U.S. border. He described an offer from a Jordan-based smuggler to provide El-
Far with $100,000 per month in exchange for 10 monthly visas in perpetuity, an offer El-
Far said he declined because “it is against my principles.”174 Under U.S. pressure after 
9/11, El-Far said that Mexican intelligence, for the first time conducted a background 
investigation on a Jordanian consul—him. The check, he said, was so thorough “they 
wanted to know how many times I kissed my wife before I go to bed.”175 
Despite such Mexican efforts to enforce integrity following 9/11, Mexican 
consulate offices in the Middle East remained vulnerable. In March 2008, for example, 
three Afghans were discovered at the Kuwait airport posing as Mexican citizens en route 
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“home” to Mexico.176 The Afghans were detained during a layover when a customs 
officers asked them to speak Spanish and two of the three could not. Each carried an 
authentic, bar-coded passport with Mexican pseudonyms.177 Investigation showed the 
Afghans obtained the passports from the Mexican consulate office in Mumbai, India by 
paying $10,000 each to a corrupted official. 
Three Iraqi Kurds apprehended after crossing the Texas-Mexico border in 2009 
similarly told a reporter they paid a Turkish smuggler named “Murat” $20,000 apiece to 
secure Mexican visas, along with airfare (see Figure 8).178 They said they gave Murat 
their passports and then the next day met Murat at the Mexican embassy in Ankara, 
Turkey, where the smuggler handed them their Iraqi passports with Mexican visas 
inside.179 The Boateng smuggling operation, in which two Ghana nationals moved 
hundreds of Somalis and Eritreans to the U.S. border through Belize and Mexico until 
their 2010 arrests, relied on corrupt personnel in both Belize and Mexican consulates 
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Figure 8.  Three Iraqi Kurds Detained in Texas 
 
After obtaining Mexican visas from the Mexican embassy in in Ankara, Turkey, the three 
Iraqis were apprehended in 2009 and taken to the ICE detention facility in Pearsall, 
Texas. They said a full-service stage-to-stage human smuggler transported them to Texas 
for $20,000 each. 
Data collections also showed that other country consulates often enabled SIA 
travel and smuggling as well, particularly Cuba, Belize, Ecuador, Venezuela, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and the Dominican Republic. The Guyanese smuggler Annita Devi Gerald, 
who had citizenship and a house in Belize, worked with co-conspirator Dhanraj Samuel 
of Trinidad and Tobago to move Indians and other South Asians from Singapore to 
Houston, Texas. To enable the travel, they provided fraudulent Belize business visas 
obtained from that country’s consulate office in Singapore, then provided Mexican visas 
to ease domestic air travel within Mexico. Fees were included in $20,000 package 
deals.181 The American fraudulent document provider, Anthony Joseph Tracy, was able 
to provide hundreds of Cuban visas to Somalis in Kenya by bribing two employees of the 
Cuban embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, identified in court records as “Consuela” and 
“Helen.”182 Both were fired after Tracy was arrested and provided information to 
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American law enforcement.183 The Iranian smuggler Assadi was able to secure hundreds 
of Bolivian visas from the Bolivian embassy in Beijing as part of a smuggling operation 
that also transported Middle Easterners. 
C. GAMING THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM 
That SIAs often seek political asylum differentiates them from the vast majority 
of Mexican migrants, who seek mainly to work in the American labor markets and would 
not easily qualify on the basis of racial, religious, or political persecution.184 As 
mentioned previously, a deportation home for an SIA is costly and not easily ameliorated 
by follow-up attempts, making the promise of access to the U.S. asylum system a highly 
critical component to SIA recruitment and its financial viability. An asylum claim at the 
American southwestern border provides opportunity for SIAs to gain legal status, with 
citizenship in the offing, and avoid the unacceptable smuggling investment loss that a 
deportation home portends. For these reasons, the promise that U.S. asylum holds for 
SIAs and their smugglers represents a leverage point opportunity for law enforcement 
intervention and intelligence collection. 
Middle Eastern and South Asia migrants consistently ranked among the top 20 
approved asylum seekers from 2000 through 2009.185 Such trends have long raised 
national security concerns; according to a Congressional Research Service Report, 
terrorists from countries of “special concern, i.e., Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia) would seek to hide their 
asylum claims among the hundreds of thousands of pending cases.”186 In 2009, the FBI 
arrested two Iraqi refugees who worked as al Qaeda insurgents during the war, and were 
plotting homeland attacks in Bowling Green, Kentucky; their arrests stopped and later 
significantly slowed an Iraqi refugee resettlement program to allow for more intense 
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security vetting.187 When hundreds of Syrian war refugees began crossing the Mexico-
California border in 2012, after traveling on Mexican tourist visas, once again concerns 
were expressed about whether or not the security vetting process was capable of 
identifying Islamic extremists who might be among them.188 The Department of 
Homeland Security’s 2008–2013 Threat Assessment, cited in open media, framed the 
asylum fraud potential as primary threat from SIAs with terrorism connections: 
At the highest level of concern, terrorists will attempt to defeat border 
security measures with the goal of inserting operatives and establishing 
support networks in the United States. These illicit actors also could pose 
as refugees or asylum seekers to gain access to the U.S. State failure and 
internal conflicts abroad will continue to generate sizable refugee flows to 
the United States—notably from countries of special interest for terrorism 
in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia—which could provide 
opportunities for illicit entry.189 
Court records and other materials suggest that some SIA smugglers and individual 
SIAs, including a number purportedly involved with terrorism organizations, have 
knowledgeably exploited vulnerabilities in U.S. legal and vetting processes to 
fraudulently gain asylum. They have done so by claiming false persecution stories or by 
omitting disqualifying personal history. In fact, several of the smugglers embroidered 
asylum fraud abuse into their operations—a finding that lends credence to often-
articulated national security concerns about SIA border crossings. Such fraud occurs 
against a backdrop of questionable U.S. effectiveness to detect it. A 2008 GAO survey of 
asylum officers, for instance, showed that 75 percent believed “they needed additional 
training to help them detect fraud, conduct security checks and assess the credibility of 
asylum seekers.”190 In 2014, four Republican congressmen asked the GAO to investigate 
the asylum process after a leaked DHS report showed that up to 70 percent of cases 
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contained proven or possible fraud.191 While the extent to which asylum fraud among 
SIAs likely is beyond ascertaining, in four of the 19 collected court cases, SIA smugglers 
specifically instructed their clients to make fraudulent U.S. asylum claims, or did so 
themselves, so they could secure permanent residence and legal status. Other analyzed 
materials added validity to this finding.  
One of the four court cases showed that Mexico City-based Nepalese smuggler 
Rakhi Gauchan showed she smuggled scores of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians 
over the Texas border until her 2013 arrest. According to an HSI agent complaint, as part 
of the service, Gauchan instructed most of her smuggling clients to falsely claim asylum 
either when they presented themselves at a U.S. port of entry or entered between ports.192 
The smuggler was familiar with the U.S. political asylum process, particularly with 
respect to how long asylum applicants are detained and which stories were most likely to 
ensure that U.S. officials granted asylum. A confidential informant in the Gauchan 
organization reported watching the smuggler provide her clients with such fraudulent 
stories. For instance, they were told to tell immigration officials that they belonged to 
persecuted political parties, regardless of their actual affiliation.193 Gauchan was aware 
of even arcane legal details of the U.S. asylum process. Italy had already rejected one 
Pakistani client being prepared for the final leg to the southwestern border, an automatic 
disqualifier for U.S. asylum; Gauchan advised her client not to tell U.S. immigration 
authorities about the Italian denial and to change the story he had used in Italy.194 
Exploiting the asylum system was embroidered into the smuggling operation run 
by Iranian national Muhammad Hussein Assadi, who, until his 2002 arrest, ran a globe-
spanning, full-service network that moved Middle Eastern Arabs though South America 
and had them arrive in U.S. airports on false passports. According to a government press 
release, Assadi instructed his clients to destroy all of their fake identification documents 
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and hide in the arrival areas of U.S. airports.195 Drawing on his deep understanding of 
immigration procedures, Assadi told his clients to then surrender to U.S. immigration 
without disclosing their true place of origin, knowing they would be likely released 
pending deportation proceedings and could next claim asylum, potentially resulting in 
permanent legal status.196  
As mentioned, Somali smuggler Ahmad Muhammad Dhakane ran a smuggling 
network from Brazil to Texas that transported as many as seven potential Somali jihadists 
over the U.S. southwestern border. He instructed them, as he did most of his clients, how 
to fraudulently claim U.S. asylum to American authorities upon arrival. Dhakane told 
agents that, “based on his conversations with his smuggling clients and his extensive 
familiarity with United States asylum law, he knew that none of the individuals he 
smuggled had a valid claim to be in the United States.”197 Court records showed that 
when Dhakane decided to retire from smuggling in 2008, he crossed from Mexico into 
Texas and claimed asylum himself based on a fraudulent persecution tale that omitted his 
own terrorism and smuggling past. Prosecutors charged and convicted Dhakane of 
asylum fraud when he was serendipitously found to have lied to immigration officials 
about his own extensive terrorist background—unbeknownst to Dhakane, an undercover 
FBI informant had been deployed inside the Texas detention center. Dhakane later 
admitted to agents he had been a guerilla fighter for the terrorist group AIAI and worked 
as a ranking “hawaladar,” or transferor of funds outside the normal banking system for 
senior AIAI leaders, one of whom was his uncle, and another of whom so trusted him that 
he offered Dhakane his daughter’s hand in marriage.198 
Another prolific SIA smuggler, the Eritrean citizen Samuel Abrahaley 
Fessahazion, received U.S. asylum on November 13, 2008 after illegally entering Texas 
six months earlier. In his application, he claimed he had been traveling across Africa in 
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2007 and 2008, fleeing persecution in Eritrea, when the evidence showed he actually was 
in Guatemala, running a prolific smuggling network bringing East Africans into the 
United States for profit.199 
Other cases anecdotally demonstrate that SIAs with disqualifying terrorist 
associations and pasts still may view asylum fraud as an effective means to achieve legal 
status after they have been smuggled. Already discussed was the case of Somalia natives 
Abdullahi Omar Fidse and Deka Abdallah Sheikh, who were smuggled to the Texas 
border with counterfeit passports, Mexican visas, and airfare to Mexico City, hotels, and 
transportation.200 In their asylum petitions, they falsely claimed the terrorist group al-
Shabaab killed their family members. The story, crafted to meet baseline legal standards 
for starting asylum processes, would have worked if Fidse had not told an undercover 
informant—again stationed in the detention center—that he was an al-Shabbab member 
who had come to the United States to conduct an unspecified terrorist operation.201  
According to media reports citing a Texas intelligence assessment, Border Patrol 
agents in 2010 apprehended two Bangladeshi SIAs near Naco, Arizona who immediately 
claimed asylum.202 One of the men, probably unknowingly, made the disqualifying claim 
he had worked for the General Assembly for Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Bangladesh, a 
designated terrorist organization. Subsequently, one of the two Bangladeshis was 
deported; however, the other was granted bond on an asylum claim and absconded.203  
D. ETHNIC DIASPORA COMMUNITIES 
Expatriate communities in key transit countries have played stepping-stone roles 
in smuggling facilitation, although the extent to which this occurs was unclear. What did 
emerge from the available data was that some facilitation activities occurred in expatriate 
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communities of Middle Eastern and African origin, residing in key transit countries such 
as Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala (see Figure 9), and Mexico. To SIAs and their 
smugglers, these communities provide crucial same-language hubs that enable 
information exchanges, referrals to smugglers and clients, fraudulent document 
acquisition, communication, money transfers, travel arrangements, lodging, and 
temporary employment to raise travel funds. As a result of this finding, expatriate 
communities are identified as a leverage point for law enforcement intervention and 
intelligence collection opportunities. 
In some cases, South American hotels and boarding houses used to stage SIAs 
became central social exchanges attracting ethnic and religious compatriots, such as a 
hotel that Muhammad Dhakane maintained in Sao Paulo, Brazil or a Holiday Inn in 
Quito, Ecuador used often by the Syrian smuggler Nizar Lorian. Iraqi war refugee Ahmr 
Boles’ case exemplifies how expatriate communities can figure in long-distance SIA 
journeys.  
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Figure 9.  Zone 1 in Guatemala City 
 
Thousands of immigrant merchants, including many from the Middle East, have resettled 
in Guatemala City’s Zone 1, where SIAs can find smuggling connections, comfort, and 
assistance from compatriots who speak their own languages. Shops with familiar names, 
as well as native foods and religious and cultural touchstones, characterize parts of Zone 
1. 
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In 2006, Boles was making his way from Syria to Texas, more or less on his own. 
After purchasing a Guatemala visa from a document broker in Syria, Boles flew alone to 
Guatemala City, where he found himself short of the knowledge and funds needed to 
proceed. However, Boles had been told he could fulfill these needs in the city’s Zone 1, a 
central market where hundreds of Arabic-speaking merchants owned businesses and 
residences.204 Boles soon found a small apartment and work selling electronics in one of 
the Zone 1 shops with names such as The Rio Jordan, Haifa, and The Egyptian. After a 
few months of acclimation, Boles had new friends who could put him in touch with 
smugglers. The common language and sympathy Boles found in Zone 1 enabled him to 
orient himself among compatriots crucial to his ability to continue northward. Amar Radi, 
secretary of the Arab Community of Guatemala, acknowledged the steady traffic of 
Middle Easterners on their way north.205  “Many Arabs come here and work a while, get 
money and then go to the U.S,” Radi said.206  
Ecuador is another country in which helpful expatriate communities from 
countries of interest sprung up, along with human smuggling enterprises, after a 2008 
change in government policy ended all visa requirements to enter the country. In the 
Boateng case, an ICE agent testified that, in cities like Quito, Ecuador, African migrants 
frequently gather at Internet cafes and “exchange information about how to move on to 
other places.”207 In 2011, under U.S. pressure, Ecuadorian authorities trailed by FBI 
agents raided 11 buildings in Quito thought to house illegal expatriate “Moslem” 
communities based on American allegations that they were aiding and abetting terrorism 
and human smuggling to the U.S. border.208  FBI agents were allowed to interview many 
Pakistanis and others, after which six detainees reportedly were extradited to the United 
States.209 Prosecutors strongly suggested that the Iranian smuggler Assadi, who was 
based in Ecuador and held dual citizenship there, converted to business purposes his role 
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as “a prominent leading figure among communities of people from the Middle East in 
Ecuador—many of whom sought to come to the U.S. illegally.”210 
From his base in Mexico, home to hundreds of thousands of Lebanese immigrants 
and their descendants, the Lebanese smuggler Salim Boughader-Musharafille was not an 
itinerant smuggler; he was a well-known restaurateur with deep roots in Tijuana, Mexico. 
Boughader-Musharaffille owned the popular La Lebanesa Café. Through an 
underground, transcontinental information grapevine centered around the cafe, those 
wishing to be smuggled over the California border could make such an arrangement on 
premises. Lebanese migrants would find their own way to Tijuana, where they would 
promptly gravitate to the restaurant in search of smuggling arrangements. Partly in this 
manner, Boughader-Musharaffile was able to smuggle more than 200 visiting Lebanese 
over the course of about three years.211  
E. CATCH, REST AND RELEASE: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS, 
PASSIVITY, CORRUPTION AND POLICY IN KEY TRANSIT NATIONS 
The State Department’s 2014 country report on terrorism noted that Latin 
America as a region had only made “modest improvements to their counterterrorism 
capabilities and their border security” from the previous years.212 It noted corruption, 
weak government institutions, weak or non-existent legislation, and lack of resources as 
primary causes for insignificant progress in some of the countries, even though most 
made some effort to investigate possible connections with terrorist organizations.213 
Analysis of the 19 court cases confirmed smuggler exploitation of these circumstances, as 
well as formal government policies that had, unintended or not, kept the northward 
passageways clear of law enforcement intervention. One such policy that surfaced in the 
data was the practice in some countries of releasing apprehended SIA migrants to 
continue their journeys, a critical leverage point for law enforcement intervention. But 
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other country-specific geopolitical circumstances contribute to the leverage points of 
diplomatic hostility of some toward the United States and catch-rest-and-release policies.  
In all 19 of the examined court cases, SIA smugglers, who themselves enjoyed 
great personal mobility and cash flows, were able to fully exploit: institutional 
government resource weaknesses associated with poor or nonexistent border control, 
government passivity or even hostility toward U.S. security goals, corruption among 
border guards and customs officials, and official policies such as catch-rest-and-release. 
Analyzing court cases and other materials helped identify six Latin American countries 
through which SIAs most often passed, consistently enabled by some or all of these 
geopolitical factors. They are: Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and 
Mexico. Sometimes, simple geography forced or encouraged funneling through certain 
countries (Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico), while geopolitical conditions 
alone drew smugglers to others. Figure 10 exemplifies one such location. 
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Figure 10.  A Truck Crossing the Border between Mexico and Guatemala 
 
People and goods cross the dry land crossing border freely near La Mesilla, Guatemala. 




Among some of these countries, critical government practice enabling forward 
SIA travels are the catch, rest and release policies primarily practiced by Panama and 
Mexico, though other countries along the way follow suit. As will be seen, in catch-rest-
and-release, SIA migrants apprehended in these countries are not detained for long 
periods, nor deported. Rather, the migrants are sheltered for a few weeks then released 
with legal documents to continue their northward journeys. These policies, however, 
work in concert with other country-specific geopolitical factors critical to the success of 
SIA smuggling. These are to be discussed contextually in this section along with catch-
rest-and-release policies.  
One clarifying example of how the other geopolitical variables work with catch-
and release is the narrow exit route from South America into Central America by way of 
Colombia and Panama’s Darien Gap. This was identified as a chokepoint route in the 
2014 State Department Country Report on Terrorism, which acknowledged it “remained 
a growing pathway for human smuggling with counterterrorism implications.”214 
The SIA smugglers who funneled their clients into this route often started the 
journey after arriving to the continent from abroad through Ecuador and Brazil, chosen 
due to ease of visa acquisition, corruption, and customs’ inability or disinterest to root out 
fraudulent travel documents. SIAs exiting Ecuador and Brazil were then able to travel 
virtually unimpeded to cross the land bridge entering Central America, enabled by 
official passivity, local immigration policy, and resource shortages. No military or police 
are posted in vast swaths of territory or along any the borders of either Colombia or 
Panama, despite media and U.S. government reporting about the route.215 The 2014 State 
Department report, for instance, stated that Colombian border security “remained an area 
of vulnerability” in part because only 1,500 of the country’s 180,000 national police 
officers were devoted to border security elsewhere.216 Furthermore, Colombia could not 
conduct any vehicle or passenger inspections at land border crossings, only used 
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biometric screening at international airports, and “faced the challenge of working in areas 
with porous borders and difficult topography plagued by…illegally armed groups.”217  
It is natural that SIA smugglers would to take advantage of a key land bridge 
through an environment where government interference is so unlikely; by not 
intervening, Colombia itself avoids the costs associated with patrol, detention, and 
deportation of migrants who also have no intention of remaining in the country. 
SIA travel along this route is further aided by the additional circumstance in 
Panama: its catch, rest and release policy. Once through Colombia, SIAs are funneled 
into the remote 40-mile Darien Gap region. The State Department report said Panama 
continued its struggle to “exert sovereignty in the underserved Darien region,” through 
which an estimated 7,000 migrants traveled in 2013 alone (8,432 during 2014, and 3,800 
during the first three months of 2015).218 With no border patrolling, only upon the 
journey’s completion did security forces detain them. Rather than incur the costs of long-
term patrolling, detention, and deportation, Panama provided food, housing, and a release 
with temporary legal status, enabling refreshed migrants to continue northward to the 
United States.219 Otto Reich, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, told the Wall Street Journal that, despite knowing this human traffic 
may threaten U.S. national security, Panamanian officials “know they are coming to the 
U.S. and…will no longer be Panama’s problem.”220 
In this somewhat representative sample, official indifference, lack of border patrol 
resources in Colombia, and Panama’s catch-rest-release policies critically enabled SIA 
smuggling rather than deterred it. SIA smugglers would naturally want to incorporate 
such circumstances into their business models, and clearly have. But the same 
combination of enabling factors was common to other countries often transited by SIAs 
to the next critical country that practices catch, rest, and release—Mexico. 
                                                 





SIAs making their way to Mexico by land must first cross through other Central 
American nations, all of which must eventually funnel through Guatemala—a land bridge 
with ocean on either side linking Central America to North America via Mexico (see 
Figure 11). Here, analysis found that corruption combines with government indifference 
and lack of capacity to enable, rather than deter, at a key choke point. Guatemala has 
been described as a super-highway of virtually unimpeded human smuggling to 
Mexico.221 The human smuggling industry has become so politically and economically 
powerful, no doubt to ensure its continued revenue, that at times it has completely co-
opted government control over border and customs police. Border control on 
Guatemala’s south and north border is largely nonexistent. 
Figure 11.  Unregulated Inner Tube Traffic on the Mexico-Guatemala Border 
 
Inner tube boat pilots navigate the heavily trafficked Rio Suchiate River, which forms 
part of the Guatemala-Mexico border. Guatemalan border guards and Mexican military 
personnel on both sides rarely question travelers or check cargo. 
In 2007, Santos Cuc Morales, Guatemala’s National Director of Migration, told a 
reporter that after 9/11 and more recently, because of the war in Iraq, American 
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intelligence officials and diplomats recognized Guatemala’s role as a geographical bridge 
for U.S.-bound terrorist travelers.222 U.S. officials asked Morales to assist in a crackdown 
“because of terrorism and the situation in Iraq.” Morales said he could not help, because 
his 450 agents stationed along the nation’s borders, at airports and at seaports were under 
the almost complete influence of smugglers. He said most of his own agents, patrolling 
land borders and the international airport, would not respond to his orders. He said that 
government bureaucrats who wielded influence over his agency did not want the 
smuggling deterred because of their own financial stakes in the business.223 As his 
country’s most senior immigration enforcement official, Morales said he wished he could 
help the Americans avert another terrorist attack, which he said “could happen because of 
the corruption here. It’s the reality of things.”224 
Gustavo Barreno, a federal prosecutor in charge of enforcing Guatemala’s human 
trafficking laws from 1997 through 2005, described working closely with American 
intelligence and law enforcement after 9/11 to disrupt SIA smuggling networks then 
operating openly in the country.225 The joint effort, however, was shut down when a 
major operation unearthed a smuggling ring that moved Arab migrants through the 
country. After the investigation turned up links between the smuggling operation and 
senior Guatemalan politicians, the entire American program was abruptly canceled, and 
Barreno said he was ousted from government.226 “The business is gigantic,” he was 
quoted saying. “You have no idea. Everyone is involved—everyone. And for an Arab to 
come into Guatemala it’s really easy—really easy.”  
A number of court prosecutions in the years since the interview with Morales and 
Barreno support their 2007 perceptions, recording many instances of bribed border 
guards and police. For instance, according to a 2010 indictment, the Brazil-based 
smuggler Fessahazion would have a Hispanic driver casually pay off border guards as 







they crossed through Guatemala en route to Mexico.227 A 2014 Washington Examiner 
newspaper investigation of Guatemala human smuggling concluded, after interviewing 
present and past senior government officials, that “it is clear that the human smuggling 
business resembles, in some respects, legal enterprises like McDonalds and Mazda.”228 
Once through Guatemala, SIA smuggling networks become beneficiaries of 
formal Mexican government policy. Many SIAs are apprehended at Mexican airports in 
Tuxla, Tapachula, Mexico City, and Monterrey as well.229 Many more are apprehended 
during land travels north. However they arrive, Mexico follows the same catch, rest, and 
release policy as Panama, providing the SIAs respite for a couple of weeks and then legal 
papers and release to finish the trek to the U.S. southwestern border. An ICE agent 
testifying in the 2010 asylum fraud case of the Somali smuggler Dhakane described 
Mexico’s policy: “Most of them, all of the East Africans and many from the Middle East, 
they will surrender at Tapachula (in the state of Chiapas bordering Guatemala) the 
Mexicans will hold them for, you know, ten to fifteen days, and then they will give them 
an order of deportation, and they are given 30 days to leave the country at that point.”230 
At times, Mexico has allowed American law enforcement or intelligence officers 
access to some SIAs prior to their releases, but not all of them.231 Boles, since he was 
Iraqi at the height of the war, described lengthy interviews by Americans while he was 
detained in Tapachula, and again after he was transported to a different facility in Mexico 
City. However, media reporting in 2007 quoted anonymous American law enforcement 
officials with Mexico experience who said the FBI had fewer than a dozen full-time 
agents assigned to Mexico City, making it impossible to interview every detained SIA—
only some of those deemed a priority at any given time.232 A shortage of appropriate 
interpreters and prevalence of fake or missing identity make it difficult to use terrorist 
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watch list databases or other intelligence resources to discern an authentic asylum seeker 
from a terrorist in transit. “The bottom line is just because you don’t get a hit doesn’t 
mean he’s not a terrorist,” one federal agent with Mexico experience was quoted saying. 
“You still could be. Fake names are a big problem.”233 
In another example of the unintended consequences of formal national policy, in 
2008, Ecuador dropped all visa requirements for anyone in the world wishing to visit for 
90 days, after which human smuggling operations moved to the country.234 In 2012, the 
researcher Freier interviewed hundreds of migrants and senior government leaders about 
the consequences.235 She concluded that, almost immediately, Chinese human smuggling 
networks began bringing thousands of Chinese immigrants into the country to stage trips 
to the U.S. border, as well as SIAs from South Asia, North Africa, and the Middle 
East.236 Senior Ecuadorian leaders and policy makers told Freier that pressure by U.S. 
diplomats who were concerned about terrorist travel forced Ecuador to resurrect visa 
restrictions two years later, for 10 nationalities from Africa and Asia, including those 
who would be regarded as SIAs from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Pakistan.237 But the quality of enforcement was questioned. Freier cited secret U.S. 
diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks showing that American diplomats continued 
the pressure even after the restrictions were returned, based on concerns that Ecuador was 
not enforcing them. By 2011, U.S. pressure forced mass arrests of Muslim immigrants in 
Ecuador, including Pakistanis interviewed by FBI agents.238 
Outside of Latin America, corruption, official indifference, and formal policy are 
also enabling factors that draw SIA smugglers. Corruption, for example, enabled exits 
and entries before SIAs ever reached Latin America. The Pakistani–Ecuadorian smuggler 
Irfan Ul Haq had Pakistani immigration agents on his payroll who allowed his clients to 
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exit without proper authorization and stamps. The Indian smuggler Thakkar bribed Indian 
customs officials to let his clients pass onto flights. The Iranian smuggler Assadi, 
likewise, had airport customs officials on his payroll for the same purpose as he flew 
clients in and out of Ecuador.  Beyond nakedly corrupt practices, the material collected 
for this thesis raised questions of indifference, professionalism, and training. Iraqi war 
refugee Boles, for instance, noted that he was rarely questioned by airport, immigration 
or customs enforcement until American investigators in Mexico interviewed him. 
Ultimately, he too was released after several weeks with legal documents enabling him to 
continue north. He said a guard inside the Mexican detention center offered to arrange for 
a local smuggler to meet Boles and several other Iraqis outside the facility gates. The 
driver was waiting for them when they emerged and drove them to the Texas border.239 
F. ROUTES: MAPPING STAGES AND LAUNCHES BEYOND THE 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
As shown in prior sections, SIA smuggling tended to follow paths of least 
resistance, as established by local geopolitical conditions related to strength of border 
security institutions, government policy toward migrants, and corruptibility of public 
servants. Smugglers and their migrant clients reflected and discussed in the 19 court cases 
and other materials reflected only about half of the 35 countries of interest. Routes were 
chosen based on locations where passage was most eased and most cost efficient, and 
where there was least risk of law enforcement disruption and arrest. Countries were 
chosen, for instance, on the basis of travel visa availability, or the presence of reliably 
corrupted officials and bureaucrats. 
Sometimes, the state of a country’s diplomatic relations with the United States 
was used to advantage; antipathy toward counterterrorism collaboration enabled SIA 
smuggling to continue in Russia, Venezuela and Cuba. Some nations might not have 
prioritized border policing or airport inspections, such as South Africa. Still others 
enacted policies that attracted and abetted the smuggling, as did Ecuador. 
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One or more of these enabling factors may partly explain why routes were chosen. 
Analysis revealed distinctly busier hubs along the routes from the Middle East, Africa, 
and Asia prior to landings in Latin America. These may suggest future leverage points for 
law enforcement and intelligence collection activities. For instance, the country of South 
Africa emerged an air travel hub linking North African and Asian countries of interest to 
South America. Within the Horn of Africa region, Nairobi, Kenya emerged as a 
significant convergence hub for flights toward the U.S.  
Migrants on the move from Middle Eastern countries of interest gravitated toward 
the Gulf States, particularly the United Arab Emirates, which served as major air hubs 
linking Middle Eastern countries of interest to Latin America. What enabling factors 
contributed to the convergence on South Africa, Nairobi and the United Arab Emirates, is 
not revealed in the data, but would seem to warrant additional investigation for law 
enforcement or intelligence collection activity. 
Once migrants did arrive in Latin America, their travel patterns and methods 
became far less differentiated. But only common routes prior to arrival in the western 
hemisphere are described in the next sections. 
(1) From the Middle East 
Routes often ran from origin nations through Turkey and Greece to European 
countries including France, Spain, Italy, and Germany—sometimes through the Gulf 
States of United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and sometimes through Russia. Migrants 
originating from Middle Eastern countries most often used landed for initial staging in 
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. See Figure 12 for route visualization.  
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Figure 12.  Departures from Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and Initial 
Landings in the Western Hemisphere 
 
Routes derived primarily from 19 U.S. court prosecutions and some open-source reports 
show heavy reliance on air travel and transit hubs in Europe, the Gulf States, and South 
Africa, indicating customs inspection vulnerabilities. All travel flows generally westward 
toward Latin America. 
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(2) From North Africa 
Routes often ran from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan through the Gulf States and 
occasionally Europe, but mostly through other African countries such as South Africa, 
Kenya, and Sudan (see Figure 13). The most common landing zones in Latin America for 
Africans were Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, and Mexico City. 
Figure 13.  Departure Routes from Africa to Latin America 
 
Routes derived from U.S. court prosecutions and open-source reports. 
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(3) From South Asia 
Routes often ran through India, Singapore, and the Gulf states (see Figure 14). 
Again, South African international airports seemed to figure as a frequent transit points.  
Figure 14.  Departure Routes from South Asia to Latin America 
 
Routes for travel from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in Asia tend to require 
among the highest fees because they entail crossing the greatest distances, making the 
most stops and border crossings, and the highest risk of law enforcement interceptions. 
The Gulf States and Europe figured often as air transit hubs in addition to South Africa. 
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G. ROUTES: LANDINGS AND NORTHWARD MARCHES IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
Once SIAs reached the western hemisphere, some nations were frequently used 
for initial landing and for “staging,” that is, allowing time to rest and prepare for further 
legs of the journey. Twelve of the 19 smuggling organizations used either Brazil (5) or 
Ecuador (7) for landing and staging SIAs. Other commonly used landing and staging 
countries included Cuba, Mexico, and Guatemala. The map in Figure 15 shows these 
travel routes. 
 Once migrants landed in such countries, they would be housed, sometimes for 
weeks at a time, while smugglers prepared for legs of the journey to come. For law 
enforcement decision-making, a distinction, therefore, can be made between key staging 
countries and “transit countries,” based on whether migrants were stationary or in motion. 
Migrants tended to linger for days, weeks, or sometimes months in staging countries, 
awaiting coordination for the next travel phases in smuggler-controlled safe houses or 
hotels. Migrants in transit countries were contrastingly on the move, stopping only for 
sleep or rest. Some staging countries doubled as transit countries, most notably Mexico 
and Guatemala. The following countries (in alphabetical order) emerged most often as 
staging or transit countries. 











2. Transit countries (can also be staging countries) 
• Colombia 
• Costa Rica 
• Cuba 








Guatemala and Panama figured prominently in almost all of the examined data 
about SIA smuggling because they act as funneling land bridges that must be crossed. 
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Figure 15.  Travel Routes into the United States via Latin America 
  
Routes derived from U.S. court prosecutions and open-source reports. 
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VI.  CAT AND MOUSE: SMUGGLERS AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Despite the heroic efforts of our law enforcement colleagues, criminal 
organizations are constantly adapting their methods for trafficking across 
our borders. While there is not yet any indication that the criminal 
networks involved in human and drug trafficking are interested in 
supporting the efforts of terrorist groups, these networks could 
unwittingly, or even wittingly, facilitate the movement of terrorist 
operatives…toward our borders, potentially undetected and almost 
completely unrestricted. In addition to thousands of Central Americans 
fleeing poverty and violence, foreign nationals from countries like 
Somalia, Bangladesh, Lebanon, and Pakistan are using the region’s human 
smuggling networks to enter the United States. While many are merely 
seeking economic opportunity or fleeing war, a small subset could 
potentially be seeking to do us harm. 
—Gen. John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps Commander, U.S. Southern 
Command240 
 
Homeland security leaders interested in matching better strategies to specific 
vulnerabilities and leverage points should understand that SIA smuggling networks are 
adaptive human social systems with many moving parts. Analysis of the court cases 
provided a rare—if limited—window on the interplay between pursuers and pursued in 
far away, often ungoverned geographies.  
Seven leverage points have been suggested for law enforcement or intelligence 
collection activity: kingpins, foreign consulate offices, hostile nations, U.S. asylum fraud, 
expatriate communities, the catch-rest-and-release policies of several Latin America 
nations, and critical enabling factors in key transit nations. Analysis of these cases did not 
indicate that past law enforcement activity occurred with any of these leverage points in 
mind. But the efforts did produce prosecutions and disruptions. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the interplay between SIA 
smugglers and law enforcement to inform decision makers who might be called upon to 
recalibrate or improve network disruption in line with a more systematic consideration of 
leverage points. First, common operational security methods of the smugglers are listed 
and discussed. This is followed by commonly used U.S. interdiction methods that were 
successfully used both by conventional American law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies stationed in foreign nations. 
A. THE SMUGGLERS 
Evidence presented during prosecutions indicated that SIA smuggling operations 
adapt more slowly to pursuit, disruption, and environmental changes than do other 
clandestine enterprises; SIA smugglers need to coordinate a higher complexity of 
components over greater distances. Still, as with any system, SIA smugglers figuratively 
deployed antennae sensitive to any information about environmental change in threat and 
opportunity pictures. Feedback loops sent such information to kingpin leaders who 
reacted when possible at strategic and tactical levels.  
Some, but not all, of the smuggling networks studied in this thesis adeptly 
innovated in response to law enforcement moves or other opportunities. After 9/11, 
several of the major SIA smuggling networks swiftly adopted operational security 
measures to evade anticipated detection and capture. For instance, one smuggler more 
pointedly cloaked his migrant clients’ ethnicities to avoid U.S. law enforcement profiling 
they presumed would follow the attacks. The smugglers studied for this thesis also 
incorporated contemporary technologies in line with current globalization trends to 
communicate and move money undercover; while bringing efficiency to operations, this 
also caused some to worry—rightfully, it turns out—about an increased vulnerability to 
law enforcement detection. The findings presented in this section illustrate the most 
common or noteworthy operational security methods SIA smugglers employed, 
effectively or not, from 2001 through 2015. 
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1. Antennae for Change and Adaptation 
A signature indicator of growing operational security was how some smugglers 
reacted to the 9/11 attacks. SIA smugglers were acutely aware that American law 
enforcement began pursuing them more aggressively after 9/11 and, in turn, instituted 
operation changes and security measures that continue to the present. The Iranian-
American smuggler Mehrzad Arbane, for example, went to extremes out of certainty that 
American law enforcement would pursue him with particular vehemence. Arbane, who 
for years prior to 9/11 moved Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis, and Jordanians into the United 
States, switched entirely to cocaine (rather than human) smuggling after the attacks 
because, as he told an associate, he feared he “may have smuggled two of the hijackers 
who flew the planes into the towers in New York on September 11, 2001.”241 That turned 
out not to be the case, court records show, but Arbane’s associate was so alarmed that he 
became a U.S. government informant and helped investigators in 2002 arrest Arbane for 
his new cocaine smuggling enterprise and the earlier SIA smuggling. 
In September 2001, the American-Jordanian smuggler Nancy Zaia traveled to 
Quito, Ecuador, where she demanded $2,000 more from two clients she had staged, as the 
cost of higher risk, saying “this was due to the tighter United States immigration controls 
in place after the 9/11 attacks.”242 Furthermore, in the fall of 2001, Zaia, who normally 
flew her clients directly to U.S. cities, hired local ground smugglers to guide Iraqi clients 
through the mountains of Colombia, where they were robbed at gunpoint, and thereafter 
stopped using air travel into the United States.  
After 9/11, the Iranian smuggler Mohammed Hussein Assadi, whose operation 
smuggled Middle Eastern clients to Ecuador and then flew them to U.S. cities on photo-
altered European visa waiver passports, began requiring his charges to alter their 
appearances in order to look less ethnic. For their flights, women were told to dye their 
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hair blonde and wear contemporary European clothing; the men were instructed to shave 
their beards and discard any personal artifacts that might make them “appear Arab.”243 
When one of his East African clients expressed concern that a new American 
border fence would foil his crossing, the Mexico-based Ghana smuggler Mohammed 
Kamel Ibrahim demonstrated he had already shifted gears. Ibrahim replied to the worried 
migrant by email: “There is a lot of rumor here, but there is still a way to enter. Don’t 
worry about that. The wall will start building next year. It is still ok from now to 
February next year.”244 
Court records also demonstrated that smugglers were aware of other changes, and 
were willing to adapt accordingly. In May 2005, a change in Ecuadorian government had 
led corrupt airport officials to charge substantially more to let Syrian smuggler Nizar 
Lorian’s clients exit the country by air. Lorian ordered an associate to establish a new 
smuggling route from Lima, Peru and to quickly transfer there a large group of clients 
staged in Ecuador. Lima was chosen not only to avoid excessive payoffs in post-9/11 
Ecuador, but because it was the only Peruvian city with direct flights to U.S. cities, 
comporting with Lorian’s business model of flying clients directly to the United States.  
2. Cloaking Identification 
SIA smugglers understood their clients would most likely fall into the hands of 
American law enforcement, as asylum petitioners, and become potential informants. 
Therefore, most of the smugglers coached, exhorted, or financially threatened clients not 
to reveal details of their operations when apprehended at U.S. destinations or in transit. 
Smugglers used aliases extensively to cloak nationalities they believed would draw 
attention in the post-9/11 national security climate. The Egyptian smuggler Ashraf 
Abdallah told clients to wire money to him in the name of “Juan Manuel.”245 The 
Eritrean smuggler Fessahazion sought to obscure his African nationality by alternately 
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using the names “Sammy,” “Alex,” and “Alex Williams.” Mehrzad Arbane went by “El 
Turco,” “Achi Saba,” or just “Tony.” 
Many of the smugglers admonished or threatened their clients into silence with 
American authorities. The smuggler Rakhi Gauchan, who used the alias “Niki,” told “her 
clients not to provide detail to U.S. immigration officials about being smuggled to the 
United States or otherwise cooperate in human smuggling investigations. Gauchan also 
has said she believes she could be prosecuted and imprisoned for human smuggling if 
arrested by the United States.”246 Other smugglers demanded that, for the final U.S. 
crossing, clients eliminate phone numbers from cell phones, throw away notes, and 
destroy any fraudulent travel documents to eliminate clues. The Ghanan smuggler 
Boateng emailed a subordinate on September 4, 2006 stating, saying in part, “They 
should not carry any phone number from USA or Belize and Mexico. They are only 
vacation here...No mention of my name.”247 
Some also sought to forcefully leverage the silence of clients caught en route. The 
smuggler Jarad, who used a wide variety of aliases, instructed one migrant, who later 
testified against him at trial, that if he or other members were apprehended in Guatemala 
or Mexico, “they should not provide his name to the authorities as being involved in 
smuggling them, warning that if they did they would lose their money, and Jarad would 
not attempt to smuggle them to the United States.” 248The smuggler Assadi told clients 
that, after their flights arrived in the United States, they should destroy all of their 
fraudulent passports and documents while still in holding areas and “surrender to U.S. 
immigration without disclosing either their true place of origin or Assadi’s role.”249 
3. Money Transfers Obfuscated 
The SIA smugglers most often used Western Union offices throughout Latin 
America and the United States to receive and send money, but also sometimes the 
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commercial mail services DHL and Federal Express. Some ordered wire transfers in  
smaller amounts, believing they would not attract the attention of regulators and 
investigators. The smuggler Lorian, worried about law enforcement pressure, told his 
underlings in late 2001 not to deposit more than $9,000 at a time “because after $9,000 
there is always an investigation and so...deposit eight, or seven, five, or eight.”250 
Kingpin smugglers used false names or subordinates to send and receive money, 
again to mask nationalities they believed would raise national security flags. The 
smuggler Lorian once sent a $2,000 Western Union wire to a KWIK Check Mart in 
Houston, Texas under the name “David Philippe Paul Gouman,” in hopes that such a 
name might not attract law enforcement attention.251 Sometimes, smugglers used real 
names, if the sums to be transferred were small. Smuggler Samuel Abrahaly Fessahazion 
had one of his subordinates instruct “Alien T.W. to have $400 wired to Guatemala in the 
name of Samuel Abrahaley.”252 
4. Communications 
SIA smugglers primarily used cell phones, and Internet-based communications 
such as email and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) available via personal computers 
to communicate with clients and one another. Mobile phone and personal computer 
technologies enabled real-time decision-making for operations strung across time zones 
and continents. The Boateng organization’s two leaders, for instance, operated 
extensively via email. Their plea agreements explained that they used email “to 
communicate with each other and other co-conspirators, to discuss the smuggling 
operation, to advertise alien-smuggling services, to negotiate smuggling fees for aliens 
who were to be smuggled into the United States, to coordinate the delivery of 
fraudulently obtained travel documents, to communicate regarding the payment of 
smuggling fees, to coordinate and implement smuggling arrangements and events, and to 
resolve issues that arose in the smuggling operation.” They and a number of other 
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smugglers used email attachment functions to send scanned images of fraudulent 
documents with corrections. Pakistani smuggler Irfan Ul-Haq also used VoIP and email 
extensively, as did the smuggler Habtom Merhay. 
The court records do not indicate the extent to which most smugglers feared 
government communications surveillance. In the months after 9/11, however, one 
smuggler, Lorian, did express heightened fear of surveillance, perhaps rightfully so. He 
told an undercover agent, who had penetrated his organization posing as a fellow 
smuggler, to “limit the number of telephone calls made about smuggling arrangements 
because the FBI would scrutinize telephone calls from overseas and would initiate an 
investigation that could cause problems.” 
B. U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
The United States has deployed both conventional law enforcement methods and 
unconventional intelligence collection methods to disrupt SIA smuggling abroad. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) press releases regarding many of the SIA cases, which 
credit various involved agencies, show that investigative efforts were complex affairs 
involving ICE HSI, but also multiple other U.S. law enforcement and foreign government 
agencies where bilateral agreements allowed American investigators to be located. 
Not mentioned in the DOJ press releases is American intelligence agencies’ 
border security involvement since 9/11; these agencies have often worked in conjunction 
with American law enforcement in Latin America and elsewhere. ICE Office of 
Investigations Deputy Director Kumar Kibble, discussing his agency’s efforts to disrupt 
SIA smuggling, testified before a congressional committee in 2009 that “partners in the 
intelligence community target the most dangerous international human smuggling 
organizations for investigation and prosecution, especially those that pose a threat to our 
national security.”253 Much of the work is classified, Kibble explained, “but the effort has 
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led to a number of significant prosecutions since 2001.”254 Elsewhere, some media 
reporting quotes U.S. and Guatemalan law enforcement sources saying SIA interdiction 
operations in Central America at times involved the use of American satellites, Coast 
Guard cutters, the U.S. Navy, and the intelligence services of various South American 
governments, which would work in coordination with U.S. agencies.255 During the 
investigation of Jordanian-American smuggler Nancy Zaia, a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in 
the Pacific intercepted a ship carrying two Jordanian clients from Ecuador whose passage 
to the U.S. border she had arranged.256 
Because less is publicly known about American intelligence’s role in SIA 
smuggling interdiction, this thesis focuses on the conventional law enforcement efforts 
used by ICE, the FBI, and other agencies stationed in some of the 48 nations with whom 
the United States had, as of 2015, established bilateral law enforcement operating 
agreements. The thematic findings presented in this section do not reflect all methods 
used, and do not suggest that any continue to be used; rather, the methods are some of the 
more common ones that are knowable from court materials and other public platforms. 
1. The Smuggled as an Investigative Resource 
Perhaps the most prevalent and important source of criminal information about 
SIA smuggling came from the people who were smuggled. Despite exhortations by their 
smugglers that their clients must not inform on them, SIAs apprehended at the U.S. 
border and elsewhere consistently provided investigative leads, information, and court 
testimony in all 19 of the prosecutions examined for this project. Public media reporting 
shows that the FBI, ICE, and Border Patrol have interviewed SIAs after they were 
apprehended on the U.S. side of the border to assess risk, but also to gather intelligence 
information about their smugglers.257 Although staffing was often insufficient to ensure 
every SIA was interviewed, testimony by SIAs willing to cooperate figured prominently 
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in the court records. For example, the investigation and 2014 prosecution of Habtom 
Merhay relied on 14 cooperating witnesses, all of whom Merhay smuggled. Their bits of 
independent testimony helped investigators piece together Merhay’s operation. In an 
Assadi case government-sentencing memorandum, prosecutors credited Assadi’s former 
clients for candidly describing the smuggler’s role in their transportation, adding, “but for 
these cooperating witnesses, who represent but a fraction of the aliens smuggled by 
Assadi, the government would have been unable to bring Assadi to justice.”258 
In addition to testimony at court, some of the smuggled have been used as active 
participants in investigations against their smugglers. In 2009, for instance, “ALIEN P” 
agreed to let law enforcement agents in Houston consensually monitor and record a 
conversation with a major co-conspirator in the Gerard smuggling network, enabling 
investigators in Florida to arrest the suspect two days later.259 
SIA interviews did not only take place on U.S. soil. According to media reports 
published in 2007, Mexico, for a time, allowed American interrogators to question SIA 
detainees in “threat assessment” interviews.260 Mexico City-stationed U.S. law 
enforcement and intelligence agents, accompanied by Mexican counterparts, usually 
conducted these interviews.261 Also, an agreement at the time allowed Mexican 
intelligence officers from the National Security Investigation Center to conduct as many 
interviews as they could when the Americans were unavailable, providing fingerprints 
and names that could be checked against terror watch lists and fingerprint databases.262 
2. Undercover Agent Insertions 
As discussed previously, the Ecuador-based Pakistani smuggler Irfan Ul-Haq was 
arrested and convicted on terrorism charges after ICE deployed three local Ecuadorian 
undercover informants to help him smuggle a blacklisted terrorist from Pakistan to the 
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United States. This was one of eight cases in which U.S. law enforcement inserted sworn 
undercover agents or paid confidential informants into SIA smuggling operations. The 
method collected evidence that may not have otherwise been available, given the natural 
camouflage and mobility smugglers enjoy in distant jurisdictions. Once undercover 
agents were accepted into a network, however, they were able to discover highly granular 
operational details. They often recorded phone calls, stored email and other 
communications, videotaped direct observations, identified otherwise hidden co-
conspirators, and developed new leads. Undercover agent operations have also enabled 
search warrants for smuggler cell phones, email, computers, homes, and businesses.  
One case in point involved a long-term, deep undercover insertion of ICE 
undercover agents into the organization of Ecuador-based Nizar Kero Lorian, which was 
responsible for moving hundreds of Middle Easterners to the U.S. border. Over time, the 
agents collected audio and videotaped documentation that revealed the organization’s 
inner workings, to include manner and means of smuggling, hierarchy, identification of 
other individuals who worked for Lorian, money transfer habits, and fees.263 Through a 
recorded telephone conversation with an undercover operative, U.S. investigators learned 
that the Arizona-based Iranian smuggler Malhamdary was selling Mexican visas for 
$12,000 each to fly Iranians into Mexico for transport over the Arizona border.264 
American agents were able to manipulate smugglers to travel to U.S. territory so they 
could be arrested and prosecuted. The was also the case with an undercover agent 
inserted into the Nepalese smuggler Gauchan’s organization, running a Mexico City-
based arm of a larger network. Posing as a prospective business partner, the El Paso, 
Texas-based agent in 2012 lured Gauchan to enter the United States for a business 
meeting; she was arrested instead, avoiding a time-consuming extradition process. 
3. Inserting Paid Informants into U.S. Detention Facilities 
In two separate known cases, paid FBI informants of Somali descent were 
inserted into Texas detention facilities, where they collected intelligence about Somali 
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SIAs, leading to three prosecutions involving purportedly terror-associated individuals. 
Only in this way was the FBI able to discover that Ahmad Dhahane had been working as 
a smuggler in Brazil, had lied on his asylum application, and was claiming inside the 
detention facility to have been a ranking operative for AIAI.265 The same method was 
used to convict Somali SIA Omar Fidse and his wife Deka Abdalla Sheikh in 2013 for 
lying during a federal terrorism investigation and on asylum fraud charges.266 
4. Arrested Smugglers Providing Information 
In several of the cases, SIA smugglers who had been arrested provided important 
leads against other smugglers. A number of them cooperated with investigators in 
exchange for lesser sentences or other benefits. Smugglers were inclined to turn on one 
another once in custody, as in the case of against the Ghanan smuggler Boateng. In a 
memorandum arguing for a lesser sentence, Ghanan smuggler Boateng’s defense attorney 
argued, “He has provided the government with as much information as he possessed and 
held nothing back, including his own use of false travel documents. Likely, his 
willingness to testify played a role in the decision of his co-defendant (clearly a more 
culpable participant) to plead guilty.”267 During the 2002 District of Columbia 
prosecution of the Ecuador-based Iranian smuggler Assadi, prosecutors had the smuggler 
Ecuador-based Jordanain smuggler Maher Jarad testify against his former associate.268  
5. Confidential Informants 
The court case files suggest that a number of the 19 investigations began as a 
result of tips from law enforcement contacts, sometimes in foreign countries. For 
example, a confidential informant working with ICE’s Attaché office in Mexico City 
provided some of the earliest information that Gauchan’s principal occupation was 
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smuggling people into the United States. It was a confidential informant who, concerned 
that the smuggler Arbane was worried that he had smuggled in two of the 9/11 hijackers, 
went to law enforcement authorities and became involved in ensuing investigation. Also, 
when the U.S.-based Iranian smuggler Malhamdary went to Mexico to shop for a 
smuggler, he was introduced to a confidential informant for the United States named 
“Gabriel,” who broke open the investigation.269 
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VII.  STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Yes, it is true that a lot of aid is given to corrupt governments, but that is 
by design, not by accident or out of ignorance. Rather, aid is given to 
thieving governments exactly because they will sell out their people for 
their own political security. Donors will give them that security in 
exchange for policies that make donors more secure too by improving the 
welfare of their own constituents. 
—The Dictator’s Handbook270 
Points of intervention are specific places in a system where a targeted 
action can effectively interrupt the functioning of a system and open the 
way to change. By understanding these different points, organizers can 
develop a strategy that identifies the best places to intervene in order to 
have the greatest impact.  
—Patrick Reinsborough, Beautiful Trouble, A Toolbox for Revolution271 
 
UCLA management professor Richard Rumelt writes in The Perils of Bad 
Strategy that good strategy focuses energy and resources on the judicious selection of one 
or very few important objectives, rather than on “a scrambled mess of things to 
accomplish, a dogs dinner of goals.”272 A good strategist, he argues, selects only a few 
objectives that are reachable with existing resources and competencies.273 With this 
principle in mind, this thesis proposes a number of strategies. These are designed to 
confront the seven leverage points of SIA smuggling networks described earlier. As well, 
the recommended strategies also consider numerous other revelations taken from the 
court case analysis, such as other important operational commonalities, SIA smugglers’ 
operational security habits and the successful law enforcement efforts to date. The idea is 
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to disrupt SIA smuggling networks at minimal investment and to deter them from re-
forming so that they deliver fewer higher-risk migrants to the United States. 
A caveat about intervening in leverage points is appropriate at this juncture. This 
thesis assumes that long-distance human smuggling networks are complex systems with 
leverage points, where a small shift in one variable can produce significant, outsized 
results. If American homeland security policy makers hope to one day more aggressively 
target these networks, they should understand that doing so may be more art than science. 
The systems analysis researcher and author Donella Meadows warns that history is rife 
with instances in which effort was applied to identified system leverage points in the 
wrong ways at the wrong times, worsening problems.274 It bears noting that social 
systems, like biological systems, can morph into new, unpredictable structures and 
behaviors at any moment in response to threats.275 The higher the leverage point, the 
more the system will resist change. Meadows continues: 
Leverage points are not intuitive. Or if they are, we intuitively use them 
backward, systematically worsening whatever problems we are trying to 
solve. The systems analysts I know have come up with no quick or easy 
formulas for finding leverage points. When we study a system, we usually 
learn where leverage points are. But a new system we’ve never 
encountered? Well, our counterintuitions aren’t that well developed. Give 
us a few months or years and we’ll figure it out. And we know from bitter 
experience that, because of counterintuitiveness, when we do discover the 
system’s leverage points, hardly anybody will believe us. 
With this caveat in mind, recommended disruption and prevention strategies are 
presented in two distinct tiers. The first involves a robust targeted diplomacy in 
conjunction with sharp, dedicated increases in foreign security aid to achieve specific 
initiatives in six Latin American countries. The second involves enhancing existing 
intelligence collection and law enforcement operations to target identified points of 
interest in Latin America, source countries of interest, and in the United States. 
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A. FOREIGN SECURITY ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT AID, AND 
ASSERTIVE DIPLOMACY 
Any strategy to achieve U.S. security objectives in foreign countries is contingent 
on a key component: friendly governments’ willingness to cooperate and follow through. 
DOJ press releases announcing SIA smuggler arrests and major case developments often 
credited Latin American police forces and governments in playing significant or 
supporting roles, suggesting some degree of successful bilateral collaborations. In a 
Brookings Institute analysis investigating how the United States should apply Israel’s 
extensive counterterrorism experience, Dicter and Byman write that, after 9/11, America 
realized that effective local partners were vital to successful counterterrorism efforts 
because, “not only does the United States lack both the capacity and the desire to be 
omnipresent, but local partners bring capabilities, knowledge and a degree of political 
acceptability to their counterterrorism efforts that a foreign country cannot possess.” 276 
But achieving such cooperation is never a fait accompli. Governments in Latin America 
are expected to resist expanding the programs recommended in this chapter; they will 
also resist shifting their own limited local resources to priorities that primarily serve 
American interests. To help secure the expanded commitments necessary, the United 
States should establish or substantially increase security assistance, humanitarian 
development aid, and training program packages to the six key transit countries, Ecuador, 
Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico. New program-specific U.S. 
infusions of money, equipment, technical assistance, and training would be tied to local 
government progress that will:  
(1) End catch, rest, and release policies in Panama and Mexico and fund the 
establishment of deportation processes and capabilities such as repatriation 
flights that would remove SIAs to their home countries. 
Funding would enable expansion of the legal system capacity and bed space 
needed to support deportation processes. This strategy would reverse catch-rest-release 
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policies in Mexico and Panama, freeing apprehended migrants to continue on to the U.S. 
border, which appreciative SIA smugglers have incorporated into their business models. 
Such a strategy is not without precedence. The Schengen Area countries in Europe and 
Australia, for instance, facing significantly increased migrant flows, recently provided 
supporting security aid and infrastructure that allows transit countries to detain and deport 
apprehended aliens from the Middle East and North Africa before they can “land” and 
claim asylum. It so happens that citizens of countries of interest listed by the U.S. also are 
singled out in Europe to undergo special security screening and visa limitations to visit or 
transit the Schengen zone by air or other means.277 The result is that thousands from 
high-risk countries are mixed with migrants from low-risk countries attempting illegal 
entry, in the same manner that Mexican migrants can obscure SIA migrants.278  
European governments have achieved repatriation agreements with key source 
and transit countries such as Turkey, Greece and Morocco, and have been funding the 
return of locally apprehended migrants to home countries. Other projects are designed 
enhance border controls through the training of immigration personnel and transfers of 
technical and financial assistance.279 For instance, the EU has provided millions of euros 
in foreign aid to Libya for detention camps, equipment, and training, prompting local 
governments to combat illegal migration at the point of departure.280 Although such aid’s 
success has yielded mixed reviews, EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos recently 
called such cooperation “a cornerstone of the Commission’s strategy to fight smuggling,” 
noting that Turkish authorities had moved quickly to adapt counter-migration strategies 
with EU assistance and diplomacy.281 
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A similar U.S. strategy with Mexico and Panama contemplates the logic that SIA 
migrants, because their financial investment can reach tens of thousands of dollars, 
should be even more sensitive to high-consequence deterrence strategies such as long-
term detention and deportation they would find in Panama or Mexico. 
(2) Fund the creation or expansion of corruption-vetted mobile customs and 
border patrol units substantially dedicated to seeking out SIAs in currently 
unpatrolled bottleneck regions. 
This interdiction and deterrence strategy contemplates implementation in all six 
identified countries to address internal leverage-point circumstances. The prioritized 
countries, however, should be Colombia, Panama, and Guatemala—the main land bridges 
linking South America to Mexico. These new customs and border patrol units, carefully 
shielded from corruption, quickly shift deployment in remote regions, as guided by 
intelligence, when smugglers’ routes shift to avoid intervention. Vetted units would be 
shielded from such influences and operate independently of the main corps. 
Again, the concept of U.S.-backed vetted military and police units is not without 
precedent in Latin America. The concept for U.S.-backed military and police units, vetted 
for corruption, has much precedent in Colombia and in Mexico, where they are deployed 
in joint counter-drug trafficking operations. Since 2000, American security assistance 
investments of many kinds have amounted to well over $12 billion, almost all of it going 
to help Colombia (Plan Colombia, et. al.) and Mexico (The Merida Initiative et. al.) to 
suppress drug trafficking, rather than national security-related human smuggling.282 In 
return, those governments have allowed significant numbers of U.S. counter-drug 
personnel to work in their territories, help created law enforcement units ostensibly vetted 
of corruption to target drugs and anti-government cartels and militias. 
 SIAs apprehended by the new such units would be subject to detention and 
deportation to home countries. In Guatemala, human smuggling organizations have 
corruptly co-opted northern and southern border control, creating what has been 
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described as a human smuggling superhighway—an obvious leverage point for law 
enforcement intervention. Under-resourced federal police in Colombia largely ignore 
migratory routes through its borders with Central America. Guatemala has struggled with 
systemic corruption in its border guard and customs cadres, due to the size and influence 
of smuggling industries in the country. The vetted unit program also should similarly 
expand to any of the other five identified transit countries as resources and bilateral 
relations allow.    
(3) Increase the number of American counter-smuggling investigators from 
conventional law enforcement agencies, with special attention on 
supplementing the ranks of ICE agents, who are deployed to attaché 
offices in the key transit countries to target kingpin smugglers. 
Policy leaders should ensure that investigators substantially prioritize SIA 
smugglers and terrorist travelers and are not diverted to drug trafficking cases, as past 
GAO reporting has noted. This strategy targets kingpin smugglers as organizational 
leverage points, knowing that their specialized capabilities and skills are not easily or 
quickly replaced and that they can be turned against one another. In addition to an 
infusion of more agents, some of those already deployed should be repositioned from 
counter-drug to counter-human smuggling investigations. Although the FBI, CIA, CBP 
and other primarily domestic law enforcement agencies are represented throughout the 
American attaché office network, policy leaders should consider significantly adding to 
the ranks of the 240 ICE investigators reportedly deployed abroad as of 2014 since they 
are specifically empowered and trained to enforce the nation’s immigration laws. 
U.S. investigators stationed in attaché offices would use conventional law 
enforcement case development techniques to track kingpins and all potential smuggling 
hierarchies in order to identify potential successors, and maintain investigative pressure 
on them all. This system would also benefit from signals intelligence and other regional 
intelligence agency reporting. This whole-of-investigation effort should expand on the 
understanding of SIA smuggling structures initially provided in this thesis—their 
architecture of inner and outer circles and their fundamental leadership characteristics. 
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Understanding network players’ roles—preferably, in real time—can inform 
targeting and source development that leads to elusive kingpins. For example, 
investigators who need to assess the relative loyalty of a captured organization operative 
would need to understand whether he belongs to the inner circle, outer circle, or is an 
indigenous partner whose loyalties would be considered fragile. 
(4) Establish an Immigration Liaison Officer (ILO) program—a corps of 
intelligence collectors to be stationed inside both U.S. embassies and local 
country law enforcement offices in origin and transit countries in Latin 
America but also in the key air transit hubs of South Africa, and the Gulf 
States of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. 
This corps would bolster and complement the tactical work being done by 
counter-smuggling investigators and ensure validity of intelligence provided by local 
police. Its focus would be to collect information from local sources on modus operandi 
and routes used by SIA smugglers, analyze it for actionable intelligence, and ensure it is 
shared with U.S. investigators and the intelligence community. One key target area, for 
instance, might be Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, which emerged from the 
data as important air hubs for North Africans and South Asians transiting to Latin 
America. ILOs also should be stationed in Gulf State air hubs such as Dubai, which also 
figured often in SIA smuggling, as well as elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and perhaps in 
Cuba once diplomatic relations with the United States have stabilized enough for such 
collaboration.   
This concept would be modeled after a 2004 program the Schengen countries 
began expanding in 2014, as the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war sent greater 
numbers of migrants toward European borders. The European ILO program’s numbers of 
immigration officers were increased, and their officers required to develop their own 
human intelligence sources; this was intended to enable them to build networks of 
confidential informants feeding them raw, real-time information about local human 
smuggling operators, local criminal groups aiding the smuggling, and means of 
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transportation.283 They also collect field intelligence through other methods, such as 
interviewing transiting or apprehended migrants in those host countries, which has been 
shown in this analysis to be a primary source of high-value intelligence on smuggling.284 
(5) With the involvement of American partners, local governments of 
Ecuador, Brazil, and Guatemala should be pressured to establish their own 
robust informant recruitment programs targeting expatriate communities, 
hotel complexes, and cultural locations around which SIA smuggling is 
facilitated. 
Expatriate immigrant communities in Latin American, as well as local hotels in 
proximity to them, are known for staging. As such, they are rich, untapped potential 
sources of intelligence on local smuggling, as well as on traveling and indigenous violent 
extremists, corrupt border guards, and airport officials. 
(6) Invest in retraining and increasing staff in the U.S. Citizen and 
Immigration Service (USCIS) asylum officer corps so that its agents  can 
be better equipped to extract intelligence information and leads from SIA 
asylum seekers who reach the U.S. border, as well as to help detect asylum 
fraud. 
As discussed, SIA migrants often count on attaining American asylum as the 
primary means by which to secure their substantial, often once-in-a-lifetime smuggling 
investment; success portends eventual U.S. citizenship while failure means deportation 
and loss of the investment. For the smugglers, word of their clients’ asylum success 
travels fast to home countries, inspiring more to hire the smuggler and ensure business 
continuity. These high stakes for both smuggler and migrant client have prompted both to 
resort to deliberate asylum fraud schemes, while government reporting indicates that 
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USCIS officers and other components of the system too often have proven ineffective at 
detecting such fraud. The separate asylum fraud prosecutions of Dhakane and Fidse, who 
had deep ties to Islamic terrorist groups in Somali, underscore the potential threat of 
leaving the asylum gate unchecked. This recommended initiative acknowledges that 
USCIS officers have been unable to detect large-scale asylum fraud and that significant 
investment should be made to improve that capability. But it also acknowledges that the 
USCIS asylum officer cadre has unique access to a category of asylum seekers, which 
this thesis has shown to be a highly rich source of intelligence information about 
smuggling facilitators, routes and modus operandi. USCIS officers should retrained, their 
numbers substantially increased, and additionally equipped so that they may be required 
to capture intelligence information that otherwise may never be collected. Intelligence 
information should then be regimentally shared with foreign-based ICE investigators and 
liaison officers. 
(7) Use state and local law enforcement agencies associated with fusion 
centers in U.S. states that border Mexico to interview apprehended special 
interest aliens who are detained in their jurisdictions, and provide the 
resulting reports to federal partners for analysis and use in international 
investigations. 
The degree to which federal law enforcement officers interview apprehended 
SIAs is not addressed in this thesis. But since 9/11, local policing authorities have been 
designated as partners in many counterterrorism efforts, often through fusion centers 
where agencies are purposefully housed together to enhance better sharing and 
collaboration. Such law enforcement officers are often vetted, trained, and have federal 
security clearances. To the extent that federal authorities, to include border patrol, ICE, 
and the FBI agents, are unable to interview all apprehended SIAs while they are in 
detention, local law enforcement resources can and should be exploited to assist in 
broadening this coverage on grounds that SIA have so often proven to be among the most 
prolific sources of actionable intelligence about their smugglers.   
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B. DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN 
Smartly applying security assistance and development aid should provide some 
incentive for local governments to cooperate in bilateral law enforcement initiatives. But 
a muscular diplomatic initiative should accompany this aid to further leverage 
cooperation at other, potentially more sensitive SIA smuggling leverage points. Muscular 
diplomacy in conjunction with aid should be used to leverage the internal political will to 
cooperate with strategic needs that largely defy unilateral U.S. action.  
(1) Ensure that the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Ecuador (and 
Cuba, once full diplomatic relations are restored) more robustly monitor, 
vet, audit, and investigate for corrupt practices within foreign service 
staffs stationed in consulate offices and embassies in countries of interest. 
This strategy would confront an important leverage point: corrupt or inadequate 
visa and passport issuance from consulates, which enable ease of SIA travel. The strategy 
would rely on integrity reinforced by covert intelligence collection operations described 
in the “Intelligence Operations” section to come. This effort should be included as part of 
a broader strategy; there is some indication that American pressure has worked in the past 
to ensure integrity inside the diplomatic missions of other nations. As mentioned, it was 
reportedly under American pressure that a Mexican honorary consul based in Jordan was 
fired in 2004 for illegally selling visas, and that his replacement underwent extensive 
background checks. Also, Cuba reportedly fired two of its embassy employees in Kenya 
after American authorities brought to their attention that they were selling visas to the 
American smuggler Joseph Anthony Tracy, who then resold them to U.S.-bound Somalis. 
Other empirical evidence points to a Central and South American desire to have 
American aid, and to not lose it once gained, making leaders vulnerable to U.S. 
diplomatic pressure. A case in point was Ecuador after 2011. Researcher Luisa Freier 
reported that aggressive U.S. diplomacy and threats to withdraw millions in aid had 
forced senior government leaders to backtrack on a controversial policy that would allow 
visa-free entry into the country to all newcomers.285 The visa-free policy immediately 
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sparked a rush of human smuggling activity from countries of interest, causing alarm in 
American national security circles, Freier wrote. Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa told 
Freier that the U.S., concerned about a spike in SIA migration from Ecuador to the 
American southwestern border, leveraged its financial support to successfully “coerce” 
wholesale changes to Ecuador’s immigration policies.  
(2) Establish an expectation that local governments, to the extent their 
capacities allow, turn their intelligence collection activity toward terrorist 
travelers and SIA smuggling kingpins, as well as Islamic extremists and 
criminals residing in ethno-national expatriate enclaves. 
Local intelligence services should be asked to provide information about 
employees and diplomats in foreign consulates. American diplomacy should 
communication that local intelligence services must share more quality information about 
these subjects with American intelligence services than they have previously.  
(3) Alert American investigators about all SIA detentions and grant access to 
any detainee for intelligence collection purposes. 
This strategy speaks to support pursuit of kingpin smugglers, potential successors, 
and SIA facilitators that American law enforcement can investigate and arrest. 
Cultivating apprehended migrants as sources of information about kingpins would exploit 
the finding in this thesis that SIA migrants have been among the most prolific 
information sources and have frequently been willing to work with investigators and 
prosecutors. 
(4) Facilitate and expedite American requests to extradite kingpin smugglers 
to the United States for jailing and prosecution, rather than allowing them 
to be processed through local legal systems. 
Numerous studies, assessments and news reports about criminal judicial systems 
in Latin America over the years have found significant dysfunction related to post-
transition from dictatorships to democracies. A 2006 Center for Strategic and 
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International Studies report, for instance, found poorly functioning systems in Argentina, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela that lacked transparency and independence 
from political leaderships.286 In 2014, trust in the criminal-justice systems of Latin 
America remained very low; majorities of the population in almost every country in the 
region still had little or no faith in it.287 A number of the 19 court prosecutions involved 
joint bilateral criminal investigations but not local prosecutions; the DOJ has successfully 
sought extraditions instead. If the volume of such investigations increases due to higher 
focus on SIA smuggling, then DOJ should continue to seek extraditions to the United 
States to produce additional intelligence on others but also to serve as a deterrent.  
C. U.S. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS: NETWORK 
WARFARE 
Generally, American border security strategy already has recognized the need for 
a “transnational” approach to counterterrorism efforts in its border security policies. In 
the years after 9/11, American border security extended beyond the physical frontier and 
deep into other nations and continents, and involved deep integration with intelligence 
services.288 But opportunities remain for more dedicated, expanded, and improved 
intelligence collection, should such a need be determined before or after an emergency.  
Sims suggests American intelligence services, whenever possible, need to team 
with counterparts in foreign nations, by diplomatic coercion if necessary because the 
ability of the U.S. government to protect its homeland depends critically on “the ability of 
foreign governments to stop terrorists traveling or resting in theirs.”289 Sims continues, 
however, by noting that intelligence agencies should act unilaterally when cooperation is 
unavailing, with “covert…paramilitary operations…and cross-border operations in 
pursuit of terrorist or criminal adversaries.” Sims calls this strategy “network warfare,” in 
which small teams of intelligence operatives move quickly to collect information 
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enabling preemptive diplomacy, coercion and decisive strikes. In short, she argues that 
the American intelligence corps should behave as “a transnational network itself, flushing 
transnational adversaries from their sleeper status by stimulating them to act and thus 
reveal themselves.”290  
American intelligence agencies should focus in this way on SIA smuggling both 
at home and abroad. Collection operations are the most appropriate method to target 
some of the seven identified intervention points, to include opportunities in 
diplomatically estranged countries that will not cooperate. Such methods also should be 
used to access communications and money transfer methods. Other strategies related to 
intelligence collection that should be considered include:  
1. Deploying CIA officers to diplomatically estranged SIA transit countries, 
or repurposing those already stationed to develop human source networks 
capable of reporting about SIA smuggling and terrorist travelers. This 
strategy speaks to an intervention chokepoint where smugglers take 
advantage of absent U.S. law enforcement inside diplomatically hostile or 
uncooperative states. SIA travel often has depended on such relations to 
enjoy relatively free operational reign in Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia.  
2. Deploying CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency officers to develop 
human source networks and exploit all available technologies, in order to 
provide information about potentially corrupt foreign consulate offices in 
countries of interest that provide visas and passports. These efforts should 
focus particularly on the consulate offices in Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, 
Bolivia, and Venezuela, and in in the Middle East, India, Russia, and 
Singapore. Intelligence officers should develop human sources in ethno-
national enclaves in Latin America that help facilitate SIA smuggling. 
Although unilateral in nature, the strategy would reinforce and 
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complement the diplomatic pressure campaign on these governments to 
self-police. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Nicholas Winton, the British subject credited with saving 669 Jewish children 
from the Holocaust, did so by forging their travel documents and transporting them out of 
Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia over nine months in 1939.291 Winton had been forced to 
resort to theft, bribery, blackmail, and the forging their exit visas to mask the origin of the 
children because foreign governments, including the United States, had refused to 
provide timely asylum or legal entry to the children.292 Winton was never prosecuted for 
human smuggling or asylum fraud; rather, in 2002, Queen Elizabeth knighted him for his 
deeds, and he has since been lionized as a humanitarian hero in films and books. As 
mentioned, Christopher Rudolph argued that security from terrorist travelers requires 
border enforcement policies that increase the visibility of mobile asylum seekers so that 
malevolent migrants can be identified and separated from the benevolent.293 The events 
surrounding the 1939 smuggling of the 669 children should serve as a reminder to current 
American homeland security leaders that any initiative to bring greater visibility to ultra-
distance human smuggling–to catch or deter terrorist traveler migrants among their 
clientele—should be balanced by a conscious discernment of motives, in humanitarian 
consideration of non-terrorists in authentic need of sanctuary, as were Winton’s 669 
children. Taking this care would be in line with other core U.S. values, many explicitly 
embodied in asylum law requiring sanctuary for those persecuted on social, political, or 
religious grounds.  
The Nicholas Winton caveat seems appropriate for a thesis with a primary 
objective of providing knowledge to assist U.S. law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies to “defend forward” against the organized smuggling of Special Interest Aliens 
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from 35 mostly Islamic countries—the only kind of migrant regarded in law and policy as 
terrorism-related national security threats to the United States. SIA smuggling networks 
qualify as the “dark networks” described by counterinsurgency scholar Sean Everton294 
and which thrive in spaces that Naim characterizes as “geopolitical black holes.”295 This 
thesis sought to shine light on them and provide the beginnings of a common baseline 
comprehension about them. It identified the likeliest organizational leverage points where 
directed U.S. intervention resources and energy might cause maximum disruption. It did 
so, to an extent, and recommended intervention strategies tailored to exploit the leverage 
points, with the caveat that these can shift out of sight and re-form elsewhere. Despite 
their ability to defy American disruption efforts since 9/11, and their rare ability among 
human smuggling organizations to move paying clients vast distances, these 
organizational “ultra-marathoners” are surprisingly absent in academic literature on 
human migration. They go unrecognized in studies about the illicit global economy 
boom, too. Yet even if their unique, globe-spanning capabilities escape attention, their 
status as targeted national security threats at the least make them worth knowing. This 
thesis aspired to raise awareness that they exist and are worth studying. 
Some of the general findings in this thesis were unsurprising, though usefully 
confirmed. For instance, quantitative analysis of 19 U.S. prosecutions demonstrated that 
SIA smuggling tended to follow geopolitical paths of least resistance, as do most dark 
networks. Like water running downhill, smugglers avoided obstacles and sought out 
weaknesses in routing their travel through various countries. The research, however, led 
to some unexpected discoveries in darker crevices. For instance, SIA smuggling networks 
have found crucial sustenance in the visas obtained from obscure diplomatic outposts that 
Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Bolivia, and Cuba maintain in the Middle East, Africa, and 
Asia. Smugglers especially sought visas from countries estranged from the United States, 
which wields little influence on those host countries to address the objectionable activity. 
Also unanticipated was the extent to which food, shelter, and medical attention 
from governments in Panama and Mexico had become integral to smuggling 
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enterprises—policies that can be ended and replaced with something deterrence-oriented. 
The practice of catching, reinvigorating, and releasing SIAs—with legal papers—to 
continue to the American southwestern border welcomed rather than deterred smugglers. 
Another discovery was the reliance of SIAs and their smugglers on merely the 
promise of accessing the American asylum system. Making a U.S. asylum claim upon 
reaching the border was so important to smuggling recruitment, success and preservation 
as a viable business, that premeditated asylum fraud figured too often as part of fee 
packages. A number of terrorism-associated SIAs were caught defrauding a system that 
government reports say is rife with exploitable vulnerabilities. But asylum system 
integrity and vetting too can be improved to separate the malevolent from the benevolent. 
Improvements can start with awareness among policy leaders about American asylum’s 
criticality to SIA smuggling and that political will is necessary to increase investments in 
asylum system personnel, fraud detection training, and intelligence collection. 
Lastly, this thesis was able to trace the contours of the rarely seen conflict 
between SIA smugglers and law enforcement in distant lands. Rendering this conflict 
more visible as it has actually played out can powerfully inform future strategic choices, 
perhaps in unanticipated ways. The data revealed smuggler evasion and operational 
security methods, and some American law enforcement tactics that obviously worked, 
albeit not necessarily from an overarching strategic plan based on strength of knowledge. 
Such a strategic understanding of this dynamic cat and mouse game, when viewed along 
with network architecture, key behavioral traits of smugglers and likely leverage points, 
should provide a starting place for American leaders who want to build better strategies. 
This thesis also left much unsaid—future researchers should build upon the 
geopolitical and systems theory ideas presented in this framework in the context of ultra-
distance human smuggling networks. For example, this thesis indicates a lower resilience 
for disrupted SIA smuggling. But ultimately, the collected data was insufficient to 
determine the extent to and speed at which arrested SIA smuggling kingpins are replaced, 
and their disrupted operations restored. Knowing the time required for successor kingpins 
and their organizations to reconstitute, and how, can inform the pace and intensity of any 
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enforcement activity, such as which individuals to target next and what kind of 
intelligence to collect. 
Furthermore, the data was insufficient to establish when market demand for SIA 
smuggling services reaches the threshold necessary to support new enterprises and 
sustain older ones. There was some indication in the data that smugglers rushed in to 
exploit the consequences of specific geopolitical events, such as when the American war 
in Iraq was producing refugees or when Ecuador eliminated its entry visa requirements. 
The reasonable assumption here is that, with study of this issue, U.S. strategists may 
predict the rise of new SIA smuggling enterprises—and confront their formation—if they 
can know how geopolitical events, such as famine or eruptions of political chaos, create 
or influence smuggling markets.   
The court cases studied for this thesis also provided too little insight about 
parochial, indigenous Latin American smuggling networks that partner with SIA 
smugglers. The court records frequently referenced the use of such local networks, but 
rarely provided details about them (such as whether they were connected to notorious 
regional drug-smuggling cartels, their attitudes toward moving Muslim SIAs, how SIA 
smugglers might have bridged cultural differences with them). Focused research on the 
indigenous smugglers who partner with SIA smugglers could empirically address a 
nagging—and often politically consequential—publicly stated concern: that drug cartels 
have worked in concert with terrorist organizations to move operatives over the U.S. 
border. Research also could produce useful knowledge of other links, nodes and cultural 
differences about these indigenous partners that could be manipulated for law 
enforcement purposes.  
One other limitation of this thesis worth noting is its dearth of detail about the 
roles that American law enforcement and the intelligence services play in SIA detection. 
The consequence of this knowledge gap is that any critique accompanied by calls for 
strategy reform can range from irrelevant to highly applicable, depending on whether 
programs and activities of U.S. agencies exist or don’t exist, or if they do whether they 
work. Little of this information is publicly knowable. The strategy recommendations in 
this thesis are offered with this void in mind. 
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As a parting thought, this thesis is predicated on the notion that American security 
leaders would find it useful to inform new strategies that might be required as a reaction 
to an SIA migrant-related terror attack, or peremptorily. However, the many instances 
that surfaced serendipitously during research—in which SIA migrants were connected to 
terrorist activities, or their smugglers thought they were terrorists—argues for preemptory 
rather than reactive planning and action. Some psychology of crisis decision-making 
literature shows that leaders throughout history have implemented policy reactively and 
that this was less than ideal for the public welfare.296 No known terrorist plot connected 
to an illegal SIA border crossing has been been publicly identified since 9/11,297 and an 
assessment of the terror threat from SIAs was beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, the research effort uncovered a surprising number of terrorism 
reference points associated with SIAs and their smugglers. Among these were: the 
Somali SIA Omar Fidse’s substantial reported involvement with al-Shabaab; the Somali 
smuggler Ahmad Dhakani’s personal associations with AIAI senior leadership, as a 
guerilla fighter, and his confession that he had knowingly smuggled into the United 
States numerous extremists; the American smuggling facilitator Anthony Joseph Tracy’s 
acknowledgement that he was in communication with al-Shabaab leaders and also helped 
Somali extremists enter the United States; the Lebanese smuggler Salim Boughader 
Mucharrafille’s operation that purportedly moved Hezbollah and Hamas agents over the 
Mexico-California border; the illegal entry over the Arizona border of two purported 
Bangladeshi members of a designated terrorist organization; and the Pakistani smuggler 
Ul-Haq’s willingness to transport into the United States individuals he believed were 
blacklisted Pakistani terrorists. An internal Texas Department of Public Safety report, 
obtained and published by The Houston Chronicle, listed additional references in which, 
for instance, a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam member was caught at the California-
Mexico border in 2012, a Somali national caught in 2011 at the California border who 
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was on multiple U.S. terrorism watch lists, and another Somali apprehended in Texas 
who claimed he was trained to be a suicide bomber. 298 
Together with any that reside behind a classified firewall, these publicly findable 
instances of SIA-connected terrorism associations justify a conversation about whether 
preemptive investments in a more robust SIA interdiction strategy—albeit one imbued 
with humane discernment for migrants legitimately in need of sanctuary—is more 
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SUPPLEMENTAL.  COURT CASE FILES 
Five pre-2004 court cases analyzed for this research were not entirely available on 
PACER: United States v. Ashraf Ahmed Abdallah, United States v. Mehrzad Arbane, 
United States v. Mohammad Assadi, United States v. Mehar Jarad, and United States v. 
Nancy Zaia. Court documents related to these cases were acquired directly from U.S. 
Attorney’s offices in 2007, during related research. 
For a copy of these case files, contact the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. 
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